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Abstract
This work investigates the semantics-pragmatics and syntax-pragmatics interface of interrogatives,
focusing on the effect of presupposition-triggering expressions like even and Negative Polarity Items
(NPIs). In exploring these cases, I aim is to contribute new empirical evidence and theoretical insight
pertinent to the general issue of how presuppositions project in interrogative environments.
Although the phenomenon of presuppositions has received considerable attention in previous work, very
little is undeirstood about how precisely presuppositions project in the domain of questions. My main goal
is to establish what processes generate presuppositions in questions, starting from what we know about
the semantics of questions and about the contribution of expressiol:s introducing presuppositions in
declaratives.
The strategy I pursue in this investigation consists in looking at cases where presuppositional material
affects the interpretation of a question in ways that go beyond the mere introduction of a presupposition.
Even and certain NPIs (so called 'minimizers') provide a rich and constrained testing ground in this
sense, as they can be exploited to signal that a questioning act is meant to be biased towards a negative
answer. This thesis argues that this otherwise puzzling property of questions with minimizers and even
can be understood as a product of (i) the way the presuppositions of even project in a question and affect
the question denotation; and (ii) the way general pragmatic principles governing what it means to ask a
question regulate how the resulting denotation can be used by speakers in a given context.
More specifically I show that the anomalous properties of biased questions with even are the
product of the presuppositions even introduces in their possible answers and the felicity of these answers
in a given context. The general conclusion this result allows me to draw is that a theory of projection in
questions must reduce their presuppositions to answerability conditions of a question in a context.
The theory of bias and presuppositions of questions developed in this thesis leads to a number of
interesting implications regarding on the one hand even and its variants across languages and, on the
other hand, the semantics and syntax of constituent questions.
Thesis Supervisor: Irene Heim
Title: Professor of Linguistics
Acknowledgments
There is no way I can even imagine having reached the completion of my graduate studies at MIT
and of this dissertation in particular if it wasn't for the generous help I received from the people I
will mention here. Their stimulating advice, support and friendship have made the entire
experience of writing this thesis not only endurable but also often very pleasant and exiting.
First among all, I wish to thank the four members of my thesis committee: Irene Heim, Kai von
Fintel Danny Fox and Utpal Lahiri.
Irene and Kai definitely made the deepest intellectual impact on my Graduate education
ever since, back in my first year at MIT, I took their Introduction to Semantics class. Irene and
Kai have been since then the most terrific teachers I have ever met. Their classes have been for
me the most interesting, clear and engaging; the appointments with them the most fruitful. Both
of them always had an extraordinary capacity to see through the most confused expositions of my
ideas and helped me see how to develop them more explicitly and precisely, how to test their
soundness, how evaluate their implications and how to convey them clearly, honestly and yet
convincingly. Over these years, their advice has always been the most helpful and precious at
every single stage of my work and their support the most encouraging.
I owe an enormous debt of gratitude to Irene for having been an incredibly generous
advisor for the entire duration of my graduate studies at MIT. I can hardly start enumerating the
reasons why I feel so extremely fortunate and privileged to be her student. Irene never missed an
opportunity to find for me a word of encouragement. The sharp, careful, precise and extremely
detailed comments on my research I received from her and her fair evaluation of my ideas have
always been a fundamental source of motivation and help for improving my work and my
teaching in every single respect. What Irene taught me goes well beyond formal semantics or
even linguistics for that matter. Her incredible commitment to teaching, her loyalty to the field
and to the scientific enterprise, her honesty, generosity, fairness and respect towards students and
colleges will always be a model for me. I am happy to know that people like her exist, in this
field and in general.
I am very lucky that also Kai has been advising me ever since he was a member of my
generals papers committee. Like Irene, Kai never missed any of my practice conference and job
talks, read just about everything I wrote and in all these occasions he had tremendously
knowledgeable and insightful comments to offer. Talking to him helped me enormously to
improve my work, my teaching, my writing, my presentational skills and many times even my
mood. Kai also helped me see how important it is to be able to recognize and be confident in the
contribution of my own work and still receive comments and criticisms in the most positive and
constructive way. I am especially grateful to Kay for the incredible intellectual and emotional
support he provided me with during my job search and my thesis writing.
Utpal's writing on questions and on Negative Polarity has been the greatest source of
inspiration for this thesis. In the Spring of 2002, when Utpal was teaching here at MIT, I had the
fortune to talk to him about my thoughts on rhetorical questions and minimizers. I feel much
honored that he has been interested in my work since then and very glad that he accepted to be on
my thesis committee. Ever since, Utpal put at my disposal his incredible knowledge through his
careful comments.
I am very lucky I had the opportunity to work with Danny Fox. Danny has always understood the
gist of any of my ideas, located their contribution within a bigger picture, expressed intelligent
criticisms and asked me the hardest questions. Talking to Danny also often forced me seeing
things from perspectives I had not even imagined. While, at first, I found this exhausting and at
times demoralizing, I soon realized how helpful it was for clarifying and organizing my own
thoughts and my writing and for finding the courage, despite my own natural resistance to this, to
entertain more radical and unconventional hypotheses. Our discussions have probably
represented the most intellectually provoking and yet stimulating stages of this work.
A heart felt thank you to Gennaro Chierchia for eleven years of continuous encouragement,
precious advice and generous friendship. Gennaro introduced to me the world of Linguistics in
such a stimulating and exiting way to make it impossible for me to resist the temptation of
wishing to become myself a linguist one day. In addition, without Gennaro's trust in my work I
would probably not even dared to apply to the program. He made my intense and enriching
experience at MIT possible by patiently helping me even with the tedious intricacies of the
application process and by guiding me, yet without any pressure, in my decision to come to the
US. Since then he never deprived me of his friendly and helpful support.
I am tremendously grateful to Morris Halle for accepting to help me with my phonology and
morphology generals paper four years ago. Morris tried to patiently educate me, read an
uncountable number of drafts of my paper, helped me improving each single one of them and
supported my project with incredible enthusiasm. Each and every appointment with Morris gave
me a boost of motivation, encouragement and optimism (besides phonology, of course). During
nights like this one, very few things have kept me awake: A mug full of cold coffee, a smoking
ashtray and Morris command on my mind: "Elena, don't give up!". Even if what he taught me
didn't make it directly into this dissertation, if tomorrow this thesis is filed and I catch my flight
it is for a good part due Morris.
Various people, besides my thesis committee, helped me with this work on even in question over
the last two years.
What I learnt from Bernhard Schwarz about even and from Yael Sharvit about wh-
questions has been of great help; thanks to both of them for the time they spent sharing with me
their precious expertise in such complicated areas of semantics. Thanks also to Scott Shank for
talking to me about his exiting discoveries about Samish only. This work also benefited a lot
from occasional conversations with Rajesh Batt, David Beaver, Silvan Bormberger, Daniel
Biring, Gennaro Chierchia, Noam Chomsky, Sabine Iatridou, William Ladusaw, Roumyana
Pancheva, David Pesetsky, Norvin Richards, Yael Sharvit, and Barry Shein. My thanks also to
Michelle De Graff, Michael Kenstowitz, Shigeru Miyagawa, Wayne O'Neil and Cheryl Zoll.
I heard that some people prefer to be left alone when they work and that some others work hard
not to feel too lonely. I, myself, never knew how to live and work without my friends.
Among all, my first and deepest thanks go to my colleague, roommate, office mate and
dearest friend Jon Gajewski. Thanks for the long linguistics discussions, for listening to all my
practice talks and putting at my disposal your amazing linguistics knowledge and smart insight so
many times. Thanks for patiently proof reading just about all my papers, most of my handouts
and parts of this thesis and for the tantalizing amount of English judgments you gave me. Thanks
for all the books and papers you ever lent me, and for those I borrowed without asking. Thanks
for the dinners and the parties, for watching movies and Buffy with me, for our short walks in the
snow and our long chats in the kitchen. Thanks for being there for me and putting up with me in
the craziest occasions. Thanks for being the greatest colleague and the most pleasant and helpful
roommate. Above everything else, thanks for being the most wonderful friend, Jon. I wish you a
life full of happiness, love and success.
I feel very lucky to have been one of Ling '98 and have classmates like Cristina Cuervo, Jessie
Little Doe Fermino, Daniel Harbour, Shin Ishihara, Zhiqiang Li, Tatjana Marvin, Ora
Matushansky, Olga Vaysman, who all have been there for me in many ways since my very first
day of Graduate School. Special thanks to Crisitina and Tatjana for being such incredible and fun
friends and to Olga and Shin for being, in addition, my patient and supportive officemates for
three long years. All the best luck for your future.
Many, many thanks to my new friend Yael Sharvit. I already mentioned her name above, but I
want to mention her again among my friends. One day, back in November, when she asked me to
work together on a paper she created the occasion for what has become for me a very important
friendship. Hanging out with Yael has been always an incredibly pleasant, educating and fun
experience. I'd also like to thank her because she has been patient and understanding with me
beyond any stretch of imagination, when, too many times, I had to leave our project on the side;
and because her enthusiasm for semantics gave me the strength to keep up with my work an
uncountable amount of times.
A big thank you to my good friend from UMass Luis Alonso Ovalle for the fun time spent
together writing our paper and for his positive attitude and always encouraging words, to Diana
Cresti for having been an endless source of valuable advice, fun and Buffy episodes, to Ivano
Caponigro, Luisa Meroni and Andrea Gualmini for keeping me company with their friendly e-
mails and to Marco Nicolis also for keeping me smiling with his humoristic ones.
I am grateful also to all my previous and current roommates in the 'linguistics apartment': Rajesh
Batt, Aniko Csirmaz, Franny Hshiao, Meltem Kelepir, Cornelia Krause, Shogo Suzuki, Lisa
Matthewson, and Marchelo Ferreira.
I am very happy that I had the chance to meet and become friends with the 'ex-
lingfamily' as well. Jonathan Bobaljik, Susi Wourmbrand, Uli Sauerland, Kazuko Iatzushiro Kai
and Lina are amazing people. Thanks to all six of them for the very nice time together.
Thanks to all fellow students, visitors and friends I met in the department of Linguistics.
Especially I'd like to thank Calixto AgUiero-Bautista, Carlos Arregui, Bridget Copley, Michela
Ippolito, John Nissenbaum, Joey Sabbagh, Gianluca Storto, Michael Wagner. Thanks also to
Ling'01 for transforming my TAing obligation in such a pleasant experience.
Thanks to Jen Purdy, Mary Graham and Dan Giblin, who, back in the head quarters pulled the
administrative strings of the department and kept it always standing and in a good mood. Thanks
to Chris Naylor for rescuing my work from the flames of my fancy i-body in more than one
occasion.
If this acknowledgements will ever make it all the way to the other side of the Ocean, I want my
friends Chiara, Cinzia and Andrea Tettamanzi to know how grateful I am that, despite the
distance, they made me part of their lives and always made a big effort to keep being part of mine
as well.
My loving gratitude to the four strongest women I ever met: my grandmother Luigi, my sister
Maria, her little daughter 'la Tatina' and my mother. Thanks to my grandmother Luigi for having
always been my most supporting fan; to my sister for never missing the opportunity to express
encouragement, trust and love; and to ia Tatina for the happiness she brought in our lives.
My gratitude, admiration and love for my mother go far beyond what words can convey.
Despite how harsh life has been to her, she never, ever quit taking the best imaginable care of me
and the rest of our family for the last 16 years. I cannot even imagine how scary and miserable
life could have been if I had to grow up without your warm love, your ability to understand me
and to be close to me, your wisdom, your irony and without you reminding me to put things into
perspective. I would certainly not have survived the last 5 years without you being there to
remind me that there is much more than linguistics in my life.
My deepest love and gratitude belong without any doubt to Martin Hackl who has been my
mentor, my coach and my home for 4 years, 8 months and 2 days of my life. Behind his humble
and shy attitude, Martin hides the gist of a unique intelligence, a genuine curiosity for about
everything that falls under his eyes and an incredible talent for science, but most importantly the
most generous and true heart. Thank you Martin for holding my hand and guiding me through
every time it was dark, scary, painful and lonely; for always finding a way to make me smile; for
accepting, trusting and forgiving me; for having let me into your life. Getting to know has been a
rare privilege, being with you is the most precious gift I ever received.
Many people I know who wrote a dissertation tell me that when they started they would not dare
to believe they would ever finish. Many who haven't yet, tell me they think it is impossible for
them to even start. I belonged to both categories and I am sometimes still incredulous. This is
why I'd like to dedicate this thesis to my little niece Tatina. Her survival is what made me
believe in miracles.
Table of Contents
Abstract 3
Acknowledgements 4
Table of Contents 8
Chapter 1: Presupposit'on and Questions 11
1.1 Two Challenges for Truth-Conditional Perspectives on Meaning. 12
1.2 Logical Presuppositions and Partiality: Extending the Fregean Analysis 13
1.3 Pragmatic Presupposition, Context Set and the Bridge Principle 18
1.4 The Meaning of Questions: Answerhood Conditions 22
1.4.1 Questions as Sets of Propositions: Hamblin & Karttunen 23
1.4.2 Questions as Partitions: Groenendijk & Stokhof 27
1.4.3 Conclusions 33
1.5 (Logical) Presuppositions in Questions: Partiality and Answerability 33
1.5.1 The Facts 34
1.5.2 Felicity Conditions of Questions and Partiality 37
1.5.3 Answer and Question-based Presuppositions in H/K Questions 40
1.5.4 Answer Based and Question-based Presuppositions in G&S's Questions 44
1.5.5 Conclusions 48
1.6. Summary and Conclusions 49
Chapter 2: Even and Minimizers in y/n Questions: A case Study 51
2.1 Even 53
2.2 A Puzzle of NPIs in Question 59
2.2.1 Introduction 59
2.2.2 The Facts of NPIs in Questions 60
2.2.3 Why 'Even'? 63
2.2.4 The Second Puzzle of Questions with 'Even': 'Easy' Presuppositions 65
2.2.5 Interim Summary: Restating the Puzzle 67
2.3 A Solution in Terms of Scope 68
2.3.1 The Idea in a Nutshell 68
2.3.2 Scope Ambiguities of Questions with 'Even' 70
2.3.3 Presuppositions and Possible Answers in a Given Context: Bias Explained 77
2.3.4 The Unbiased Reading Explained 81
2.4 An Indirect Argument for the Scope Theory 83
2.5 On the Projection Problem 86
2.6 Ambiguity Theory vs. Scope Theory: An Overview of the Debate 91
2.6.1 Arguments against the Scope Theory: the Exceptional Scope of 'Even' 92
2.6.2 Wilkinson's arguments in Favor of The Scope Theory 102
2.6.3 Conclusions 106
2.7 More on Even: Likelihood, Universal Force and Existential Presupposition 106
2.7. 1. The Scales of 'Even' 107
2.7.2 The Quantificational Force of the Scalar Presupposition 108
2.7.3 The Existential Presupposition 110
Chapter 3: Even and Minimizers in Wh-Questions 117
3.1 The facts 119
3. 1.1 Minimizers in Wh-Questions 119
3.1.2 'Even' in Wh-Questions 121
3.2 The Problem of Accounting for 'Easy' Presuppositions in Wh-Questions 125
3.3 A Solution in Terms of Scope: Whether in Wh-Questions 129
3.3.1 'Whether' in Wh-questions 130
3.3.2 Scope Ambiguities of Wh-Questions with 'Whether' and 'Even' 132
3.3.3 Bias and Presuppositions Explained 135
3.3.4 Conclusions 139
3.4 Whether in Wh-Questions: Implications and Evidence 139
3.4.1 'Whether' in Wh-Questions: Evidence form Bulgarian 140
3.4.2 Wh-questions with and without 'Whether': Weak and Strong Exhaustivity 142
3.4.3 The Problem of Strongly Exhaustive 'De Dicto' Readings 150
3.5 Conclusions
Chapter 4: Even Across Languages and the Scope Theory 161
4.1 The Cognates of Even: Rooth (1985)'s and Rullmann's Argument 163
4.2 Why Scope: The Bias of Auch Nur in Questions 169
4.3 Cross-linguistic Motivations for a Compositional Analysis 171
4.4 A Lahirian Analysis: Easy Presupposition, NPIhood, Bias and Compositionality 172
4.4.1 Ambiguity of 'Nur' 172
4.4.2 The Exclusive Presupposition of Nur2: NPI Behavior and Bias Explained 180
4.4.3 Scalar Presuppsotion: Schwarz (2002) 189
4.5 Evidence for an Unspecified 'Only': Samish 197
4.5.1 Only in Strait Samish: Shank (2002, 2003) 199
4.5.2 Conclusions and Open Questions 204
4.6 N-words Meaning EvenNpl 204
4.7 Giannakidou (2003): Three Evens in Greek 215
4.8 Conclusions 223
Appendix 225
References 241
159
Chapter 1
Presuppositions and Questions
The aim of this work is to contribute new empirical evidence and theoretical insight pertinent to
the general issue of how presuppositions project in interrogative environments. An understanding
of the effects of presuppositions in questions is crucially contingent on an understanding of the
semantics and pragmatics of questions, on the one hand, and of those linguistic phenomena that
involve presuppositions on the other. This thesis does not attempt to provide an extensive review
and discussion of all that has been proposed in these two areas. Instead, some assumptions
regarding questions and presuppositions will be made and motivated on very general grounds to
provide a frame for the discussion of the empirical phenomena the thesis is concerned with.
In the first part of this chapter (sections 1.1-1.4), I introduce these assumptions partly
justifying my choices from the perspective of a truth-conditional view of meaning, and partly on
the basis of expository purposes. Further empirical motivation for the choices made here as
opposed to some of the alternative views on questions and presuppositions will come from
exploring the effects of presupposition in questions in the following chapters. When the occasion
presents itself, a more detailed comparison between the frameworks adopted here and others will
be provided.
In the second part of the chapter (section 1.5) I show that the theories of questions and of
presuppositions introduced in the first part narrow down the possible analyses of presupposition
projection in question to two types of approaches. For reason that will be clarified there I will
refer to them as Question-basedand Answer-basedApproach.
The chapter is structured as follows. We start by pointing out how both presuppositions and
interrogatives at first present a challenge to a compositional and truth-conditional view of
meaning. We then review what type of proposals have been made in order to provide an
understanding of these two aspects of natural language without giving up the main principles of
the truth-conditional approach. Finally I will indicate which of these proposals will be adopted in
the coming discussion on presuppositions in questions.
1.1 Two Challenges for Truth-Conditional Perspectives on Meaning
One of the main goals of the study of meaning in natural language is to come to an understanding
of how the meaning of expressions that a sentence contains contributes to what the whole
sentence conveys. One of the most influential and successful approaches is based on the Fregean
principle stating that the meaning of complex linguistic expressions is fully determined by the
meaning of their immediate parts and the way they are combined in the syntax (Principle of
Compositionality). This view has proven to be extremely insightful in that, together with an
explicit theory of syntax, it constrains in a principled way our working hypotheses concerning
the structural properties of complex expressions and syntactic operations that generate them, the
types of corresponding semantic operations and the types of the semantic objects we can attribute
to simple and complex expressions in all natural languages.
An important feature of most compositional approaches to meaning is the view that when
we understand what a sentence of natural language conveys, we are capable to judge how the
world should look like for the sentence to be true or false, i.e. we can understand its truth-
conditions, without being trained to judge the truth of that sentence in each possible situation
(see Larson&Segal 1995 Heim&Kratzer 1998 and Chicrchia&McConnell Ginet 2000 for
discussion). Within an approach to meaning that is both compositional and truth-conditional,
determining the meaning of single expressions boils down to establishing their systematic
contribution to the truth conditions of the sentences in which they can appear in the most general
way. Moreover, understanding how the meaning of bigger units is generated involves an
understanding of which modes of semantic composition correspond to syntactic operations
generating these units.
At least two types of considerations have challenged this view since its very origins in
Frege's work (cf. Frege 1891). The first challenge comes from the existence of types of
utterances other than declaratives. How could one maintain that the meaning of expressions is
their contribution to truth-conditions, when these same expressions obviously have the same
meaning in, for instance, interrogatives or exclamations, for which it seems to make no sense to
even ask whether they are true or false?
The second challenge was presented by the existence of expressions and constructions
that seem to somehow contribute to what a sentence conveys in ways that do not (only) affect its
truth-conditions in a fully compositional way. On the face of it, the existence of such expressions
undermines a truth-conditional theory of meaning as well as the principle of compositionality:
there seems to be more to the meaning of a sentence's components than their contribution to its
truth-conditions, and therefore more to the meaning of that sentence as a whole than its truth-
conditions. In addition, the latter non-truth-conditional aspects of a sentence's meaning emerge
in ways that are not completely compositional. Let's consider these two challenges in turn,
starting with the latter.
1.2 Logical Presuppositions and Partiality: Extending the Fregean Analysis
By studying meaning under a truth-conditional perspective, it became immediately clear that we
need to distinguish different components of what we think, intuitively, a sentence conveys (i.e.
truth-conditions, presuppositions and implicatures), because sometimes part of what seems to be
conveyed appears to somehow escape the Fregean principle. Notorious examples of expressions
whose contribution is not merely truth-conditional are definite determiners, predicates like quit,
fail, manage, focus particles like only, and syntactic configurations like it-clefts in English (see
Soames 1989, for a more exhaustive list of relevant expressions and constructions). Consider, as
an illustration, the case of the English predicate quit. The meaning of this predicate appears to
involve two components: one which interacts in a fully compositional way with the other
expressions in the sentence (e.g. negation) to determine its truth-conditions, another one that
does not:
(1) Mary has quit smoking = Mary used to smoke and she does not smoke right now'
(2) Mary hasn't quit smoking - Mary used to smoke and she does smoke right now
S=" can be read as "conveys."
The only difference between the two sentences (1) and (2) is the presence vs. absence of
negation. Assuming that negation has sentential scope and its meaning reverses truth-values.
Then, according to the principle of compositionality, we would expect (2) to be the negation of
everything that (1) conveys. It turns out that this is not the case: part of what (1) seems to convey
is, in fact, NOT negated but rather conveyed in (2) as well, i.e. that Mary used to smoke.
Furthermore, speakers of English share the intuition that in sentences like (1), this latter
component is actually not straightforwardly asserted but rather presented by the speaker as taken
for granted.
Similarly, Frege, contra Russell, argues that the existential and uniqueness component of
the meaning of definite descriptions is not part of the assertion, as they do not get negated in
negative sentences:
(3) a. The king of France is bald
b. The king of France isn't bald.
That there is a unique king of France is an information that is presented as taken for granted by
the speaker, rather than being part of the asserted proposition.
Expressions like even, as well, also, too (so called 'additive' focus particles) challenge a
truth-conditional view on meaning even more radically. This is so because these particles do not
seem to contribute to the truth-conditions at all, although speakers share the intuition that their
presence in a sentence makes a clear difference in what is conveyed. Let me illustrate this point
with an example containing even. Compare (4)a and (4)b. On the one hand, a speaker uttering
(4)a, but not (4)b, appears to also be committed to the truth of something like (6). On the other
hand, both linguists and philosophers (c.f. most notably Stalnaker 1974 and Karttunen&Peters
1979) have suggested that the contribution of even (e.g., (6) in our example) is not part of the
truth-conditions of the hosting sentence at all but is presented as background uncontroversial
information.
(4) a. Even Mary came to the party
b. Mary came to the party.
(5) truth-conditions: (4)a and (4)b are true iff Mary came to the party.
(6) There is somebody other than Mary that came to the party
Among all the relevant people Mary was the least likely to come.
Once it was established that there are clear cases of expressions whose semantic import is
not (only) truth-conditional, two questions emerged: What precisely is the nature of this import
and how we can maintain, against this apparent piece of counterevidence, that something like the
principle of compositionality FULLY determines the way meaning is expressed and interpreted
in natural language.
Frege's take regarding the first question (further elaborated in work by Strawson,
Karttunen, Gazdar and Stalnaker and many others) was already that there are at least two
components to what a sentence coveys: assertion and presuppositions. Understanding the
assertion amounts to the ability of determining what it takes for the sentence to be true or false
(our old truth-conditions); the presuppositions of a sentence are distinct from what is asserted in
that they are instead, conditions that must be satisfied in a given state of affairs for that sentence
to be attributed a denotation at all (as Frege has it) or conditions that must be satisfied in the
utterance context for the utterance of a sentence to be felicitous (cf. Austin 1962). 2
In addressing the second question, it's important to keep in mind that, although non-truth-
conditional, the import of at least some presupposition-triggers (such as e.g. even) is sensitive to
the (truth-conditional) meaning of the other elements in the sentence and to its structural
properties (scope relations and focus structure), in ways that invite a compositional treatment for
the contribution of this expressions as well (see Karttunen&Peters 1979, Rooth 1985). 3
Therefore, particles like even seem to teach us that sometimes compositionality extends beyond
the mere truth-conditional component of meanings, and, furthermore, that similar operations tlht
derive truth-conditions combine the import of such expressions with the truth-conditional
meaning of portions of the sentence that are in their scope and in their focus. Given this,
answering the questions above requires that our understanding of the nature of the import of
2 Stalnaker further clarifies the notion of felicity conditions with respect to a context and its relation with
definedness conditions in a world. This issue is addressed in section 1.3.
3 For example, if instead of Mary, even was associated with party, by intonational prominence of this word or by
structural contiguity to it, what the resulting sentence would imply would be very different from (5).
these words involves compositionality and even a systematic relation with the notion of truth-
conditions.
There is at least one approach to presuppositions (Logical Presuppositions) that places
this relation in the lexical meaning of the expressions that trigger presuppositions in a very
straightforward way. This approach finds its origins in Frege's semantics of definite determiners
(formally further developed in much work since then) according to which the connection
between truth-conditions and definedness conditions is transparently established by introducing
the possibility of partial (truth-conditional) meanings. The core insight of this type of analysis is
that the presuppositions imposed by definite determiners can be treated as definedness conditions
they impose on the derivability of truth-conditions of the hosting sentence. An explicit execution
of this idea can be given in form of the lexical entry in (7). 4
(7) [The] = p,,<e>: there is exactly one x E C such that p(x) = 1. the unique y E C s.t. f(y)=1
where C is a contextually salient subset of De. (H&K 1998, p.81)
Let us see how a partial meaning of this kind can help accounting for the above mentioned
presuppositions of sentences containing a definite. The first step towards this goal is to make
sure that the definedness conditions in the lexical entry above project so as to become
definedness conditions of the whole sentence. Heim&Kratzer's (1998) propose the semantic
composition rule of functional application (FA), given below, which is crafted for this very
purpose:
(8) FA: If a is a branching node and {13, y} is the set of its daughters then a is in the domain
of [[ ] iff 3 and y are in the domain of [[11] and [[J is in the domain of 1[31 or 1131 is in the
domain of [[y],
If defined, i[atl = f[Ii(lY i)D or fIa] = [y](f(i[31D (H&K 1998 p. 76)
4 The lexical entry in (7) above is sufficient for a treatment of Logical Presupposition in a purely extensional system.
When intensionality is added to the system the intension of a definite description should look as follows:
(i) lIThe king of France ] V= Xw: 3! x s.t. [)w'. Iking of France w" ] (w)=1 . tx s.t. Iking of France ]W (x) =1
Where a 10 is a function from object language expressions to their intension.
The way the partiality of this denotation ultimately expresses felicity conditions on the context of utterance will be
clarified in the next subsection.
In order to see how this analysis works consider the two sentences in (9).
(9) a. The staircase in the department is dirty.
b. The staircase in the department isn't dirty
c. Presupposition of a and b: There is a unique staircase in the department.
Native speakers of English share the intuition that an utterance of (9)a and (9)b (under
unmarked intonation) is infelicitous in a context where (9)c is false. The above approach
captures this intuition in a fully compositional fashion by imposing that the existence of a unique
(contextually salient) individual satisfying the predicate in the definite description (staircase in
the department, in our example) is a condition that needs to be satisfied for each constituent
containing this description to have a denotation and therefore for the whole sentence to be
attributed a truth value (i.e. a denotation) at all. Given this, when the presupposition fails to be
true the sentence is meaningless and therefore infelicitous.
Notice that partiality is a property of semantic values; therefore viewing presuppositions
as a product of partial lexical entries amounts essentially to viewing them as a semantic
phenomenon (hence the terms 'logical presupposition' and 'semantic presupposition').
Conclusions
In this section I introduced the semantic approach to presuppositions of definite descriptions
proposed in Frege (1891). Although far from uncontroversial (cf. Stalnaker 1974-99 Gazdar
1979 and Soames 1989), the semantic approach to presuppositions is appealing in at least two
related and important respects. Encoding presuppositional import as part of the definition of the
lexical import of words like the, allows us to maintain both compositionality and a truth-
conditional approach to meaning.
The semantic approach is compatible with a truth-conditional view of meaning because
expressions introducing semantic presuppositions contribute, although indirectly, to the truth-
conditions of a sentence by introducing further conditions that determine whether we can derive
these truth-conditions at all. It preserves compositionality because definedness conditions are
computed in a fully compositional way. This latter aspect of the analysis will prove to be crucial
when we will turn our attention to the effect of even in questions.
It is worth at this point to step back and establish how far we have gotten in accounting
for the speaker's intuition about sentences containing a definite description or some other
presupposition trigger. These intuitions are always relative to a conversational context and boil
down to the following: an utterance of a sentence in a context where its presupposition is false
sounds awkward. Notice that the semantic approach, as presented so far, derives only
undefinedness of tne sentence in a state of affairs where the presupposition is false (see ft. note
6), but no reference is made to a conversational context. Therefore what still needs to be
clarified, in order to account for the intuition described above, is the relation between
definedness conditions with respect to a world and the conditions a context has to satisfy in order
for a sentence containing a presupposition trigger to be uttered felicitously in that context. This
ultimately amounts to establishing a connection between possible worlds and conversational
context. Stalnaker's (1974) formal definition of conversational context introduced in the next
section allows us to draw this connection.
1.3 Pragmatic Presupposition, Context Set and the Bridge Principle.
Stalnaker (1974) offers a notion of context that allows us to establish a direct relation between
definedness in a world and felicity in a context. The intuition behind this notion is that a
conversational context can be viewed as a state of affairs where the participants to the
conversation cannot precisely identify the actual world among possible alternatives to it, but
share a number of assumptions regarding it, which restrict the possible options to only those
where these assumptions are true. According this view, the context can be defined as that set of
possible worlds (the 'context set') in which all the propositions that are taken to be true by the
participants of the conversation (i.e. the Common Ground) are true.
In the picture Stalnaker offers both meaning and presuppositions are viewed as related to
the conversational context. First, Stalnaker identifies the meaning of sentences with their
contribution to the already existing conversational record.. Specifically, each utterance, if
compatible with the Common Ground, increases it with the addition of the proposition it
expresses. As an effect of this, the context set is reduced to the set of possible worlds in which
that proposition is true. Technically, this operation is one of intersecting the context set c with
the newly conveyed proposition. However, since the latter can be a partial proposition, instead of
regular intersection, one needs to introduce the operator +, defined as shown below (cf. Heim
1982):
(10) For every set of worlds set c and every, possibly partial proposition p,
c+ p = crp if p is defined in every world in c, undefined otherwise.
The meaning of a sentence is then defined on the basis of its effect on c, along the following
lines:
(11) The speaker utters S.
S denotes p.
p is not controversial (i.e. c + p 4 0)
p provides new information (i.e. c + p # c)
==> A new context set : c' = c + p
Second, presuppositions are taken to be the propositions that are taken for granted by the
participants to the conversation, and therefore true in every world in the context set (Pragmatic
Presupposition). A sentence S that presents a certain proposition p as uncontroversial or taken for
granted by all the participants of the conversation, is therefore subject to specific felicity
conditions: only in contexts where p is in fact part of the CG, i.e. true in all the worlds in the
context set, is an utterance of S felicitous.
Although this system does not identify presuppositions with logical presuppositions,
partiality is taken to be one way the speaker can signal what (s)he is taking for granted.
Specifically Stalnaker proposes that the relation between definedness conditions with respect to a
possible world and felicity conditions with respect to a set of worlds is as established by the
following principle (this formulation is Soames 1989, p.581):
(12) Bridge Principle If S logically presupposes P relative to a context C, then an utterance of
S in C pragmatically requires that the conversational background entails P.
In other words, a sentence that receives a denotation only in worlds where a certain proposition q
is true, is felicitous only when q is true in every world of the relevant context set.
Let me illustrate with an example how precisely, according to Stalnaker's approach,
partial meanings do indeed generate pragmatic presuppositions. Consider the following sentence:
(13) Mary brought the cake
Given what we saw above, the intention of the cake is the following. (The notation [[I €
indicates a function from expressions of the object language to propositions):
(14) [[The cake B] = Xw: 3! x s.t. [Xw'. [[ cake IjW ] (w)=1 . tx s.t. [[cake IW (x) =1
Thus, (13) expresses the following partial proposition:
(15) Xw: 3! x s.t. [Xw'. [[cake ]w' ] (w)=1 . Mary brought in w the unique cake in w.
Now suppose that one of the participants of a conversation utters (13) at a stage of the
conversation in which the Common Ground contains the information that there is just one salient
cake. In this case the context set c will have the following property:
(16) c c Xw. 3! x s.t. [Xw'. [[cake ]w ] (w)=1
This means that in all the worlds in c the logical presupposition of the sentence is satisfied and
therefore the sentence is felicitous because the context satisfies what it pragmatically requires to
be felicitous, according to the bridge principle.
What if c does not entail the information that there is just one cake?
(17) c Z Xw. 3! x s.t. [Xw'. [[cake ]]" ] (w)=1
This happens when the definedness condition of the sentence is true only in some of the worlds
in c or when it is false in all. According to the above principle, though, the sentence under
consideration is infelicitous in both cases.
Sometimes, however, a speaker might exploit a presupposition to convey new
information, i.e. information that is compatible with but not entailed by what is already taken for
granted. For example, even if the participants of a conversation are not aware of the marital
status of the speaker, he can still utter the following sentence:
(18) My wife is always late.
By doing so the speaker achieves the goal of informing his interlocutors that he has a
wife, without explicitly saying so. The possibility of using presuppositional expressions for the
purpose of conveying new information relies on a process called accommodation that can be
characterized within this framework in the following way. If sentence is uttered that signals that
the speaker takes a certain proposition p for granted, in a context where actually it is not (i.e. c _
p) but it is incompatible with the commonly shared information (i.e. c n p 4 0) and none of the
addresses has objections against p being added to the CG, then the context set c is first updated
with p (p is added to the CG) and then the sentence in question is evaluated with respect to the
new context set resulting from this operation.
In light of the possibility of accommodation, the above generalizations regarding
sentences like (13) need to be better qualified: if the sentence is evaluated with respect to a
context set that entails its definedness condition, the sentence is felicitous, if not, then the
sentence is infelicitous, unless accommodation is possible.
Stalnaker's Bridge Principle above, so named as it links a semantic property of
propositions (i.e. partiality) to a pragmatic aspect of sentences expressing them, builds on the
following rational. When sentence is defined in all the worlds in c, it is possible to divide up c
into two sets, the set containing the words where the sentence is true, which are retained, and the
set containing those where it is false, which are then excluded from the resulting context set c'.
Since narrowing c down is precisely the function of an utterance of a declarative sentence, the
sentence is felicitous. In a case where a sentence is not defined in all the worlds in c, the above
bipartition is not possible because while the participants to the conversation will know what to
do with the worlds in c, where the sentence is either true or false, i.e. retain the ones where it is
true and exclude those in which it's false, they will not know what to do with the worlds where
the sentence lacks a truth value. 5 As a consequence, Stalnaker claims, the process of context
updating gets stuck
In the following chapters, which focus on presuppositions of even in questions, I will
adopt Stalnaker's view on presuppositions. Moreover, in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
I will also assume that even has a partial meaning and that it induces a pragmatic presupposition
as prescribed by the Bridge Principle in (12).
1.4 The Meaning of Questions: Answerhood Conditions
We can now turn to our second challenge for a truth-conditional view of semantics. As
mentioned above, the notion of truth-conditions is not suitable for all the types of utterances to
begin with. Questions and exclamations are simply neither true nor false, and still we would like
to describe their meaning in terms of their structural properties and the expressions they involve.
The motivation for this latter requirement is not just a theoretical matter, but also, and more
importantly, an empirical one. In fact, if a speaker understands the meaning of both (20)a and
(20)b and of (19)a he also automatically understand (19)b.
(19) a. Is Mary blond?
b. Is Mary blond and tall?
(20) a. Mary is blond.
b. Mary is blond and tall.
Given this, a criterion of adequacy for a semantic theory of questions is that it should be able to
explain differences like the above in the same terms in the two cases (thus ultimately in terms of
5 According to Stalnaker, this rational confers conceptual necessity to the Bridge Principle. Soames (1989),
however, points out that the kind of motivation one can find for the bridge principle is only empirical and not
conceptual, contrary to what Stalnaker assumes. We could in fact imagine that language worked differently, and,
e.g., that when a sentence is uttered that denoted a partial proposition, we would just eliminate all the worlds in the
context set where the sentence is not true (i.e. either false or undefined) or all those worlds where the sentence is
false (thus keeping the worlds where it is either true or undefined). Language does not work like this, but it could
very well work this way, as there is nothing conceptually wrong about any of these two options.
the difference between the import blond and of blond and tall).
Thus a semantic analysis of questions needs to achieve at least the two following goals:
first it needs to establish what kind of objects (if not truth-conditions) questions denote, second it
needs to derive this denotation compositionally from the semantic import that the expressions in
a question can have in general, i.e. in all the kinds of utterances they can occur in.
Insofar as the same expression should make the same contribution to the meaning of a
declarative and of a question, if we endorse the Fregean view on meaning, then we are
committed to assume that expressions contribute to questions their typical truth-conditional
import in declaratives. But how can smaller expression contribute their truth-conditional import
to the meaning of questions, which are neither true nor false?
One way to solve this problem is by viewing the meaning of questions as a function of
the meaning of declarative linguistic entities semantically related to them: their answers. Two
main currents of thought regarding the semantics of questions (the Hamblin and Karttunen
tradition (H/K, henceforth) and the more recent tradition started by Groenendijk and Stokhof
(G&S)) build precisely on this hypothesis. Let's briefly consider these two approaches in turn.
1.4.1 Questions as Sets of Propositions: Hamblin & Karttunen (H/K)
The main intuition behind H/K's approach is that what characterizes the meaning of a question
are the conditions that would make a reply to that question a semantically adequate answer to it,
i.e. its Answerhood Conditions. H/K's semantics of questions encodes straightforwardly the
correlation between Answerhood Conditions and the notion of truth-conditions: an interrogative
denotes the set of propositions that represent its possible answers.6 Since the elements in this set
are propositions, i.e. truth-conditions, those elements are determined in a fully compositional
6 Unlike Hamblin (1973), Karttunen (1977) actually proposes that the denotation of a question in a world is a
smaller set, i.e. the set of its TRUE answers in that world. This difference however is not substantial as it is possible
to systematically derive, from a Karttunen set a Hamblin set, containing all the possible partial answers (besides the
empty set), and vice versa, from a Hamblin denotation we can always determine the true answers at a given index
(as first pointed out in Groenendijk & Stokhof 1984, Chl ft. 38, cf. also Berman 1991, Lahiri 1991 and Rullmann &
Beck 2000). Following a very common practice, in this work I will assume an analysis of questions that shares
properties of both systems. On the one hand I will adopt Karttunen's assumptions regarding the structural properties
of questions and the way a question denotation is derived from its structure. I will however depart from Karttunen's,
and follow Hamblin, in taking the denotation of a question to be the set of all possible partial answers, rather than
just the true ones, for reasons that will become clear in ch.2.
fashion on the basis of the truth-conditional import of the expressions the question contains and
the way they are combined in the syntax.
Specifically in Karttunen's system the meaning of a part of the structure of an
interrogative has the same semantic type of the meaning of a declarative, i.e. a proposition. What
allows the system to get from propositions to question denotations (i.e. sets thereof) is the
additional assumption that questions, as opposed to declaratives, contain in their complementizer
position a silent question morpheme (here referred to as ?) whose semantic function is precisely
to allow this transition. Let's see how.
Here I will illustrate Heim's (1994) rendition of Karttunen's analysis (cf. also Heim &
von Fintel 2000 and Heim 2001). 7 Reinterpreting Karttunen's insight within Heim and Kratzer's
compositional system, Heim takes the ?-morpheme to denote a function that takes a proposition
(i.e. functions of type type <s,t>) and returns the singleton set containing that proposition (or,
equivalently the characteristic function of this set, whose type is type <st,t>).
(21) a. [[? ]= Xp.{p}
Given this, the constituent headed by the ?-morpheme (also called 'proto-question' after
Karttunen 1977) will always denote a singleton, as illustrated in (22):
(22) a. Did Mary arrive?
b. Proto-question:
Mary arrived
c. Interpreted LF of the proto-question:
{Xw. [larrivedaW(M)= }
xp. {p} 1 iff Mary arrived
Mary arrived
7 C.f. also Bittner (1994) and Dayal (1996) for variants of Karttunen's semantics of questions.
Notice that in (22)c the meaning of the ?-morpheme, a function of type <st,<st,t>>, is combined
with an argument of type t. Given this, the compositional rule that applies in this case is
Intentional Function Application (IFA), defined Heim and Kratzer (1998) and reported in (23):
(23) Intensional Function Application (IFA):
If a is a branching node and {1, y} the set of its daughters then for any possible
world w and assignment function g, if %3] wg is a function whose domain contains
Xw'. I[y]]"' g, then [[al]"w = IIl'wg (Xw'. fIlyl w'" g) (Heim&Kratzer 1998, p.308)
Now, how do we get from a singleton to a set of all possible alternative answers to the question?
In the case of a y/n question the formation of a set of alternatives is due to the presence of a
(possibly silent) whether, whose denotation is a function that takes the singleton set {p} as an
argument and transforms it into the set containing the same proposition AND its negation:
(24) a. [[ whether (or not) ]] = XQ<st,>. { p: p E Q or -p e Q} (for every p, -p = Xw. p(w) = 0)
(25) a. Did Mary Arrive?
b. fI whether (or not) Mary arrived]J= [ Did Mary arrive?]]
The result of applying the meaning of whether to the above singleton set is the set of possible
answers to the question. i.e. the propositions that Mary arrived and that Mary didn't arrive:
(26) {Xw. [[arrivedjW(M)=l, Xw. [[arrivedDW(M)=O}
Q<st,t>. { p: p e Q or -p e QJ {Xw. [[arrivedjW(M)=1 }
p. { p } 1 iff Mary arrived
Mary arrived
Other wh-phrases different from whether, are instead analyzed as question existential quantifiers,
as shown in (27)b and c, that move above ? and are then 'quantified' into the singleton set
containing an 'open proposition.' 8 The result of this quantification is a set of possible answers as
shown in (27)d:9' 10
(27) a. fi who ] = Q<e, <st,t>>. { p: 3x [student (x) & p E Q(x)] }
b. I[ which student ]I = Q<e, <st,t>>. { p: 3x [student (x) & p e Q(x)] }
c. {p: 3y [student(y) & p e [Xx.{ that x came}](y)}= {p: 3y[student(y) & p= that y came]}
Xx.{ that x camel
which student 1{ {that g(1) came}
1 • ltl came g'"w = 1 iff g(1) came in w
tl came
The above set contains propositions of the form That Mary came, That Bill came, etc.... These
propositions are possible answers to the question. Notice, though, that each one of these
propositions that is true in a given state of affairs doesn't per se constitute a completely
satisfying answer to the question in that state of affairs. In fact, a speaker that utters which
student came will be satisfied only by a complete list of students that came (complete true
answer). Uttering a sentence that expresses just one of the true propositions in the set above is
providing only part of the information requested by the questioner. Given this I will refer to the
elements of H/K denotation as instantial answers. Once the set of all instantial answers is
provided, the notion of complete true answer can easily be defined as the conjunction of the true
8 Karttunen originally proposed that wh-words denote ordinary existential quantifiers (type <et,t>):
(i) [whol = XQ <e ,. 3 x [person(x) & Q(x)= 1
These quantifiers combine with their argument via the rule of wh-quantification given in (ii)
(ii) Wh-quantifying Rule:
For every world w and assignment function g
If a has daughters 3 and y, then for every world w and assignment g if I31W"' g is of type <<e,t> t> and
j[y]"' g is of type <e,<st,t>>, then [ffcal" = {p: If3]"' g (Xxe. p E (y]"w'g (x))=1 }
This definition of Karttunen's rule original was provided in Heim ad von Fintel (2001).
9 For time being I am ignoring the issue of de dicto/de re ambiguities. The above simplified analyses, in fact, derives
only the de re reading of the question under consideration. I will return to de dicto readings in Ch3.
10 The motivation for dividing the labor of creating the semantic object of an adequate type (i.e. a set of
propositions) on the one hand and of quantifying into this set to generate alternative propositions on the other,
becomes clear when multiple wh-questions come into the picture (see Karttunen 1997 and Heim 2000).
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instantial answers.
We can now return to our examples in (19) and (20) and see how H/K-system achieves
our desideratum. The H/K denotation of our question in (19)a is the set in (28), while the
denotation of (19)b is the set in (29). The difference between the two sets is a difference between
their members, which ultimately depends, as desired, on the truth-conditional difference between
blond and blond and tall:
(28) {p: p = w. I[blond i (M) =1 or p =Xw. [fblond ]] (M)= 0
(29) {p: p = w. I blond and tall ] W (M) =1 or p =Xw. [blondandtall ]W(M)= O}
Thus, by taking very seriously the idea that the very property of the meaning of a
question is to provide a set of alternative answers, H/K's semantics of questions allows us to
maintain the two abovementioned corner stones of truth-conditional theories of semantics:
compositionality and the view that meaning is ultimately definable in terms of truth-conditions.
1.4.2 Questions as Partitions: G&S's Semantics
The main difference between H/K and Groenendijk and Stokhof's (G&S) semantics of question
lies on what notion of answer is taken to be primitive: in K/H instantial possible answer is the
primitive notion and complete true answer is a derived one; G&S build their system by taking
as primitive the latter notion of answer.
Specifically, in G&S's view (the intension of) a question uniquely identifies a partition of
the set of all (contextually relevant) possible worlds into equivalence classes with respect to what
is being questioned. Each of these sets of worlds is the proposition corresponding to a possible
complete answer to the question. The extension of a question in a given world, e.g the actual
world, is the one class of worlds among them that contains that world, i.e. the true complete
answer in that world.
For example, the intension of a constituent question like Who came? is a partition of W
into classes each containing all and only those worlds that are equivalent with each other with
respect to the extension of the predicate come. This partition is the same as the partition in
classes where each class is a complete possible answer to the question:
(30) Who came?
W
W
A polar question like Did Mary come? partitions the set of worlds so that two worlds are in the
same cell iff in those worlds the proposition that Mary came has the same truth value, thus two
cells are created one being the proposition that Mary came and the other cell being the set of
worlds corresponding to the proposition that Mary didn't come.
That Mary came That Mary didn't come
W
The ultimate result in both cases is a partition of the set of (contextually relevant) possible
situations into mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive cells each representing a complete
possible answer to the question.
The way a question identifies a partition is by denoting an equivalence relation between
{w: I[came Il= 0J
{w: [[came wJ= {Bill})
{w: [came Iw= (Bill, Sue)
{w: [came wJ= (Bill, Sue, Mary}J
1w: [ came ]w; {x: :x is a person) }
That nobody came
That Bill and nobody else came
That Bill and Sue and no one else came
That Bill, Sue, Mary and no one else came
Everybody came
worlds ( type <s,st>), that holds between two worlds iff the extension of what is questioned is the
same in both of them. Thus the G&S-intension of (31)a and(32)a is (31)b. and (32)b respectively.
(31) a. Who came?
b. Xw .Aw'. [fcomel]w= I[come ]Jw
(32) a. Did Mary come?
b. Xw. Xw'. I[ Mary came ]"W = [Mary came ]w'
How exactly do we arrive at a partition of W from a relation between elements of W?
Given any equivalence relation between worlds we can always define a set of propositions, say
PARTR, that for each world contains the set of worlds that are in the R relation with it:
(33) DEFINITION: For each R, s.t. R is an equivalence relation in W (cf. appendix)
PARTR = (pe P(W): 3 we W & we dom (R) & p= { w': wRw'}}
It is easily provable that each PARTR is a partition of W into jointly exhaustive and mutually
exclusive sets of worlds (i.e. a partition).
(34) THEOREM: For each R, that is an equivalent relation in W, PARTR is a partition of W
In fact one can prove that there is a one to one correspondence between the set of all possible
equivalence relations in W and the set of all partitions of W (see appendix). Therefore we can
safely switch back and forth between relation-talk and 'partition-talk'. (See appendix for a
formal proof, cf. also Landman 1991).
(35) THEOREM: There is a one to one correspondence between the set of all equivalence
relations and the set of all partitions of W
Given all this, a G&S-question intension uniquely identifies a partition of W into complete
possible answers to it. Its extension in a world is the complete true answer in that world.
Although G&S differ from H/K in what notion of answer is taken to be basic, it is pretty
obvious that also in this theory the meaning of questions is directly connected to the notion of
truth-conditions via the notion of Answerhood Conditions: A question extension is the truth-
condition of its true and complete answer in the world of evaluation, the question intension is the
partition into sets of the truth-conditions of its possible complete answers.
As mentioned above, establishing a relation between question denotation and truth-
conditions of the answers is not sufficient. An adequate theory of questions should also predict
this relation on fully compositional terms.
Before concluding this section, I will illustrate how G&S system can satisfy this
requirement as well. Specifically, I will show that partitions are derived compositionally from
the LF structure of questions by applying standard semantic operations (intensional function
application, predicate modification and predicate abstraction) to the standard truth-conditional
import of the various subparts of these structures. In doing so, since the present purpose is
mainly a comparison between the two theories of questions, rather than illustrating G&S's
original formulation itself, I will follow Heim's (1994) and provide a rendition of G&S in terms
of the semantic system developed in Heim&Kratzer (1998)..
Let us start by considering the constituent question Which student come?. According to
Heim's version of G&S this question has the structure given in (36)a. The question ?-morpheme
in this structure is assigned the denotation in (36)b. and the wh-phrase is taken to be equivalent
to the predicate in its restrictor.
(36) a.
Xx. x is a student and x came
which student came
Xx.x is a student Xx. x came
b. i[? ]= P<s,et>. Xw.Xw': w and w' e W. P (w) = P(w')
The desired partition is obtained by combining the two predicates in the question via
predicate restriction and the result with the meaning of the meaning of ? by IFA, as in (37):
(37) [ ?] (Xw. [Istudent and come ] w)= =
Xw.Xw'. { x: is a student in w & x came in w} = {x: x is a student in w & x came in w' }
This much is sufficient to compositionally derive the denotation of a single-wh question,
from its LF structure. When we turn to multiple-wh questions and y/n questions, however, the
semantic type of the lexical entry of the ?-morpheme in (36) ceases to match its argument, which
is of type t in the case of polar questions and of an n place relation for multiple wh-questions
containing n wh-phrases:
(38) a. Did Mary come?
<<s,et>,<s,s, t>:
me
e <e,t>
(39) a. Which student read which book?
99999
x. Xy. student' (y) & book' (x) & read' (x,y) 13
' '
which stuaent
Ax.x y. boook x) & read (x,y)
read which book
What is needed, in order to interpret a structure like (38)b, is the proposition taking operator as
the value of ? given in (40)a, while for a structure like (39)b. to be interpretable the ?-morpheme
should be a function from two place relations to partitions, as given in (40)b:
13 In order to combine n place relations (where n>l) with one place predicates we need the following generalized
version of the PM rule:
PM (modified): If a has daughters 0 and y, s.t. [13 ] is of type <el,<..,<e,, t>>..> and I[y ]I is of type <e,t> then
ff[x ] = ,x. ......X. [P1 ] (x1 ) =1 and [y ] (xl) =1
In G&S's (1985) system this is also achieved with a generalized compositional rule (see G&S 1985, p. 111)
(40) a. if? 1]= P<st. Xw.Xw': w and w' e W. P (w) = P(w)
b. [II? ]= XP<s<e,<e,t>>>. w.Xw': w and w' e W. P (w) = P(w)
Given this, the G&S system needs to assume either a family of meanings as defined in (41), or
one meaning that is underspecified for the type of its argument as in (42), rather than just one
fully specified semantic value:15
(41) Family of ? :16
f[? i]= P<s<el ... <en ,t>...>>. Xw.Xw': w and w' e W. P (w) = P(w')
n = 0 ==>Yes/No questions
n = 1==> Single wh-questions
n >1 ==> Multiple wh-question
(42) Underspecified ?:
[[ ? I = Pa,. -w. Xw': w and w' e W. P(w)=P(w')
where a = <s, <el,<...<e,, t>...>>> for n E No
We can now return to our cases in (19) once more and see how also G&S meet our
criterion of adequacy. The G&S intensions of (19)a and (19)b are given in (43) and (44),
respectively. It is immediately clear that we can easily define the difference between the two on
the basis of the difference between the truth-conditional import of the two predicates involved in
the two questions.
(43) Xw. Xw' . [[blondl] W(M) = [[blondl" W(M)
(44) aw.aw'. [[blond and tall]W'(M) = [[blond and tall l'(M)
15 This is true of the present rendition of G&S's system. In the original version of the system, a construction specific
semantic composition rule is assumed instead, that turns any n-place relation in a partition (see G&S 1985, p. 108).
16 Entries of underspecified or polymorphic types are exploited elsewhere. Cf. the analysis of only Rooth 1985 Ch.
III and the semantics of and, or and not (cf. von Stechc v 1974, Keenan&Faltz 1978 and Heim&Kratzer 1998).
1.4.3 Conclusions
To sum up, in the last two sections I have shown how presupposition triggering expressions and
questions appear to represent a challenge for a truth-conditions-based theory of meaning. We
then saw how it was possible to formulate analyses of these two phenomena where truth-
conditions and compositionality still play a central role. Specifically, we considered a view of
presuppositions as definedness conditions on the derivability of truth-conditions and two views
on questions that compositionally relate, in somewhat different ways, the meaning of questions
to the truth-conditions of their possible (partial or complete) answers. Given these premises,
many questions arise at this point, both at an empirical and at a theoretical level: what happens
when presupposition-triggers appear in questions? Do questions convey presuppositions? If so
can we maintain a view on presuppositions as definedness conditions on truth-conditions and can
we still derive these pragmatic effects compositionally also in questions?
1.5 (Logical) Presuppositions in Questions: Partiality and Answerability
The empirical question above is easily addressed: questions containing presupposition triggers
do carry presuppositions. Specifically, they retain the presuppositions of their declarative
counterparts. For example, the question in (45)b implicitly suggests (45)c, just like the
declarative sentence in (45)a:
(45) a. Mary brought the cake.
b. Did Mary bring the cake?
c. Presupposition: There is exactly one (contextually relevant) cake
Therefore the case of questions is completely parallel to the case of negation. Uniqueness and
existence of an object satisfying the predicate cake, conveyed by the definite description the
cake, are conveyed in questions as well, rather than being questioned. In fact, much work on
presuppositions shows that their persistence in questions is one of the characteristic features of
presuppositions. Because of this, questions have often been taken as reliable heuristic to establish
whether the meaning of a given expression is partly presuppositional (cf. Karttunen 1973,
Soames 1989, Chierchia &McConnell Ginet 1990, Beaver 2001).
Why and how presuppositions project in questions the way they do, however, is much
less straightforward an issue. In fact an explicit and (where necessary) compositional under-
standing of the effect of presupposition-triggers in question has not yet been provided.
As we saw in sections 2 and 3, the notion of presupposition has been traditionally tied to
the notion of truth. What makes the task of understanding presuppositions in questions
particularly hard is, again, that questions do not directly denote truth-conditions. Indeed, when
we turn to questions, it is not immediately clear how definedness conditions on expressions that
contribute to truth-conditions should affect question meanings. In this respect, a truth-conditional
semantics of questions proves particularly helpful. This picture connects the semantics of
questions to the semantics of declaratives in a very straightforward way, so that we can reuse all
that we understand about presuppositions in declaratives to understand their properties in the
domain of questions.
Even when we limit our attention to semantic presuppositions and to truth-conditional
analyses of questions, however, there are at least two possible options for a treatment of
presuppositions projection in questions, which on the surface appear to be equally correct. In this
section I will sketch these two options and show that, indeed, for simple cases they both seem to
capture the speaker's intuitions regarding the effects of presupposition triggers on questions they
are part of. For completeness, here I will illustrate how the two options work in both H/K and
G&S's theories of questions. In the remainder of the thesis in addressing the puzzle of even in
questions I will then adopt the former framework for reasons that will become clear only at the
end of Chapter 3, and I will leave to the appendix a discussion of how G&S's view copes with
the same facts.
1.5.1 The facts
Let's consider once more the question in (46)a.
(46) a. Did Mary bring the cake?
b. There is exactly one cake in the context.
As mentioned above, a question of this sort is commonly believed to carry the presupposition
that (46)b is true. As it is common practice in linguistics, this claim is based on speakers'
intuitions regarding a question of this sort. We can actually try to be more precise about the kind
of intuitions involved in this case by considering the effects of uttering this question in the three
different types of hypothetical contexts that are suitably constructed to test our hypothesis. These
contexts are the same ones considered above when we were looking at the correspondent
declarative sentence (i.e. Mary brought the cake).
In investigating the different judgments about our question in these contexts, it will be
useful to relate them to the function of a question in a conversation. At this prc'.minary stage we
might safely assume the following. According to H/K view on questions, uttering an
interrogative means presenting a set of alternative propositions and requesting that the addressee
chooses among these propositions those that he or she believes to be true in the actual situation,
if (s)he can, and, otherwise, that (s)he signals that (s)he has no opinions on the matter. Given
this, when a question is uttered, the only way the conversation can proceed is that the
addressee(s) complies with the speaker request.
With this very general notion in mind, let's turn to our three types of conversational
contexts. Recall that the difference between them lay in the amount and kind of knowledge the
participants to the conversation share with respect to the uniqueness of a cake in the context.
One conversational context we considered was such that both speaker and addressee
believed that there are two cakes, and they both know about each other's knowledge. For
example we can imagine the conversation to be taking place at a party where the speaker and the
addressee are standing in front of a table where two cakes are sitting. Let's call such a context
C1. In a context like Cl, uttering a question like (46)a would be very awkward, if not
impossible.
(47) Cl: The conversational CG entails that (46)b is false.
The second type of context we focused on was one where the context set does not entail
(46)b but does not entail its negation either. This situation can arise in various ways. One case is
when only the speaker believes that there is just one cake, because he is facing the table while
the addressee has no opinion one way or another on the matter, because she is standing with the
table behind her back.
(48) C2: The conversational CG entails neither (46)b, nor its negation
For the conversation to be continued accommodation has to take place, before the addressee can
address the speaker's request in one of the two above mentioned ways. In fact, the intuitions of
speakers of the language is that all her possible responses (Yes, no or I don't know) will carry the
presupposition that there is exactly one cake. Given this, the only way the addressee can comply
with the speaker's request for information is by first updating her own assumptions regarding
how many cakes there are, with the information that there is exactly one. Only after doing so, she
wil! be able to address the question in the most cooperative way she can.
Another type of situation where the context set doesn't entail (46)b or its negation is a
case in which the addressee believes that there are two cakes (the negation of (46)b), because she
sees in a corner of the table, hidden to the speaker, something that she believes to be another
cake. Silent accommodation in this case is obviously impossible. And, indeed, in this situation
presumably the addressee will try to correct the speaker's assumption that (46)b is part of the
shared informational background, rather than answering her question directly which would signal
that the speaker's question was infelicitous for her. In case speaker and addressee do not reach an
agreement regarding this matter, because, say, they disagree on the nature of the object in the
corner, the conversation on the topic raised by the question would be stuck. In case the
agreement is met in favor of what the speaker was taking for granted, accommodation takes
place and the addressee is probably expected to answer the question. Otherwise the question is
commonly recognized as inappropriate and dropped.
Finally consider a context where both speaker and addressee believe that there is exactly
one big cake at the party and that this, again, is part of their mutual knowledge. In this case the
addressee can straightforwardly comply with the speaker's request.
Summing up, an utterance of (46)a, is perceived to be felicitous only if the conversational
CG already entails (46)b or can be accommodated so as to do so.
1.5.2 Felicity Conditions of Questions and Partiality
In this and the following two subsections I will illustrate two natural ways in which the above
intuitions can be captured in K/H and G&S's systems respectively. Specifically I will introduce
two hypotheses on how the definedness conditions of sub-constituents of a question project so
that the whole question is felicitous only in contexts where these conditions are met.
The first and most natural hypothesis, which I will refer to as Answer-based Approach,
is that it is sufficient for the semantic presuppositions introduced by presupposition triggers like
the to be inherited as such by the possible answers to a question for the question as a whole to
carry a pragmatic presupposition of the type described in the previous section. According to this
view the question as a whole is always semantically well-defined irrespective of the w•hether a
given context set entails that presupposition, but turns out pragmatically infelicitous if it doesn't.
On the other hand, in the second approach, which I will refer to as Question-based
Approach, a question semantically presupposes all the presuppositions of its sub-constituents.
Therefore a question turns out denotation-less in contexts where these presuppositions are not
satisfied.
I will illustrate the details of these two options by discussing example (46) repeated
below:
(49) Did Mary bring the cake?
Recall that, our lexical entry for the definite determiner is the one repeated in (50) (cf. ft.
note 6):
(50) [[The cake]¢ e= Xw: 3! x s.t. [Xw'. ff cake ]'W ] (w)(x)= . tx s.t. a cake ]] (x) =1
Where [ ]] is a function from object language expressions to their intesion.
In Heim&Kratzer's system, definedness conditions of this sort are inherited at every node
of the structure that contain an expression introducing them, according to the way the rule of
function application (FA) is defined:
(51) FA:
If a is a branching node and {3, y} is the set of its daughters then a is in the domain of [[]liff t
and y are in the domain of If[] and [[y ]is in the domain of [03n
If defined, the IEal = 11[311( fiY ])D (H&K 1998 p. 76)
This rule guarantees that the definedness conditions introduced by the cake are inherited
by all the constituents of a question whose meaning is computed by FA, i.e. up to the node
labeled as 0 in the figure below:
(52) a. Did Mary bring the cake?
b. Proto-question
???
Mary brought the cake
c. For any possible world w and assignment function g
[O 1w.g is defined iff 3!x s.t. [Xw'. [f cake I"' ] (w)(x)=l
if defined then [ O ] w".g =1 iff Mary brought the unique cake in w
d. [[? ]=Xp.{p}
The next step in the computation, however, requires an application of IFA (repeated in (53)),
since the meaning of ? is a function defined for propositions (type <s,t>) but its argument, when
defined, is a truth value (type t).
(53) Intensional Function Application (IFA):
If a is a branching node and {1, y} the set of its daughters then for any possible
world w and assignment function g, if 3p]] w.' is a function whose domain contains
Xw'. [y]] w''g , then [[hal W"' = i[f13I"g (Xw'. [[II] W"g). (Hem&Kratzer 1998, p.308)
Once partiality is added into the system, however, the above rule of IFA needs to be
slightly modified. To see why, notice that in (52), the argument of 1[ ? 1 is partial. The IFA rule,
as it is, does not cover cases of this sort. While Heim&Kratzer don't give a version of IFA that
would cover cases of this sort, they do address the issue of how the semantic rules need to be
modified when partiality is added to the system. The cases they discuss is the rule of Predicate
Modification (cf. Heim&Kratzer (1998), p. 83. ft. note 4) and of X-abstraction (ibidem, p. 129, ft.
note 12). One natural adaptation of the rule to IFA, in the same spirit, is given in (54):
(54) Itensional Function Application revised (IFA*):
If a is a branching node and { , y} the set of its daughters then for any possible
world w and assignment function g, a e dom ( 1[] "w g) iff 13 dom([ I , " ') and if
] w"'. g is a function whose domain contains Xw': y E dom( [A11 " g). [YI]J W, g, then
Ial w"' g = [[113w"' (Xw': y E dom ([j w', ). i[y] w', g )
The output of this revised rule will inherit the definedness conditions of the intensional
functor (i.e. 3111 "' 5 above), but not necessarily those of its argument. In fact, whether the
definedness conditions of y, will be inherited or blocked (or have some other effect on the
output)17 depends on the semantics of the functor itself.
This is what allows us to entertain either the two hypothesis on presupposition projection
in questions mentioned in the introduction to this section. Indeed, these two options depend on
what semantics we decide to attribute to the question morpheme The null hypothesis is that the
meaning of the ?-morpheme is as given above and repeated in (55)a, but we can also entertain an
alternative hypothesis: that this morpheme denotes a function that inherits the definedness
conditions of is argument (55)b.
(55) a. Option 1:
For any index w and assignment function g [ ? ] w.' = pP<s,t>. {P}
17 Here what I have in mind is Karttunen's (1973) distinction between filters, plugs and holes for presuppositions. In
the system above the distinction is encoded in the lexical entries of the functor in terms of presence or absence of
definedness conditions of the functor that depend on the definedness conditions of its argument. The two lexical
entries I hypothesize for the ?-morpheme exemplify of how plugs and holes are distinguished here.
b. Option 2:
For any index w and assignment function g
[ ? ] ",g = Xp<s,t>: we dom (p). { p }
Both these options prove equally satisfactory to account for the intuitions regarding our simple
example in (46) above. Option one leads to an Answer-based approach to presupposition
projection in questions, option one to a Question-based approach. The next subsection illustrates
this from the perspective of H/K framework. Subsection 1.5.4 illustrates the same point form the
perspective of G&S's system.
1.5.3 Answer and Question-based Presuppositions in H/K Questions
We can start by endorsing Option I for the meaning of ?. The resulting denotation of the proto-
question in (52) is as in (56):
(56) I[i? I I[O]D = {Jw: 3!x s.t. 1[cake]"W(x)=1. M. brought in w the unique x s.t. I[cakeI"W(x)= 1}
When the meaning of whether is applied to this set, the result is a set containing two partial
propositions, one being the affirmative answer and the other the negative answer to the question,
and both carrying the same definedness condition, i.e. that there is a unique cake. Let's see how
we obtain this result.
First, recall that the relevant lexical entry for whether is repeated in (57):
(57) II whether (or not) ]] = Q<st,t>. I p: p Q or -pE Q}
where for every propositions p, -p = Xw. p(w) = 0
Notice that the negative operator that is contained in this lexical entry (i.e. -) was crafted
for cases where its argument is non-partial. Once the option of partiality becomes available, the
definition of this operator needs to be also modified as to extend to cases like the present one.
Since negation is an environment where presuppositions project quite systematically (i.e. it is a
hole for presuppositions) 18, as we saw above, I will assume the following:
(58) - (p) = Xw: w e dom (p). p(w) = 0
Once this much is assumed, the result of applying the meaning of whether to its argument is as
given in (59)
(59) fIwhether ]J(II? ]1 [OD) =
{[w: 3!x s.t. [cakellj(x)=1. M. brought in w the unique x s.t. I[cake]w(x) = 1,
Xw: 3!x s.t. [cakell](x)=1. M. didn't bring in w the unique x s.t. [[cake]]w (x) =1 )
The definedness conditions introduced by the are inherited as such only by the
propositions representing the answers to the question, while the denotation of the question as a
whole is always defined, whether these conditions are satisfied or not. In other words, under this
view, only the answers to the question can end up being semantically undefined, but the question
as a whole always receives a denotation. Yet, this can account quite straightforwardly for the
intuition that the question itself is felicitous only if those conditions are satisfied. Let us see how.
The problem we are dealing with here is very reminiscent of one addressed by
Stalnaker's (1978) bridge principle (see section 1.3), i.e. one of connecting partiality of the
answers (a semantic feature) to its pragmatic effects on the question. The connection is easily
identified on the basis of the following general principle:
(60) Question Bridge Principle'9, 20
A question is felicitous in c, ONLY IF it can be felicitously answered in c.
(I.e. if at least one of its answers is defined in c)
18 Karttunen's (1973) terminology.
19 In Higginbotham (1996) a process of conditionalization (adding a presupposition to each answer) and
factorization (eliminating infelicitous answers) together with an exhaustivity condition on partitions (at least one
answer should be non-empty) achieves the same result as our bridge principle. My proposal departs from
Higginbotham's in that it allows different answers to carry different presuppositions, thus predicting that the
factoring process spares, in some cases, some but not all the answers. The importance of this will become clear in
Ch.2.
20 According to this principle all it is required for a question to be felicitous is that at least ONE of its answers is
defined in the context. Other answers can be undefined. This aspect will turn out to be a crucial in the understanding
of the difference between infelicity and another effect sometimes triggered by presuppositions in questions, i.e. bias.
Here I named the principle after Stalnaker's principle as to signal that the two have the same
functions: determining how partiality influences pragmatic adequacy. It's worth pointing out,
however, that the two Principles are different in one important respect. While the rationale
Stalnaker's principle referes ultimately to the possibility vs impossibility for an utterance to
modify the context set, the above question bridge principle does not need to refer to context
change. This is so because under the current hypothesis the function of a question is not to
directly affect the context but consists in presenting a number of propositions and requiring the
addressee to point out those that are true. Because of this, the rational behind the Question
Bridge Principle, unlike Stalnaker's, does confer it conceptual necessity: If all the answers are
undefined, the question is unfit to its function, as one cannot request someone else to indicate the
true propositions in a set of propositions none of which can be true, because all are undefined.
We can now return to our example. Based on the Question Bridge Principle, and given
the denotation we derived for our example, we predict correctly that the question is felicitous
only if the context set entails that there is a unique cake at the party. Let me illustrate why.
Recall that the two answers to the question semantically presuppose that there is a unique
cake (P).
(61) yes = Xw: 3!x s.t. l[cakef]w(x)=l. M. brought in w the unique x s.t. [[cake]JW(x) = 1
no = Xw: 3!x s.t. [[cakeIjW(x)=1. M. didn't bring in w the unique x s.t. I[cake]'w (x) =1
Presupposition (P) = Xw. 3!x s.t. I[cakeI W(x)=1
In a situation (say C) where c does not entail P, both answers will be undefined (modulo
accommodation) and therefore, unless accommodation can take place, there is no way the
question can be answered felicitously. If the question cannot be answered felicitously in C, then
it is infelicitous in C, according the Question-Bride Principle. On the other hand, if the question
is uttered in a situation where c does entail P, then both answers are felicitous and the question is
also felicitous, because it is answerable. Given this, if both speaker and addressee believe P, and
mutually know this, (46) can be uttered felicitously.
In this analysis, the felicity conditions of a question are directly derived from the
definedness conditions of the possible answers, just like the denotation of the question is derived
from the truth-conditions of its possible answers. In this sense, this approach to projection is an
Answer-Based Approach.
Let us now turn to our second option. According to this option, the question as a whole
inherits the definedness conditions of its argument.
(62) For any index w and assignment function g
a f ? IIw'g ([IMary brought the cakel]w) is defined iff
3!x s.t. [[cake] W(x) =1
b. If defined, then I[? ] w'g ([ Mary brought the cake]]") =
{w: 3!x s.t. l[cake]]W(x)=I. M. brought in w the unique x s.t. [[cake]lw(x)=l }
The denotation of the entire question is obtained by combining whether with this partial object
by the Heim&Kratzer rule of FA. Since this rule is crafted so as to project the definedness
conditions of each constituent to the next bigger constituent containing it, the result is also a
partial denotation:
(63) I[ whether ]]w'g (fi ? Mary brought the cake EI w.') is defined iff P(w)=1
a. P = Xw. 3!x s.t. [cakel w(x)=
b. If defined then, E[ whether ]]w.g ([[ ? Mary brought the cake ] W' ) =
{Xw: 3!x s.t. I[cakej w(x)=l. M. brought in w the unique x s.t. [icake]"w(x) = 1,
Xw: 3!x s.t. I[cake]"w(x)= . M. didn't bring in w the unique x s.t. [[cake] " (x) =1 }
This option accounts quite straightforwardly for our felicity-judgments regarding the question.
The question as a whole semantically presupposes P, thus, according to Stalnaker's Bridge
Principle, in every context C it pragmatically presupposes that the context set c in C entails P. No
additional felicity principle for questions is needed.2 1
21 Stalnaker's principle is indeed defined for 'sentences' in general, therefore it should extend to interrogative
sentences as well. One problem with this extension, however, is that Stalnaker's rationale does not apply
1.5.4 Answer-basedand Question-based Presuppositions in G&S's Questions
In this subsection I will show how also G&S's system explains the facts discussed in section
1.5.1 regarding (64)a.
Before comparing the two approaches to presuppositions from the perspective on questions given
in G&S, let me clarify how the pragmatic function of a question can be defined in this system.
First, a feature of G&S system that can help us defining this function is that that in order to
account for phenomena of context dependency, they assume that questions denote partitions of
the relevant context set (c) rather than the entire set of all possible worlds (W). Given this, the
pragmatic function of a question relative to the context is to provide a partition of c in mutually
exclusive and jointly exhaustive cells representing its possible complete answers and require the
addressee to indicate which of these cells is a true proposition.
With this general pragmatic definition in mind let us see how a Question-basedanalysis
and an Answer-basedanalysis of presuppositions can be expressed in partition semantics.
If a question contains a presupposition trigger, the argument of the ?-morpheme is
partial, just like in K&H system, as shown in (64)b.
(64) a. Did Mary bring the cake?
? O
M. brought the cake
b. For any possible world w and assignment function g
[ ]]w".g is defined iff 3!x s.t. [fcake]]W(x)=l
if defined then I[O 1wg =1 iff Mary M. brought the unique cake.
Recall that the lexical entry for this morpheme we introduced above is as repeated in
(65).
straightforwardly to questions, given the difference between the pragmatic function of a question and of a
declarative mentioned above. The way the function of a question can be defined within a G&S's perspective will
allow extending Stalnaker's reasoning to questions as well. On the other hand, within that perspective, the Question
Bridge Principle will loose its plausibility.
(65) I[? 1]= ,p<s,t. Xw.Xw': w and w' e W. p () = p(w)
Notice that here, again, we encounter a problem similar to what we faced above with our original
meaning for -. Specifically, the lexical entry above cannot be applied to partial arguments, as is,
since the identity relation (=) in its truth-conditions requires p to be a total relation.
Given this, in order to cover also cases in which partiality is involved, the lexical entry of
? must be modified. Here as well there we have two possible options, which I illustrate in (66):
(66)Option 1:
[I? ]]= Xp,t>.Xw: w e dom (p). Xw': w' e dom (p). p (w) = p(w')
Option 2:
I[ ? ]J= Xp,pt. Xw.Xw': w e dom (p) and w' e dom (p). p (w) = p(w')
The first entry above leads to a Question-basedview of presuppositions, while the second entry
leads to an Answer-basedone. Let us see why.
I will start by considering option 1. If applied to a partial proposition and to a given worlds w,
the first entry above does not even generate an output at all, if the argument if the proposition is
not defined in w. In the example under discussion, the result is the following:
(67) For any possible world w and assignment function g
a [[?1 (1w'.[O ]" w'g) (w) is defined iff 0 e dom ID ` "g
O e dom [[]w 'g iff 3!x s.t. Icake]]w(x)=1 (P is true in w)
b. if defined then I[?I (Lw'. O ]0"' g) (w)= Xw': 3!x s.t. [cake] '(x)=l. Mary brought the
cake in w iff Mary brought x in w'.
Given this, the question inherits the definedness conditions of its argument and therefore
semantically presupposes that there is a unique cake (i.e. P). This accounts for the fact that this
presupposition must be true in all worlds in c for the question to be felicitous. Here is how.
Suppose c does entail that there is a unique cake (i.e. that in all the worlds in c there is a unique
cake). As a consequence, for every two worlds in c the relation in (67)b. is defined. This
situation is one in which the question does exhaustively partition c:
Figure 1: c c Xw. 3! x s.t. I[cake ]]w (w)(x)1
p=that Mary brought the cake
On the other hand, if c does not entail P then there are some worlds that are neither p nor non-p
worlds, as show in figure 2:
Figure 2: c X Xw. 3! x s.t. [ cake ]Jw (w)(x)1
0 = subset of c that is partitioned
O= subset of c that is not partitioned
P = Xw. 3! x s.t. f[cake w]" (w)(x)1
p = that Mary bought the cake
This means that the equivalence relation is defined only on a subset of c and that the remaining
portion of c is not partitioned.
As mentioned above the function of a question in a context is to exhaustively partition the
context set into cells representing its possible complete answers. In a situation as the one
described above, however, the context set is not fully portioned. Extending Stalanker's rationale
for the bridge principle to questions we can speculate that this is what makes the question
infelicitous, as the addressee will not know what to do with the worlds that are neither p nor non-
p worlds. Since P is not entailed by c, it is not entailed by the addressee believe-worlds either,
therefore as far as he knows the actual world could well belong to the non partitioned area of the
question, which makes it impossible for him to answer it, without accommodating the
presupposition first.
Since the pragmatic presupposition of a question, under this analysis, is the product of
aspects that pertain the effect of the question itself on the context set, this analysis belongs to the
Question-basedapproach to presuppositions in questions.
Let us now turn to option 1, repeated below:
(68) Option 1:
I[ ? ]= Xp<s,. w.Xw': w E dom (p) and w' e dom (p). p (w) = p(w)
If this is lexical entry is adopted, then for every p, and every w, the result of applying the
meaning of ? to p and its result to w is always defined no matter whether w is or is not in dom(p).
The output though is a partial proposition, which inherits the definedness conditions of p, as
desired:
(69)For any possible world w and assignment function g
I[?? (Ow'.[[O A]*") (w) =
Xw': 3! x s.t. [[cakellW(x)=l & 3!x s.t. [[cakel "'(x)=l. [[]W "'` = I 0 ]w'.g
This amounts to saying that questions containing presuppositional expressions are always
semantically defined but their answers are partial objects. As we saw above, we can understand
the presuppositions of such questions as pragmatic presuppositions coming from their answers.
The case is fully parallel to the result we obtain when we applied Option 1 to a K/H type
semantics repeated below for comparison.
(70) [ ?]IjAw.[[ ] '.g)(w) =
{f w: 3!x s.t. I[cakellW(x)=1. M. brought in w the unique x s.t. l[cake]"W(x) = 1,
Xw: 3!x s.t. Ijcake]]W(x)=1. M. didn't bring in w the unique x s.t. ffcake]lW(x) =1)
Recall that in G&S system the question denotation in a given world is the proposition
representing the complete true answer in that world, while in K/H system it is the set of possible
answers. Given this, as far as root questions are concerned, Option 1 in G&S system is just like
option I in H/K system: the question has a denotation, and therefore an answer, in every world.
However in each world, the proposition representing the true answer in that world has a
presupposition. Since it is part of the function of a question to require the addressee to pick up
the cell of the partition representing a true proposition, P must be entailed by at least one cell of
the partition for the question to be felicitous (Question-bridge Principle).
On the other hand, we expect different results in intensional embedded contexts, since the
G&S answers carry the presupposition that P is true in the evaluation world as well.
1.5.5 Conclusions
In this section I explored different ways in which some basic facts about presuppositions in
questions can be derived in each of the two systems considered in the previous section, i.e.
K&VH and G&S.
I did so by focusing on just one example, i.e. a yes/no question containing the definite
determiner and I have shown that as far as this example is concerned, the two systems make the
same predictions.
Specifically I hypothesized two theories of projection of presuppositions in question:
one that projects the definedness conditions of the sub-constituents of a question all the way up
to the whole question, the other projecting them only up to the denotation of the possible answers
and then deriving the felicity condition on the question on the basis of a pragmatic principle of
answerability. I have shown that these two situations obtain under the following conditions:
irrespective of whether we endorse K/H semantics of question or G&S's: (i) if the meaning of
the ?-morpheme is world independent and therefore does not inherit the definedness conditions
of its argument, questions containing presuppositional expressions do not semantically
presuppose the presuppositions of their arguments, but presuppose them pragmatically; (ii) If the
meaning of the ?-morpheme is world dependent and inherits the definedness conditions of its
argument, then the question as a hole semantically presupposes the semantic presuppositions of
its answers. As far as these two projection mechanisms are concerned, we will soon see that the
latter turns out to be preferable as it comes with enough flexibility to directly account for cases
that the former theory cannot address, without incurring in redundancy.
1.6 Summary and Conclusions
It is commonly recognized that one of the characteristic properties of presuppositions is that
they 'project' in interrogative sentences. Since this phenomenon is fully systematic it must be
the case that natural language is equipped with specific semantic and pragmatic mechanisms
that make it possible. Moreover, these mechanisms ought to be related to the semantics of
questions and the way presuppositions work in general. Given this, in order to contribute some
insight pertinent to the general issue of how presuppositions project in interrogative
environments, the first task is to decide which theory of question is better equipped for
addressing the issue of projection.
Presuppositions have been traditionally tied to truth and assertion: the presuppositions
of an utterance have to be (or believed in a conversation to be) true for the uttered sentence to be
true or false (or felicitous). Given this, the theories that prove to be most adequate for the task of
addressing the issue of presupposition projection are Hamblin and Karttunen's and Groenendijk
and Stokhof in that they directly define the meaning of questions in terms of the meaning of their
possible answers. This picture connects the semantics of questions to the semantics of
declaratives in a very straightforward way, so that we can reuse all that we understand about
presuppositions in declaratives to understand their properties in the domain of questions
As for those presuppositions that can be accounted for in terms of partiality of meaning, I
proposed that there are at least two natural ways to derive their projection in a question within a
truth-conditional semantics of question: a Question-based approach and an Answer-based
approach. Here is a brief schematic summary of how the two approaches work:
•UESTION-BASED APPROACH
The meaning of a question containing presuppositional expressions is a PARTIAL
semantic object. If the presuppositions of the questions are false the question has no
denotation (or, in G&S system its denotation is not what it is supposed to be). Given this
the pragmatic presuppositions of a questions are fully determined by its semantic
presuppositions.
'ANSWER-BASED APPROACHI (cf. Higginbotham 1996, p. 375)
The meaning of a question is always defined. The felicity conditions imposed by
presuppositional expressions on a question are systematically determined by the
partiality conditions those expressions impose on the possible (semantically congruent)
answers.
(71) a presupposes (71)d BECAUSE the effect of the cake on the meaning of the question is such
that both its possible answers carry this presupposition:
(71) a. Did Mary bring the cake?
b. Yes (Mary brought the cake)
c. No (Mary didn't bring the cake).
Both presuppose: d. There is a unique relevant cake.
Presuppositions then 'project from the answers to the question', according to the following
principle which connects partiality (a semantic feature of the answers) to the pragmatics of the
question (Stalnaker 1978).
(72) Felicity Bridge Principle
A question is felicitous ONLY IF it can be felicitously answered.
(I.e. only in contexts where at least one answer is defined)
While the difference between the two approaches is obscured in cases like the one
discussed in this chapter, the relevance of the presuppositions of the answers for the felicity of a
question becomes clear when we turn to our case study in the next Chapter.
Chapter 2
Even and NPIs in Y/N-questions: A Case Study
This chapter investigates in further detail how precisely presuppositional expressions affect the
presuppositions and the meaning of questions in which they occur. The strategy I pursue in this
investigation consists in looking at cases where presuppositional material affects the interpretation
of a question in ways that go beyond the mere introduction of a presupposition. Even and a certain
subclass of Negative Polarity Items (those called 'minimizer-NPIs like lift a finger or bat an
eyelash) in interrogatives provide a rich and constrained testing ground in this sense. This is so
because the presupposition of even determines the interpretation of the question itself as neutral
information seeking question or negatively biased question, depending on the nature of the
focused expression it is associated with.
This phenomenon, I will argue, is related to a long standing puzzle regarding minimizers in
questions. The puzzle, first observed in Ladusaw (1979, Ch. 8), is that minimizers, unlike other
NPIs of the any and ever variety, induce obligatory negative bias on questions in which they occur.
An understanding of the effect of the presuppositions of even in questions will provide us with a
straightforward solution of the minimizers puzzle.
Specifically, I will show that we can understand the bias effect of even and of minimizers in
questions in terms of: (i) the way that the presuppositions introduced by even affect the question
denotation in a compositional way; and (ii) the way that the resulting denotation can be used by
speakers in the context of a conversation, given the pragmatic principles governing what it means
to ask a genuine question.
The phenomena studied in this Chapter will offer some insight on how presuppositions
project in questions: We will see that the Answer-based Approach described in Chapter 1 turns out
to be the most adequate to explain the facts regarding even and minimizers.
Moreover my analysis of these phenomena sheds some light on the following peculiar
feature of questions with minimizers. These questions belong to the set of exceptions to the
generalization that linguistic form (e.g. interrogative form) maps into conversational function
(expressing lack of opinion on the subject matter and seeking information about it) by the
mediation of semantics (question denotation). This is so because, questions with minimizers, while
exhibiting all the linguistic properties of interrogative sentences (i.e. subject-auxiliary inversion,
rising intonation, wh-movement), display a conversational function somehow different from what
interrogatives are typically used for because they convey the speaker's expectation for a negative
answer. However, the proposal in this chapter shows that once the effect of the presuppositions of
even on the question denotation are taken into account, this type of apparent counterevidence to the
form-function mapping generalization represented by questions with even can be fully derived
from those same semantic and pragmatic mechanisms that lead us to that generalization.
The content of this chapter is structured as follows. I will start by presenting the basics of
the semantics of even that I assume (section 2.1). Sections 2.2 and 2.3 introduce my case study.
Specifically, in sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 I illustrate the puzzle of minimizers in questions and then
in sections 2.2.3 and 2.2.4 I show how it relates to the behavior of even in questions. The
parallelism with even will allow me in section 2.2.5 to restate the puzzle as a more general
phenomenon of ambiguity of questions with even. In section 2.3, I will propose a solution to the
puzzle in terms of how the scope of even in questions determines the presuppositions of their
answers. Section 2.4. shows how the case of questions bears on the choice between two competing
views on even: Karttunen&Peters' scope theory and Rooth's (1985) lexical ambiguity view.
In section 2.5, I return to the problem of presupposition projection in questions and clarify
how the case study I proposed in this chapter is relevant with respect to this more general issue.
Before concluding this chapter, given the central role the focus particle even plays in my
investigation of presuppositions in questions, it will be worth to pointing out some yet unresolved
issues concerning its properties and my position regarding them. Specifically, since some of the
assumptions I endorse here are a matter of a current debate, in section 2.5 and 2.6, I will present an
overview of that debate and justify, where necessary, my choices. First I will focus on the already
mentioned controversy between the supporters of a scope theory of even and the ambiguity theory
(section 2.5). Then, in section 2.6, I will turn to the remaining aspects of the semantics of even
endorsed here that have been argued to be controversial in the recent literature on this expression.
2.1 Even
Before introducing my case study on the behavior of even in questions, it's worth starting with my
basic assumptions regarding the meaning of this particle. A number of aspects of the semantics of
even I will assume here are uncontroversial, while others are still under debate. As for the latter, a
comprehensive discussion will be provided in sections 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6.
It is uncontroversial that even doesn't contribute to the truth-conditional aspect of meaning,
but only introduces a presupposition.' One way to capture this is to attribute to even a denotation
with the effect of an identity function (as proposed in Rooth 1985), but a partial one that in each
world returns the truth value of its own argument as a value only if the conditions imposed by the
presuppositional content of even are met in that world. Assuming with Rooth (1985) that even, like
other focus sensitive operators, always takes propositional scope and ignoring for the moment the
issue of focus association, here is how this partial identity function would look:
(1) [[even ]W= xp: (p(w)=l. p(w)
Karttunen & Peters 1979 actually argue that even introduces a Conventional Implicature rather than a
Presupposition. The term Conventional Implicature was coined by Grice (cf. Grice 1975), where it was meant to be
contrasted with Conversational Implicature, rather than with Presupposition. The distinction between this notion and
the one of presupposition is less clear and whether they differ at all depends on what theory of Presuppositions one
adopts.
The way CI's are defined in Grice's paper implies at least a distinction between this notion and the notion of
Logical Presupposition, which I assume here to be relevant for even. A logical presupposition is computed together
with the truth conditions and is always an entailment of the assertion, while CI is logically and compositionally
independent from what is said (Grice 1975, p.45, cf. also discussion in Potts, to appear). In the same spirit, in K&P,
Conventional Implicatures are taken to be a distinct layer of meaning that is computed in parallel but independently
from truth conditions. The importance of this distinction, however, is far from obvious. Neither Grice nor K&P
provide compelling argument for choosing a two dimensions system over the one dimension system like the one
adopted here. Moreover, such a system fails to properly derive presuppositions in the scope of existential quantifiers,
as noted by K&P themselves in an endnote to their paper. One dimension systems appear to fare better in this respect
(cf. Heim 1993 p.224, Beaver 2001, p 232). In a second respect CIs differ from Pragmatic Presuppositions in the sense
of Stalnaker's 1998. While the latter must be present in the CG (i.e. true in all the worlds of the relevant context set),
the former, according to K&P, don't have to, but must be simply compatible with it (i.e. true in some worlds in the
context set). Also for this distinction it is hard to test. Since theory of presuppositions always involve also a notion of
accommodation (see Ch 1), it is very hard to tell these two options apart on the basis of empirical evidence.
According to (1), the only contribution even makes comes in form of the definedness condition cp.
At least the three following aspects of ýp are considered uncontroversial.
First, everybody agrees that qp makes reference to the propositional argument of even, i.e. p
in our lexical entry above. Here I refer to this proposition as the 'prejacent proposition', a term
coined by medieval logicians and recently revived in von Fintel (1999) to indicate the
propositional argument of only. I will also refer to the object language sentence in the scope of
even at LF as the 'prejacent sentence'; however, when it will be clear in the context, 'prejacent'
will be meant to refer to the prejacent proposition.
Also uncontroversial is that (p states a comparison between the prejacent and a set of
alternative propositions somehow determined by the position of focus in the prejacent sentence
(cf. Rooth 1985, 1996). To see why, compare (2)a and (2)b:
(2) a. Mary even invited [Bill]f to the party.
Presupposition: Inviting Bill to the party was less likely/ more noteworthy... for Mary than
inviting anybody else to the party.
b. Mary even invited Bill to [the party]f.
Presupposition: Inviting Bill to the party was less likely/ more noteworthy... for Mary
than inviting him to any other social event.
Here and throughout I will use '[ ]f' to mark focused constituents. The presupposition in (2)a has to
do with Mary inviting Bill as compared to Mary inviting other people. The one in (2)b, on the other
hand, compares Mary's invitation of Bill to the party with her invitation of Bill to other events.
This dependency of the contribution of even on a focalized element in the sentence has come to be
known as focus association (cf. Jackendoff 1972, Rooth 1985 etc.). In this work I will adopt
Rooth's (1996) theory of focus and take the above mentioned alternative propositions to be in
general (a relevant subset of the set of) propositions obtained by substituting the focused
expression in the prejacent sentence (Bill and the party, in our examples) with expressions of the
same sem:ntic type (Susan, John...and the dinner, the concert... for (2)a and (2)b respectively).
Following Rooth (1985-1996), I will refer to this set as C.
Thirdly, no one objects to the observation that the comparison between the prejacent with
its alternatives in C is made along the dimension of some contextually relevant scale where all
propositions are ranked with respect to one other. This property of even is also referred to as
scalarity.
While this much is more or less uncontroversial, the nature of the scale and the condition
even imposes on the position of the prejacent on it, is, instead, still matter of debate. Here I will
mainly follow a tradition started by Karttunen & Peter (1977-K&P henceforth), according to
which these conditions are taken to be the following: (i) that the prejacent and its contextually
relevant alternatives be ranked with respect to likelihood (likelihood view); (ii) that the prejacent
occupies the lowest position in the ranking (i.e. it is the least likely to be true among all the
alternatives) (universal scalar presuppositions) and (iii) that some alternative proposition distinct
from the prejacent be also true in the utterance context (existential presupposition) (cf. Stalnaker
1974, Fauconnier 1975a,b and K&P1979). This much assumed, I'd like to point out here that in the
discussion of the case study below, it will be possible to uniquely concentrate on the scalar import
of even and ignore its existential presupposition.
Here is a way to formalize Karttunen&Peters' semantics in terms of a partial lexical
meaning of even (c.f. also Rooth 1985):
(3) [[even]"W=XC.Xp: VqEC [qAp--4q >LIKELw p] &(3qE C [q :p&q(w)=1]). p(w)
p >LIKELYw q := given a set of relevant facts in w, p is more likely than q
C := the set of contextually relevant alternatives to p, in the sense of Rooth (1996).
(p = 'p is the least likely proposition among the alternatives & some alternative that is
distinct from p is true'
According to this lexical entry, even is a two-place partial function that takes a contextually
salient set of alternative propositions (C) and a proposition (p) and returns the truth value of p in
the evaluation world just in case the following conditions are satisfied: that p is the least likely
proposition among the alternatives in C and that some q in C distinct from p is true. The
requirement that the set C is a subset of the focus value of the prejacent sentence is imposed by the
presence of an operator (-) in the syntax, which introduces this requirement in the form of a
presupposition, together with the stipulation that the first argument of even is co indexed with the
covert argument of -.
For concreteness, let us see how this theory of even fares in declarative affirmative and
negative sentences. On the one hand, the above lexical entry correctly predicts the 'scalar'
presupposition of even in affirmative declarative sentences that the prejacent is the least likely on
the relevant pragmatic scale. Specifically, (4)a asserts (4)b and presupposes (4)c:
(4) a. Kim even solved [Problem 2]f.
b. Assertion (p): Kim solved Problem 2.
c. Scalar Presupposition: For any contextually salient alternative x to Problem 2, it is
LESS likely that K. solved Problem 2 than that K. solved x.
Ipis the-LEAST likely alternative/Pr. 2 is the hardest
On the other hand the lexical entry above, by itself, cannot cover cases where even occurs
in a negative sentence or in the scope of other Downward Entailing (DE) operators. In fact, when
we turn to negative sentences, even appears to introduce a different scalar presupposition. This is
shown in (5).
(5) a. Kim didn't even solve [Problem 2]f.
b. Assertion (not p): Kim didn't solve Problem 2.
c. Presupposition: For any x among the contextually salient alternatives to Problem 2, it
is MORE likely that K. solved Problem 2 than that K. solved x.
p is the MOST likely alternative/Pr. 2 is the easiest
Surprisingly, the presupposition even seems to trigger in (5) is that the prejacent is the most
likely, rather than the least likely, among the alternatives; the opposite of what we just saw in (4).
Since, as we will see below, the choice between these two presuppositions is not always
determined by the presence vs. absence of an overt negation, it might be useful at this point to
introduce two abbreviations: adopting a terminology proposed in Barker&Herburger (2000), in the
remainder of this thesis I will refer to presuppositions that are typical of even in affirmative
contexts (like (4)c) as 'hard' presuppositions and to those that are typical of negative contexts (in
(5)c), as 'easy' presuppositions.
Hard presupposition = p is the least likely proposition among the alternatives
Easy presupposition = p is the most likely proposition among the alternatives.
In addition, for the specific example under consideration I will use the two following
abbreviations:
EasyP = Problem 2 was the MOST likely for Kim to solve
HardP= Problem 2 was the LEAST likely for Kim to solve.
As things stand, the meaning for even given in (3) above predicts presuppositions of the
'hard' kind but cannot account for 'easy' presuppositions. K&P 1977, however, suggest a solution
to this problem in terms of scope. Specifically they explain the presupposition in (5) as a
consequence of the scope of even with respect to negation: if even has wide scope, our lexical entry
in (3) captures this presupposition as well. 2 According to this view the LF for (5)a is (6)a. The
resulting presupposition (6)b is equivalent to (5)c.
(6) a. LF: even [Kim didn't [solve [Problem 2]f]] rthe rjaei t is n ,t p'
b. Presupposition: For every contextually relevant alternative x to Problem 2, it is LESS
likely that ]Kim didn't solve Problem 2 than that Kim didn't solve x.
Not p
'Not pJ'4 is' T"theLASTikelypi• s the:i "'t MOST likely 1
2 In order to account for why only this reading is available, the assumption that needs to be made is that even is a
positive polarity item.
Given that even takes scope above negation, the prejacent in this LF is no longer the proposition
that Kim solved Problem 2, but its negation. Therefore, the presuppositions of even, according to
(3) is that that Kim didn't solve Problem 2 is the least likely among a set of alternative propositions
of the form That Kim didn't solve x, where x is some other problem. Since for any two propositions
p and q if p is more likely that q than 'not q' is more likely that 'not q' (i.e. negation is a scale
reversal operator), this amounts to saying that that Kim solved Pr.2 is the most likely proposition
among a set of alternatives of the form that Kim solved x. DE expressions in general share this
feature with negation, thus the account extends to all other occurrences of an easy presupposition.
While scope is sufficient to explain why even can trigger an easy presupposition in the
scope of a local negation, in order to account for the absence of a hard presupposition in this type
of environment requires the additional assumption that even is a positive polarity item, and as such
MUST out scope negation when it is local to it (c.f. Ladusdaw 1979).
It is worth mentioning here that Rooth (1985) proposed a completely different solution
from the 'scope view' in order to understand the effect of even in negative sentences. Rooth's
alternative explanation posits a lexical ambiguity for even. According to his proposal, besides the
one even in (3), there is a second even ("evenNpl") which directly introduces the easy
presupposition. The distribution of this second even is confined to those contexts that typically
license NPIs (negation, questions, etc.), thus capturing the fact that its presupposition emerges
only when even occurs in the scope of DE expressions.
(7) IIevenNPiIIl= XC<st.>. Xp<s,t>: Vq<s.t>4[qEC & q p 4 q < likely p]. p(w)
Scalar Presupposition: p is the MOST likely among the alternatives ('easy').
(8) LF: [ Kiml didn't [evenNpl [ tl solve Problem 2]f ]] ] the prejacent is 'p'
One finds in the literature on even both arguments supporting Rooth's ambiguity theory
(see Rooth 1998, von Stechow 1991, Rullmann 1997, Barker and Herburger 2000, Giannakidou
2003 and Herburger 2003) and ones supporting Karttunen & Peters' scope theory (c.f. Wilkinson
1996). As we will see in section 2.4 below, the facts regarding even in questions, addressed in this
chapter, will provide indirect evidence for the scope theory. A detailed review of the scope vs.
lexical ambiguity debate will be offered in section 2.5.
2.2 A Puzzle of NPIs in Questions
2.2.1 Introduction
We can now start introducing our case study. I will do so by illustrating a puzzle concerning
questions with negative polarity items (NPIs), whose relation to even will become clear soon.
It is well known that Negative Polarity Items (NPIs) like any, lift a finger and the faintest
idea, are grammatical in questions. However the class of NPIs appears to split into two
sub-varieties when their effect on the interpretation of questions is taken into account: While
questions with any and ever can be used as unbiased requests of information, questions with so
called 'minimizers', i.e. idioms like lift afinger and the faintest idea, are always biased towards a
negative answer (a problem first addressed in Ladusaw 1979). In this chapter I will concentrate on
the case of y/n questions, wh-questions with minimizers will be considered in Chapter 3.
The solution I will propose for the polar questions elaborates on Ladusaw's original appeal
to general pragmatic principles linking the way a question is asked to the speaker's expectations
concerning its answer. Specifically, I show that the rhetorical effect of y/n questions with
minimizers is a consequence of presuppositions, which, in each utterance context, reduce the set of
possible answers for the speaker to the singleton containing the negative answer. From the
perspective of the hearer, the speaker's preference for a question associated with presuppositions
of this sort is a signal of her bias towards the negative answer.
The distinctive property of minimizers that accounts for these presuppositions is, as
already proposed in Heim 1984, that minimnizers contain a silent even, while any and ever do not
(contra Lee & Horn 1994). In other words, minimizers, but not any, are NPIs of the Hindi variety,
which also involve even plus an expression referring to a lower scale-endpoint (see Lahiri 1998). 3
One crucial ingredient of my proposal is Karttunen&Peters' (1979) and Wilkinson's
(1996) scope theory of even. The present section shows that, once the scope possibilities of even in
a question are taken into account, the bias follows from the semantics and pragmatics of questions.
There is an additional advantage of this analysis in terms of scope, i.e. that it accounts,
without any further stipulation, for certain otherwise unexpected presuppositions of questions
containing minimizers and more generally of questions where even associates with the lower
end-point of pragmatic scales (see Karttunen&Karttunen 1977 and Wilkinson 1996).
3 Importantly Lahiri points out that Hindi questions with NPIs are biased as well.
This section is organized as follows: in subsection 2.2.2 I present the relevant empirical
facts. 2.2.3 shows that the same bias of questions with minimizers is found in questions where even
associates with expressions denoting the lower end-points of the relevant pragmatic scales.4
Section 2.2.4 illustrates how the presuppositions introduced by even in a question relate to those
introduced by this particle in declarative contexts. Interestingly, when even associates with a scale
lower end-point, the presupposition of the question is the same as the one found in negative
contexts, although no overt negation is present in the question.
In the following section (2.3) I present my proposal. Specifically I argue that an analysis in
terms of scope predicts not only the bias of the questions under consideration, but also the peculiar
presuppositions they come with. What will make this unified account available is that a simple and
natural notion of possible answer to a question in a context is restricted to those propositions
whose presuppositions are satisfied in that context.
2.2.2 The Facts of NPIs in Questions
Questions that contain any and ever (like (9)a and (9)b) can be used as neutral requests of
information.
(9) a. Did anybody call?
b. Has John ever been to Paris?
On the other hand, questions with minimizers always come with what has often been
described as a negative rhetorical flavor (Ladusaw 1979, Heim 1984, Wilkinson 1996, Han
1998). Compare the a and b examples in (10)-(15).
(10) a. Will Mary lift a finger to help organize the party? Negatively Biased
b. Will Mary do anything to help organize the party? Neutral
4 As we will see more explicitly below, the scales I am talking about here are in a sense the opposite of likelihood
scales. The examples will involve scales ranging objects on the basis of their size or their difficulty. As solving more
difficult problems is, under normal circumstances, less likely than solving easier ones and lifting heavier weights or
moving for a bigger distance less likely that performing smaller movements, in all cases considered the lowest point of
these scales will correspond to the highest point on the scale of likelihood and vice versa.
(11) a. Did Mary utter a single word?
b. Did Mary say anything?
(12) a. Did John lend you a red cent?
b. Did John lend you any amount of money?
(13) a. Do you have the faintest idea how to solve this problem?
b. Do you have any idea how to solve this problem?
(14) a. Has Mary ever hurt a fly?
b. Has Mary ever hurt anybody?
(15) a. Is Mary advising even a single student?
b. Is Mary advising any students?
Negatively Biased
Neutral
Negatively Biased
Neutral
Negatively Biased
Neutral
Negatively Biased
Neutral
Negatively Biased
Neutral
In order to avoid confusion, a better qualification of these facts might be needed at this point.
It has recently become common practice to classify as 'rhetorical' those uses of questions
whose purpose is different from seeking information. Within this practice, 'negative rhetorical
questions' are only those questions whose force is not of an interrogative, but, for all intents and
purposes, of a negative assertion (see, e.g., Progovac 1993, Han & Siegel 1996 and Han 1998). 5
This notion of 'negative rhetorical question' does not accurately capture the rhetorical
flavor of questions like those in (10)a-(15)a, as the presence of minimizers does not always
prevent an information-seeking force altogether.6
Nonetheless, questions with minimizers are never neutral. If not 'negative rhetorical', the
flavor they come with is that of 'negative bias.' In fact, to the extent that these questions can be
used to elicit information, they cannot be used to disinterestedly do so (Ladusaw 1979, Ch. 8,
p.188). The presence of minimizers is systematically felt to signal the speaker's expectation for
(bias towards) a negative answer.
5 However, notice that within the above mentioned previous tradition, i.e. in Borkin 1971, Ladusaw 1979 among
others, the classification as 'negative rhetorical' was meant to merely indicate that the questions under consideration
are felt to be biased towards the negative answer.
Borkin (1971) illustrates this point by showing that questions like those in (10)a-(15)a are
infelicitous in contexts where it is clear that the speaker is unbiased as for what the true answer
would be like. Notice in these contexts that the corresponding questions with a or any are fine. (16)
illustrates this point.
(16)
Scenario 1:
I am trying to buy coffee at a vending machine that takes only coins. I need just one more penny to
get my coffee. Bill comes by:
a. Can you lend me a penny?
b. # Can you lend me a red cent?7
Scenario 2:
Jen is the administrative secretary of the department of linguistics at MIT. She is preparing a
document for the department archives that lists current students and their official advisors.
Stephanie is helping her out. Miss Calendar is a new faculty member and Jen doesn't know her at
all and doesn't know which students she is advising, if any. Thus Jen has no expectations as to
whether she has started advising already or not. She asks Stephanie:
c. # Is Miss Calendar advising even a single student?8  # Minimizer
d. Is Miss Calendar advising any students? /ANY
Ladusaw (2002) also observes that while questions with any, ever, and yet can be answered
affirmatively with a simple yes, questions with minimizers call for some further expansion in case
the hearer wants to answer them affirmatively:
6 I'd like to thank Klaus Abels for pointing out to me the importance of this clarification.
7 (16)b is perfectly felicitous in a scenario, where although Bill offers the speaker his help to pay for an expensive
book, the speaker knows that he has just lost his job and he really cannot afford to give away any money away.
8 Again, this question is perfectly fine when Ms Calendar has been around for a while already but actually Jen suspects
that she is very lazy with students.
(17) A: Did Mary contribute any money to this cause? 'ANY
B: Yes.
A: Did Mary contribute a red cent to this cause? # Minimizer
B: # Yes.
B': Well, yes, actually she gave a little bit.
B': Yes, actually she gave a lot of money, did you forget?
This seems to be a characteristic of rhetorical questions in general. For example, if the following
question is uttered by Kobe after a 52 point game, a plain no does not seem to be a felicitous reply:
(18) Kobe: Am I or am I not the best basketball player ever?
Addressee: # No
Addressee: 1 Well actually you are not, because other players did much better than this.
Given that judgments of this sort are quite solid, we can conclude that a minimizer in a
question obligatorily signals the speaker's expectation of a negative answer, whether or not the
question under consideration is also used to elicit some sort of information confirming or
disconfirming such an expectation; any and ever, on the other hand, do not generate this flavor.
The analysis presented in this section attempts to make sense of this difference.
2.2.3 Why 'Even'?
As mentioned above, my account of the bias of minimizers in questions will exploit Heim's (1984)
assumption that these items involve a possibly hidden even and that their overt component
provides a focus which even is associated with. This section shows why even is relevant.
Besides containing a covert even, the overt component of minimizers like lift a finger
clearly denotes the low end-point of the contextually relevant pragmatic scale (cf. Horn 1989, p.
399, see also ft. note 4). Interestingly, the semantic effect of even in questions depends precisely on
the position of its focus on the contextually relevant scale. When the focus is the lower end-point,
the question has the same rhetorical flavor to it as questions with minimizers, when it is the higher
end-point the question is, instead, neutral.
Consider, for example, a question like (19) uttered in a context where the relevant
alternatives to the focused element (add I to 1) are various mathematical operations, which can be
ranked on a scale of 'difficulty'. On such a scale, add 1 to I is clearly the lower end-point and the
question is felt to be biased.
(19) Can you even [add 1 to l]f ? negatively biased
On the other hand, if the expression associated with even denotes the higher value on that scale (as
in (20), the question can be used as a disinterested request of information.
(20)Can you even [solve this very difficult equation]f? neutral
Thirdly, when the position of the focus of even on a scale is still to be determined, the
question is 'ambiguous' between a neutral and a biased reading, accordingly. This is shown in
(21). (21)a is a biased question, if the relevant pragmatic scale in the utterance context is (21) b. On
the other hand, the same question is neutral, if Problem 2 is the higher end-point of the
contextually relevant scale, as in (21) c.
(21) a. Can Sue even solve [Problem 2]f? ambiguous
b. < the most difficult problem, problem n,..., Problem 2> negative biased
c. < Problem 2, problem n....,..., the easiest problem > neutral
Finally if there is no relevant ranking or if Problem 2 occupies a position somewhere in the
middle of the relevant ranking, then the question is just infelicitous:
(22) a. #Did Kim even solve Problem 2?
b. <the hardest problem, Problem 5, Problem 2, Problem 3, the easiest problem>
Notice that if we assume that minimizers involve a hidden even, the similarity between
questions involving them (repeated below) and questions where even associates with the lower
end-point of a scale, as in (23)a. and (23)b, is expected.
(23) a. Did anyone (even) lift a finger to help you? negative biased
b. Does John have (even) the least bit of taste? negative biased
c. Do you have (even) the faintest idea of how hard I'm working? negative biased
This is so because, as pointed out above, it is a property of these idiomatic expressions that they
always denote the minimal quantity or extent in their respective domains and therefore always
occupy the lower point of their respective scales. For example, in each context, the overt portion of
lift a finger will denote the lowest value on a scale where different actions are ranked with respect
to how helpful they turn out to be in that context.
(24) < be the most helpful ... ,
do the dishes and carry all the shopping bags,
drive the car and open the door,
open the door,
lift a finger>
Given this, an account of the biased reading of questions like (19)a. with even will
automatically extend to the systematic bias of questions with minimizers like those in (10) to (15).
Section 2.3 will present such an account.
Before turning to this proposal, however, in the next section I will introduce one further
puzzling correlation between the position of the focus of even on the relevant scale and the effect
of even in a question: while when the focus is the highest on the scale the question carries the usual
presupposition of even, when it is the lowest on the scale the question carries an unexpected
presupposition, i.e. a presupposition typically occurring when even appears in a negative sentence
(as first noticed in Karttunen&Karttunen 1977, see also Wilkinson 1996)
2.2.4 The Second Puzzle of Questions with 'Even:' 'Easy' Presuppositions
If we look at them from another perspective, the facts presented in the previous section show that,
besides an ambiguity between neutral and biased readings, questions with even exhibit a second
related puzzle, which has to do with which presuppositions even introduces in them.
Indeed, as we saw there, even in a question is compatible only with two types of contexts:
contexts where its focus is the lowest point on the relevant scale (the easiest problem, the smallest
thing etc.) and contexts where it is the highest point on that scale (the hardest problem, the biggest
thing etc.). But this means that questions with even are also ambiguous also with respect to the
presuppositions they carry (c.f. Karttunen&Karttunen 1977 and Wilkinson 1996). Let us see why.
Consider once more the example repeated in (25). Since this example is compatible only
with contexts where Problem 2 is the hardest or where the problem is the easiest, it is felicitous
only when either of the two following presuppositions is true: that solving problem 2 was the least
likely thing for Kim (HardP) or that it was the most likely thing for her (EasyP):
(25) a. Did Kim even solve [Problem 2]f? ambiguous
b. < problem 2, problem 5, problem 3,......, the easiest problem >
Presupposition: For any alternative x, it is MORE likely that Kim solved x than that she
solved Problem 2 (p is the LEAST likely among the alternatives) (hardP)
c. < the most difficult problem, problem 3, problem 5, ... , problem 2>
Presupposition: For any salient alternative x to Problem 2 it is LESS likely that Kim
solved x than that Kim solved Problem 2. (I.e .p is the MOST likely among
the alternatives.) (easyP)
This is so because if the problem is the hardest for Kim to solve (i.e. the highest on the difficulty
scale) the proposition that Kim solved Problem 2 is the least likely (lowest on the scale of likely
hood) and vice versa.
Importantly, given the correlation pointed out in the previous section between the position
of the focus of even on the scale and the interpretation of the question, the ambiguity between a
bias and a neutral reading and the one being discussed here are two sides of the same coin.
Questions with even are ambiguous between a biased reading carrying an 'easy' presupposition
and a neutral reading carrying a 'hard' presupposition.
The puzzle these questions exhibit, when considered from the perspective of what they
presuppose, is the following. Their two possible presuppositions (hard and easy) coincide
respectively with the presuppositions of the corresponding affirmative and negative declarative
sentences. Given this, the presence of a hard presupposition is not surprising, as there is no
negation in (25)a., but the presence of an easy presupposition appears at first to be puzzling from
the point of view of the scope theory adopted here, precisely because there seems to be no negation
in the question that even could out scope.
As a matter of fact, Rooth's lexical ambiguity hypothesis does instead predict the
possibility of an 'easy' presupposition as well. This is so because, the one even which directly
triggers this presupposition (i.e. (7) above), is expected to be licensed in questions by whatever
factor licenses NPIs in general in these contexts. In addition, precisely when the focus of even is
the lower end-point, the other meaning of even, which generates a 'hard' presupposition is
pragmatically excluded. This is only an apparent advantage of the ambiguity theory though,
because, as we will see below, this theory fails to predict the systematic co-occurrence of 'easy'
presuppositions with the 'negative bias reading' of the question.
2.2.5 Interim Summary: Restating the Puzzle
In the last two sections, two aspects to the 'ambiguity' of questions with even emerged. First, these
questions can be neutral or biased. Second, they can be associated with the presuppositions that are
typical of affirmative or of negative sentences containing even. The two aspects of the ambiguity
are related as follows: In contexts where the 'easy' presupposition is true the question is biased, in
those where a 'hard' presupposition is, the question is neutral. Plausibly, in some cases the
expression representing the focus of even is compatible only with one of the two presuppositions
(e.g. the easiest problem, the hardest problem) and therefore the question is either unambiguously
biased or unambiguously neutral respectively.
These facts are summarized in Table 1.
Y/N Questions With Even
CaseA ,Case B
Interpretation Biased Unbiased
Presupposition easy 'hard'
Examples: DidKimeven Solve Problem 2?
S'Did K even solve the easiest problem? .
Did K even solve the hardest problem?
Table 1
Since in minimizers even associates to the lower end-point of a scale, a question hosting one of
these items can only convey an 'easy' presupposition, i.e. they belong to column A, in tablel.
What is puzzling about these facts, is that even is capable of introducing in questions,
which do not contain an overt negation, a presupposition that typically emerges only when this
focus particle co-occurs with negation. In addition, the emergence of such a presupposition
systematically corresponds to a biased interpretation of the question.
Given this, although our initial goal was an understanding of the bias of questions of this
type, now the task becomes more demanding: finding a unified explanation of both this rhetorical
effect and of the unexpected presupposition of these questions (i.e. 'easy'). Despite the apparent
advantage of the ambiguity theory pointed out above, the remainder of this chapter shows that, the
scope theory ultimately proves more suitable to this task: An explanation based on a single
meaning for even (as in (3)) and the syntactic (scope) configurations in which it is interpreted
accounts for both the presence of an 'easy' presupposition and its co-occurrence with the
rhetorical flavor.
2.3 A Solution in Terms of Scope
2.3.1 The Idea in a Nutshell
According to the theories of questions presented in Chapter 1, asking a question like Did Mary
call? Amounts to ask which of the following options is true:
(26) a. Mary called.
b. Mary didn't call.
Similarly, (27) amounts to asking whether (28)a is true or (28)b is true.
(27) Did Kim even solve the easiest problem?
(28) a. # Kim even solved the easiest problem.
b. Kim didn't even solve the easiest problem.
The affirmative answer to (27)a is infelicitous, because it presupposes that the easiest problem was
the hardest for Kim to solve. 9,10 On the other hand, the negative answer is felicitous because it has
one reading (where even scopes above negation), carrying the opposite presupposition (i.e. easyP).
This helps understanding why questions where even associates with the lower end point of
the relevant scale are systematically biased: Since only the negative answer can be felicitous, no
concrete choice is given to the addresee: (s)he can only answer negatively. In addition, we can also
see why biased readings are systematically related to an 'easy' presupposition: the only real choice
given to the addresee is a proposition presupposing that the problem was the easiest for Kim.
An important and novel component of this kind of expalanation is the possibility that the
asnwers to one and the same question can carry different, and in fact incompatible,
presuppositions:
(29) a. Yes, Kim even solved the easiest problem presupposes hardP.
b. No, she didn't even solve the easiest problem carries an easyP.
9 Unless, of course, Kim is an ambitious and provocative student who always solves the hardest problems in a problem
set, and leaves out the easier. In such a context, where (28)a becomes a felicitous answer, the question is not biased to
begin with.
o1 The combination of assertion and presupposition of (28)a can't be represented in the semantics as felicitous, thus it
can't find a felicitous linguistic form. This is different from the following fact about any:
(i) Q: Did John say anything? Neutral
A: *Yes John said anything (Yes John said something)
(i) A is simply ungrammatical, but there is nothing semantically wrong with it. So the semantic object is perfectly
felicitous and will not be excluded as a possible answer. Indeed we can express the same content with some. On the
other hand (28)a. is semantically odd, because of the combination of even with the scale-bottom, but not
ungrammatical! ( see previous foot note)This is why an NPI even will not help!
Although surprising, this possibility can be shown to follow from the assumption that even
unambiguously denote the function described in (3) and from the syntactic configurations in
which it is interpreted in the question. An analysis in these terms will be presented in the rest of
this section.
2.3.2 Scope Ambiguity of Questions with 'Even'
If the scope theory of even is correct, the differences in table 1, repeated below, should be the
effect of a scope ambiguity. In this section, I will begin by showing how, besides the expected
'hard' presupposition, this hypothesis predicts the possibility of an 'easy' presupposition in
questions with even.
Table 1
In confronting the task of deriving 'easy' presuppositions, we can start by pointing out that
the presupposition of the negative answer would be an 'easy' one, if even was present in this
answer and had wide scope over negation (the opposite scope relation would generate instead
hardP)."
" The careful reader has probably already noticed that (30)b doesn't seem to have a reading where negation has scope
over even. The absence of this reading is due to the fact that English even is generally infelicitous in the immediate
scope of negation, a restriction that has often been attributed to a Positive Polarity nature of even. Given this, an LF
like (30)d should be ruled out. Notice, however, that I will not entertain the hypothesis that we can derive the above
ambiguity between hardP and easyP presuppositions in (30)a from a scopal ambiguity of even in the answer (30)b.
Such a hypothesis of a scopally ambiguous answer to a scopally unambiguous question would be per se implausible.
Instead, the analysis that will be presented below attributes the possibility of the two presuppositions of (30)c and
(30)d to a scope ambiguity of even with respect to the trace of whether in the question. Therefore, the restrictions on
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Y/N Questions With Even
CAseA Case B
Interpretation Biased Unbiased
Presupposition 'easy : - 'hard'
Examples: DidKim even Solve Problem 2?
SDid K even solve the easiest problem?
SDid K even solve the hardest problem?
(30) a. Q: Did Kim even solve [Problem 2]f
b. A: No, Kim didn't even solve [Problem 2 ]f
c. LFI: even [NOT Kim solved [Problem 2 ]f]
Scalar Presupposition: not p is the LEAST likely among the alternatives
d. LF2: NOT even [Kim solved tl [Problem 2]f]
Scalar Presupposition: p is the LEAST likely among the alternatives
(even>not)
¢€, easyP
(not>even)
(4 hardP
The task ahead of us consists in showing that the two different presuppositions are actually
due to different scope options for even in the question (30)a itself. In other words, the proposal is
that questions involving even are scopally ambiguous; under one reading they carry a 'hard'
presupposition, under the other they carry an 'easy' one. In order to entertain this hypothesis we
will need to make two assumptions.
The first assumption is that a y/n question always involves a hidden whether, (previous
approaches based on this assumption are Hull & Keenan 1973, Hull 1975, Bennett 1977, Hausser
& Zaeffer 1979, von Stechow & Zimmermann 1984, Higginbotham 1993 and Krifka 2001). Here I
will take this silent whether to mirror Karttunen's wh-words in its syntax and semantics. Within a
Karttunen-style semantics, this amounts to saying that whether denotes an existential quantifier
with an implicit restrictor, just like who (whose Karttunen-style lexical entry is given in (31)b for
comparison). 12 Differently from these wh-phrases, however, whether quantifies over functions of
type <t,t>,13 and its implicit restrictor contains just AFF and -:
Xt. t=1 is AFF
AFF (T) -4T
AFF (F) -4 F
Xt. t=O is -1
(T) - F
(F) - T
Intuitively, treating whether as an existential quantifier over a set containing only these two
truth-functions boils down to the claim that whether means something like which of yes or no (c.f.
the LF occurrences of the English lexical item even under negation, that blocks (30)d), will not affect it.
12 For the present purposes, it would be equivalently fine to adopt a Groenendijk and Stokhof (G&S henceforth)-style
semantics of questions and get rid of the assumption of a hidden whether. As an additional cost this hypothesis comes
with, though, a type lifted meaning for even would be needed in order to interpret the structures in which this particle
scopes above the G&S ?-morpheme (cf. Appendix).
13 That whether should denote a higher order quantifier of this kind is already in Bennett 1977 (cf. also Krifka 1998).
Krifka 1997), just like who is equivalent to which person.
(31) a. I[ whether ]= 3f<~tt, . h <t, [h = Xp.p or h = Xp.-p] and f (h)=1]
= which of 'yes' or 'no'
b [Iwho]= XP<et. 3xe [person (x)and P(x)=l] Karttunen-meaning '4
= which person
Like other wh-words, in the syntax, whether moves above the set-creating ?-morpheme,
leaving a trace of type <t,t> in its base position.'" The resulting denotation for a y/n question will
be a Hamblin-set, namely the set containing the affirmative and the negative answer.
It might be useful to see how this works for a simple y/n question like (32)a (see also
appendix for a more detailed derivation).
(32) a. Did Mary arrive?
b. {p , -p}
Whether Xf <. {f(p)}
1 { g(l) (p) }
? [[tl IA g (p)= g(1) (p) p=that Mary arrived
t I, It> Mary arrived
As shown in (32)b, the semantic composition proceeds in the usual manner. The denotation of the
proto-question contains the variable over truth functions, denoted by the trace of whether. At the
next higher node the X-abstraction rule applies and binds this variable. Then, the resulting
14 This is so if we assume, with Karrtunen, that all wh-words are existential quantifiers combined with their sister in
the syntax by a generalized version of Karttunen's Wh-quantifying Rule (see appendix). Alternatively, one could view
wh-words as 'question-quantifiers' (as shown in (ii)) and do away with the wh-quantifying rule.
(ii) I who] = Q e. t,,. {p: 3 x [person(x) & p e Q(x)l
.whether]l= XQ ,,.<,,t~,. {p: 3h.t> [(h= Xt.t or h=Xt.t=0) & p E Q(h)l I
15 In Chapter 3 an alternative analysis will be suggested, according to which all wh-words are indefinites rather than
quantifiers and are interpreted in their base position. The predictions with respect to the facts discussed in this chapter
will be the same as those of a movement-based analysis. Other facts however will suggest that an in situ analysis is to
be preferred. Given that for the purposes of this chapter the two views are equally suitable and because movement
makes it easier to visualize the core of my proposal, I will temporarily assume that all wh-phrases move at LF above ?.
X-abstract is combined with the quantifier denoted by whether, by an application of the following
versions of the wh-quantification-rule (see Karttunen 1977), generalized to all types of quantifiers,
as to cover the case of quantifiers over objects of type <t,t>:
(33) Wh-quantifying Rule (generalized):
If a has daughters 0 and y, where
[[1 ] w".g is type <<a,t> t> and U[y ] w. is type <cr,<st,t>>, then for every world w and
assignment g:
[a ]W".g = { p: [ ]"'g( x . PE yJ ]"'g(x))=1)
The output of this operation, in our example, is a set of propositions that contains, for each
function of type <t,t> in the restrictor of whether, the value of this function applied to the
proposition that Mary arrived. As there are only two of these functions (identity and negation) the
propositions in the set will be that Mary arrived and that Mary didn't arrive, i.e. the Hamblin
denotation of the question, as desired.
The second assumption needed for the present purposes is that even can have narrow or
wide scope relative to the trace of whether. This assumption is an implicit consequence of
endorsing a scope theory of even. The two LFs of (30)a. are, thus, (34)a and b.
(34) a. [Whetheri [? [tl [even [Kim solved [Problem 2]f] twhether >ever
b. [Whether1 [? [even [ tl [Kim solved [Problem 2]f] even> twhether
As an effect of the presence of even, the elements of the set denoted by each of these
structures are partial propositions: Each proposition is defined only in those worlds in which the
presupposition introduced by even is satisfied. However, given that the scope of even is different in
the two structures, these presuppositions will be, in turn, different. Specifically, those propositions
in the two sets corresponding to the negative answers are distinct partial propositions: the negative
answer to (34)a presupposes hardP, while the negative answer to (34)b presupposes easyP. Let's
see how this difference follows from a scope ambiguity of even relative to the trace of whether.
Assuming the usual meaning for ? (as in the Answer-basedApproach), the semantic
composition for (34)a is shown in (35)a (cf. also appendix).' 6 (35)b and c illustrate the denotations
and presuppositions of negative and affirmative answer to the question under this reading.
YES 0.
(35) a. { Xw. AFF [even I (p)=f l, w. e i • (p))=l
Whether Xf,-t,t .{Xw. f (lleven I]W(p))=l }
{fw. g(l) ([Ieven ]w(p)=l)
tl,<tt> [even ]]W(p)
even Kim solved Problem 2
b. [ no ]l=Xw.j[even Ifw(that Kim can solve Problem 2)=1
= - f even ]](that Kim solved Problem 2)
p = that Kim solved Pr.2
NOT > EVEN
Presupposition: That Kim solved Problem 2 is the LEAST likely proposition among the
relevant alternatives. hardP
c. [Iyes]l= Xw.j[even ]]W(that Kim can solve Problem 2)=1
= [[even]J(that Kim solved Problem 2)
Presupposition: That Kim solved Problem 2 is the LEAST likely proposition among the
relevant alternatives. hardP
In (35)a even composes directly with the proposition that Kim solved Problem 2, as shown in the
shaded box in the three above. Therefore the presupposition it induces will be that this proposition
is the least likely among the alternatives, no matter what value g(l) takes, i.e. no matter if we talk
about the negative or the positive answer.
16 Since the analysis is compatible with any current view on phenomena of association with focus, to simplify matters
a bit, I will leave out from the following structures the first argument of even, i.e. the set of contextually relevant
alternatives C, and assume, for the moment, that even is a partial identity function over propositions.
(36)b illustrates the semantic composition of (34)b, the structure where even has wide
scope with respect to the trace of whether (cf. also the appendix).
For every possible world w:
YES NO
(36) a. {Xw. ffeven] W(p)=l, Xww.
Whether fet,tt> {Xw. [I even] W(Xw ' . f (f1 K. solved Problem 2 W) =1)=1) }
1 {jw.[evenJ "(Xw'.(g(1)) (fIK. solved Problem 2 ]j"')=1)= }
even g(1)( flK. solved Problem 211)
p = that K solved Pr.2
tI.<L. im solved Problem 2
b. [[no ]1= Xw. [[evenl w (- (that Kim solved Problem 2))=1
= f[evenj (that Kim didn't solved Problem 2))
EVEN>NOT
Presupposition: The proposition that Kim didn 't solve Problem 2 is the least likely
among the alternatives. 4* easyP
c. [[ yeslj= Xw. 1evenJf(that Kim can solve Problem 2)=1
= f[evenll(that Kim can solve Problem 2)
Presupposition: That Kim solved Problem 2 is the LEAST likely proposition among
the relevant alternatives. hardP
In this case the argument of even (i.e. (gl) (p)) contains the variable denoted by the trace of
whether. At the top node, after the application of the wh-quantification-rule, whether has been
quantified-in and this variable is bound by this existential quantifier; given this, the resulting
denotation of this structure is the set containing two partial propositions obtained by applying
i[evenJ to the value of the identity or of the negation function applied in turn to the meaning of Kim
solved Problem 2:
{ f even ]( AFF ([[Kim solved Problem 21D) , [ even ] (- ([[ Kim solved Problem 2]D) }=
{ [[even](that K solved Problem 2) , [[levenj (That Sue didn't solve Problem 2))
As a consequence, in the case of negation, since f[even]j applies to the already negated
proposition, the presupposition it induces will be of the easyP kind, i.e. that Kim didn't solve
Problem 2 is the least likely proposition among the alternatives, thus that that Kim solved Problem
2 is the most likely. This is shown in (37).
(37) [Eeven]J (That Kim didn 't solve Pr2)
(i) is defined iff for every p in the set of relevant alternative propositions, p >likely that
Kim did NOT solve Problem 2; CeasyP
(ii) if defined, [[evenl(That Kim didn't solve Pr2) = 1 iff Kim didn't solve Problem 2.
On the other hand, in the affirmative answer even scopes over the identity function, i.e. an
upward entailing function, therefore the resulting presupposition is hardP, just like in the case
where even takes narrow scope instead.
To sum up, a scope ambiguity of the sort postulated above for a question like (30)a, i.e.
between the two LFs in (34), predicts the difference in presuppositions between the negative
answers of these two LFs that is illustrated in (38).
(38) a. Can Sue even solve Problem 2?
b. no answer to (34)a = - f[evenj (that S. can solve Problem 2)
Scalar Presupposition: hardP
c. no answer to (34)b = [[even]](that Sue can't solve Problem 2)
Scalar Presupposition: easyP
Interim Summar,:
Recall that our goal in this section was to make sense of the intuition that when eveln associates
with the lower end-point of the relevant pragmatic scale in a question, the question comes with an
'easy' presupposition. Let's see how far we got in accounting for this phenomenon.
So far, I have merely shown how a scope theory of even predicts that one possible answer
to these questions under one of their two readings (even>tracewhether) is associated with an 'easy'
presupposition. Since the presupposition of the other possible answer and of both answers under
the other reading is a 'hard' one, this obviously doesn't suffice to account for the intuition that the
question as a whole unambiguously carries an 'easy' presupposition.
In fact, we can conceivably take a question denoting a set of partial propositions to
presuppose the disjunction of the presuppositions of these propositions, as predicted on the basis of
the question felicity principle mentioned in Chapter 1. Recall that this principle indeed simply
requires that one of the possible answers to the question be felicitous. Given this, as things stand
right now, the above analysis still yields the incorrect prediction that, no matter what the position
of the focused expression in the relevant scale is, a question with even can have one of two
presuppositions: i. a hard presupposition, under its surface scope reading and ii. the disjunction
'hard or easy', under inverse scope of even with respect to the trace of whether.
In order for an 'easy' presupposition to become the presupposition of a question with even,
one of the two readings (i.e. tracewhether>even) and one of the answers to the other reading
(even>tracewhether) should be excluded for some reason, at the stage where the presupposition of the
whole question is determined. Section 2.3.3 shows that this is precisel; ., hat happens in the cases
where the focus of even is the lower end-point on the scale.
2.3.3 Presuppositions and Possible Answers in a Given Context: Bias Explained
In the previous section we saw that the Hamblin set of a question with even contains only partial
propositions, i.e. propositions whose felicity in a context will be restricted by the presuppositions
introduced by even. We can entertain some speculations about how this affects the interpretation of
a question containing even in a given context.
Recall that according to Stalnaker view, adopted in this work, the context is a set of
possible worlds in which all the propositions presupposed by the participants to a conversation are
true. Since answers with false presuppositions give rise to presupposition failures, it is reasonable
to assume that a speaker uttering a question in a context c is biased towards those answers whose
presuppositions are true in all the worlds in c ('true in c' henceforth). This section illustrates in
more detail how this effect comes about.
Let's call Q/c the subset of the Hamlin set Q, containing only those possible answers the
speaker is presenting as live alternatives in a context c, i.e. the answers whose presuppositions are
true in c. (See Heim (2001)).
On the one hand, when all the answers to a question have the same presuppositions only
two options are possible: Q/c can be identical to Q or empty. The latter situation results in a
presupposition failure and in fact the question is infelicitous, as we saw in Chapter 1. Consider the
famous example in (39).
(39) Have you stopped beating your wife?
If the utterance context c is such that the addressee has never beaten his wife, Q/c is empty
and the question infelicitous. This is so because both its answers (and therefore the question itself)
presuppose a proposition that is not true in c.
On the other hand, in cases where different elements in the Hamblin-set Q have different
presuppositions, there will be also contexts (say c') where the set of possible answers (Q/c') is a
non empty proper subset of Q. For example, if some possible answers to a question presuppose P
and others presuppose R and if P is true in c', but R is not, the situation will be as follows:
P-answers= answers presupposing P
R-answers= answers presupposing R
1• = Q/c'
O =Q
Given our considerations in the previous section, this is precisely the kind of situation we
expect to find when even occurs in a question and is associated with the scalar lowest va;ue. What
I will argue now is that, in contexts of the sort just described, the question will come with a bias
flavor towards the P-answers.
Consider once more our question (30)a, repeated below in (40). The utterance context has
the important function of providing the information as to how high on a pragmatic scale the
Figure 1:
denotation of the focused expression (Problem 2) is ranked with respect to the relevant
alternatives. The contexts that interest us, given our present purposes, are those in which Problem
2 is very easy to solve, i.e. where Problem 2 denotes the lower end-point of the scale (40)b below.
(40) a. Did Kim even solve Problem 2?
b. C':: < the most difficult problem,.., Problem 2 >
In a context of this sort, a 'hard' presupposition is false and an 'easy' one is true, thus Q/C'
contains only easyP-answers.
Figure 2: = Q/C'
=Q
This situation has two important consequences. The first consequence regards reading
(34)a (trace whether> even) repeated here as (41)a. Recall that under this reading both answers to the
question presuppose hardP. Therefore, this reading is absent in C' because all its answers
presuppose hardP and therefore would be infelicitous in C'. This is shown in (41).
(41)l[Whetherl? ti even M. solved [Pr2]fJ ]]= { 1even]j(p), -- [evenl(p) I
Since Yes presupposes hardP, f[yesl l f[(41)al /C'
Since No also presupposes hardP, 1[no]j f((41)a]/ C' 4i j(4)a]] C' = 0
The second consequence is that the set of those answers to the second reading (i.e. (34)b,
repeated in (42) that are possible according to the speaker's presuppositions, i.e. the set [[((42)]]/C',
contains only the negative answer. This is so because only this answer comes with a
presupposition that is true in C'.
(42) [[Whetherl ? even tl M. solved [Pr 2]f]l ={ f[evenj(p), 1[even] (-p))
Since Yes presupposes hardP, F[yesl 11(42)]/ C'
Since No presupposes easyP, I[no]le [11(42)11/ C' 1* (42)]]/C' ={ [even]](~p)
The conclusion is that, in contexts where even associates with the lower end-point of the
relevant scale, the question hosting it will be unambiguously interpreted under the wide scope
reading of even and only its negative answer will qualify as 'possible':
Table 2
This accounts for both the puzzling phenomena related to questions of this type that were
discussed in the previous sections.
First, we can now understand why a question containing even is felt to be biased towards a
negative answer, in contexts where the focus of even is the lowest scale end-point. If the speaker
decides to formulate a question in a way that, given the context, excludes the possibility of an
affirmat:ve answer, he must be biased towards the negative one. Second, as the singleton of the
possible answers in these contexts contains the answer presupposing easyP, if questions inherit the
presuppositions of their answers, as dictated by the Anwer-Based Approach to projection, then the
question also unambiguously presupposes easyP.
As mentioned above, the analysis presented here for questions with even extends
automatically to minimizers. Recall that these items involve a hidden even. In addition, given their
idiomatic nature, in every context, the overt portion involved in their structure denotes the lower
end-point of the relevant pragmatic scale. As a consequence, the present proposal correctly
predicts that these items will always enforce on questions a negative bias effect.
2.3.4 The Unbiased Reading Explained
So far, this section provided a unified perspective on two puzzling properties of questions with
minimizers and, more generally, of questions with even and a focused expression denoting the
lower point of the contextually salient pragmatic scale: A rhetorical effect and an unusual
presupposition. Adopting Heim's (1984) hypothesis that NPIs of the above variety contain a
hidden even, I argued that the two above properties follow from: the scope theory of even and
rather natural and simple assumptions regarding what should count as a possible answer in a
context.
The above proposal makes another desirable prediction. The prediction concerns contexts
where the focus of even denotes instead the highest scale end-point.
(43) a. Can Sue even solve Problem 2?
b. c: < Problem 2, problem 5,..., the easiest problem>
In contexts of this kind, the question in (43) is not obligatorily biased towards either
answer.
Recall from the previous section that the conditions under which a question is obligatorily
biased are the following: the reading where both answers have the same presuppositions (t whether
>even) is pragmatically excluded and only one answer to the question under the other reading
(even>twhether) is pragmatically possible, as illustrated in the picture below:' 7
Figure 3: Trace whether> even
Figure 4: even>Trace whether
/ No
* = answers presupposing hardP and therefore infelicitous in the context
17 We can view the effect of the presuppositions of even here as reducing the denotation of the question to a singleton
When the context is such that Problem 2 is the hardest (for Kim) to solve, this situation
never comes about. This is so because, although under the reading where even scopes above the
trace of whether, one of the answers is systematically excluded, the other reading is always
available and its answers are both felicitous:
(44) a. Whether, [? [tl [even [Kim solved [Problem 2 ]f] twhether >even!
b. f no ]= - [feven]j(that Kim solved Problem 2) NOT > EVEN
Scalar Presupposition: That Kim solved Problem 2 is the LEAST likely proposition
among the relevant alternatives. hardP
c. [yes]]= I[even]J(that Kim solved Problem 2)
Scalar Presupposition: That Kim solved Problem 2 is the LEAST likely proposition
among the relevant alternatives. hardP
(45) a. [Whether, [? [even [ tj [Kim solved [Problem 2 ]f] even> twhether
b. [ no ]= f[evenj] (- (p)) EVEN>NOT
#Scalar Presupposition: The proposition that Kim didn't solve Problem 2 is the least
likely among the alternatives. 4* easyP
c. [[yes] = ffeven]](that Kim can solve Problem 2)
Scalar Presupposition: That Kim solved Problem 2 is the LEAST likely proposition
among the relevant alternatives. hardP
The picture, in these contexts, is therefore the following:
Figure 5: Trace whether>even
Yes No
Figure 6: Even>Trace whether
Yes
by, e.g., applying Higginbotham's 1996 factorization process (see Higginbotham 1996, p. 375).
= answers presupposing easyP and therefore infelicitous in this context
Since in this case, a reading where both answers are presented by the speaker as available choices
no biased interpretation is enforced.
2.4 An Indirect Argument for the Scope Theory
In the previous section we have seen how a scope theory of even provides a unified account of both
peculiar properties that questions with even exhibit in contexts where the focus of even is the lower
end point of the scale.
At the beginning of this chapter (section 2.1) I mentioned that Mats Rooth in his
dissertation challenges Karttunen&Peters' analysis in terms of scope and proposes an alternative
view in terms of lexical ambiguity of even. In this section I will show that Rooth's lexical
ambiguity thesis cannot cope with the same set of empirical observations regarding even in
questions as well as the scope theory does. My conclusion will be therefore that questions provide
at least indirect support to the scope approach.
The question that needs to be addressed is twofold: first we need to establish whether
Rooth's theory can account for the 'easy' presuppositions these question can sometimes carry,
secondly whether it can also explain why these presupposition systematically co-occurs with bias.
With respect to the former of these two issues, as noted above, Rooth's proposal seems to fare as
well if not better than the scope theory. In fact it correctly predicts that questions with even can
have an 'easy' presupposition, because evenNpl, which is responsible for such a presupposition,
should be licensed in questions just like any other NPI. On the other hand, however, Rooth's
proposal, by stipulating the existence of evenNp, directly introducing an 'easy' presupposition,
leads to the incorrect prediction that questions with even should never be obligatorily biased, thus
failing to deal with the second of the two issues mentioned above. In the rest of this section I will
illustrate why this is the case.
In the contexts where a biased interpretation is obligatory, a hard presupposition is
infelicitous, while the 'easy' presupposition is true. According the ambiguity view, this simply
means that the non-NPI meaning of even (in (3) above), which triggers hardP, is excluded; the
only possible reading is the NPI one (given in (7) above), which triggers an 'easy' presupposition:
(46) a. Did Kim even solve [the easiest]f problem? hardP
b. Did Kim evenNP solve [the easiest]f problem? easyP
If c C; that Problem 2 was the easiest for Kim to solve then -> 'a and #b
Notice, however that the choice of the NPI-even, blocks our prediction that the affirmative answers
should be infelicitous in these cases. This is so because evenNpj actually introduces an 'easy'
presupposition in each answer, which makes both answers felicitous in the contexts under
consideration:
(47) a. Did Kim evenNpl solve [the easiest]f problem? Negatively Biased
a. [whether [? [evenNpl [Kim solved [the easies]f problem]
b. [[ no ] = - i[evenNpl]](that Kim solved the easiest problem)
Presupposition: That Kim solved the easiest problem is the MOST likely proposition
among the relevant alternatives. EasyP
c. ff yes] = iJevenNPI (that Kim solved the easiest problem)
Presupposition: That Kim solved the easiest problem is the MOST likely proposition
among the relevant alternatives.
b. Since c C that the easiest was the easiest for Kim to solve both answers are felicitous!
Defenders of the ambiguity view might object that evenNpl cannot actually occur in the
affirmative answer, because unlicensed, and that this excludes the possibility of (47)c. and is
enough to explain the effect of negative bias:
(48) a. *Yes, Mary evenNpI solved [the easiest]f problem.
b. No, Mary didn't evenNpi solve [the easiestlf problem .
However an explanation of negative bias along these lines cannot be right. In fact since the only
reason why evenlNp is unacceptable in an affirmative answer is that it is a NPI and NPIs want
negation, if the above account was correct, NPIs like any and ever should also trigger negative
bias, as they also are ungrammatical in affirmative answers.
(49) a. Did you meet any students? Neutral
b. * Yes I met any students.
c. No, I didn't meet any students.
But, as noticed at the very beginning of this chapter, this is not the case: any and ever do not trigger
bias in questions. As a consequence, what does triggers bias in a question with minimizers and
even cannot have anything to do with NPI licensing in its respective answers.' 8
As a potential rebuttal to my objection, the ambiguity camp might claim that bias should be
viewed as independent from the presupposition of even and rather as an effect of the presence of an
expression denoting the lowest point of a pragmatic scale (as basically proposed for the case of
minimizers in van Rooy 2002, which builds on speculation made by Krifka 1995).
This proposal does not seem to be correct either, as a comparison between questions with
even+the scalar low endpoint and the correspondent questions without even clearly show: while
the former are negatively biased the latter are not. Flr concreteness, Compare the effect of (50)a
with that of (50)b , in a context where the relevant pragmatic scale is (50)c.
(50) a. Did Kim even solve Problem 2? biased
b. Did Kim solve Problem 2? unbiased
c. <the most difficult problem, problem n,..., Problem 2>
Moreover, this view would still fail to explain the difference between minimizers and any, which
also denotes the lowest point on its own scale.
On the basis of these considerations, the conclusion we can draw is that the ambiguity
hypothesis has no explanation for the facts discussed in this chapter, and rather deprives us of the
only plausible explanation. Therefore, these facts provide at least indirect empirical support for the
competing view, i.e. Karttunen&Peters' scope theory of even.
18 Notice that Han's 1998 proposal only strong NPIs (cf. Zwarts' 1996) induce a bias effect in questions is not
satisfactory either. In fact Strong NPI should be ungrammatical in contexts like in (i). while minimizers are not:
(i) a. Less then 3 students lifted a finger to help.
b. At most three students contributed so much as a dime.
c. At most 2 people had the slightest idea about what was going on
Moreover, it is not clear how their 'strength' should explain the bias flavor of questions with minimizers.
2.5 On the Projection Problem
The previous sections have shown that an explanation of the correlation between bias and 'easy'
presupposition crucially relies on the fact that questions with even can contain propositions with
contrasting presuppositions, that their infelicitous answers are factored out and that the
presupposition of the remaining answers is inherited by the question as a whole.
In this section I will argue that, if this proposal is on the right track, it can actually shed
some light on the problem of presupposition projection in questions introduced in Chapter 1. In
order to do so, I will compare the predictions of the two approaches discussed there, i.e. the
Answer-based Approach, which was implicitly assumed so far, and the Question-based approach,
when applied to the case of questions with even.
I will conIclude the Answer-based Approach, is more adequate to the task, in that it derives
directly the presuppositions of questions with even. The Question-based Approach, on the other
hand, will prove at best to be redundant.
Let us consider each possible LF of a question with even in turn and see how each approach
derives its presuppositions. The first possible LF is schematically represented in (51):
(51) a. Trace whether>EVEN
Whether 0
? g(l) ([fven f(p))
t1 <> ffevenD (p)
even p
Recall that under the Answer-based Approach the lexical entry of the ?-morpheme is such
that its output does not inherit the felicity conditions of its input:
(52) if? D] = Xp<st>. (P)
Given this the function is always defined, i.e., for every proposition it returns a set containing that
proposition. Such a proposition, in this case, is both partial and assignment-dependent:
(53) i01 = {I w. g(1) (leven]]W(p)) =1 }
When the meaning of whether applies, the result is also always defined. Specifically we derive a
set of two propositions both coming with a hard presupposition:
(54) 1I11] = fw. AFF ([even]lw(p)) =1, Xw. -n (i[evenll (p)) =1 }
This makes the question unanswerable unless the hard presupposition is true, therefore the
question pragmatically presupposes it, i.e. it is felicitous only when p is the least likely among the
focus determined alternatives.
Let's now turn to the Question-Based approach. In this approach the meaning of the
?-morpheme is such that its output does inherit the definedness condition- of its input.
(55) For any possible world w, and assignment function g
ii ? ] w,,g = Xps,t>: w dom (p). { p }
Therefore, according to this approach, the meaning of the proto-question is the following:
(56) For any possible world w, and assignment function g
i[OIw*gis defined iff we dom (Xw'. g(l) ([[even]"w(p))=l)
if defined then IlO]f] ' g = {Jw. g(l) (I[evenllw(p)) =1 }
This node carries an assignment-dependent definedness condition. In order to determine how this
condition affects the definedness of the entire structure we need to establish how conditions of this
sort project when whether is quantified in.
There are two theories of presupposition projection in quantificational structures: Heim
(1988) and Beaver (2001). Heim's theory derives a universally quantified definedness condition in
any quantificational structure; Beaver's, on the other hand derives existential definedness
conditions when the relevant quantifier is an existential one. Therefore, according to the two
theories, the resulting presuppositions are as given in (57)a and b respectively:
(57) For any possible world w,
a. [Olj is defined iff 3f { AFF, -} s.t., we dom (f (fleven] (p)))
b. I[O" Wis defined iff Vf { AFF, -,} s.t. , we dom (f ([[evenJ] (p)))
Since f is outside the scope of even, the presupposition is, independently on whether f is AFF or -,
that p is the least likely among the alternatives, i.e. 'hard'. Therefore both the above conditions
can be satisfied only in worlds where the hard presupposition is true. When defined then:
(53) 0[[O11 = { w. AFF (I[evenl] '(p)) =1, Xw. --, ([even I(p)) =1 })
Like above, both answers come with a 'hard' presupposition. Given this, according to the
Question-based Approach there are two reasons why the question, under this reading,
pragmatically presupposes a hard presupposition. First because it semantically presupposes it,
second because it would be impossible to answer it felicitously unless it was true. Given this, this
approach presents some redundancy that was not there in the Answer-based Approach.
Let's now turn to the other possible reading of the question, schematically shown in (59)
(59) For every world w and assignment function g
0 Tracewhcther>EVEN
Whether 0
? [[evenj g(I) ((p)(w))
even g(l)(p(w))=l abbreviation p=Xw. Ipl "=1
1. <t> P
In the Answer-based Approach we saw that:
(60) a. [I0] = { w. [IevenD" g(l) ((p)(w)))=l
h iff[O = {Iw. ([[evenIw AFF(p(w))) = 1. Xw. fvenl]" , (p(w))) =1
= {Aw. ([IevenDl"(p) = 1. Xw. lfeven]w~ - (p) =
The result is a set of propositions, one presupposing easyP the other presupposing hardP. In
contexts where hardP is false, the hardP-answer is factored out and the question as a whole ends
up biased and presupposing what the remaining answer presupposes, i.e. easyP, and vice versa.
Let's see what happens if we, instead, endorsed the Question-based Approach. Once again,
the proto-question carries an assignment-dependent presupposition.
(61) For any possible world w, and assignment function g
[ff[O~j is defined iff we dom (Xw. eJven]]"(g(1) (p]]W)")=1)
if defined then [O]J'g -= {= w. f[evenJw" (g(1) ([Lp ")= }
In this case, however, unlike for the other reading, Heim's and Beaver's projection theories
ultimately generate very different results:
(62) For every possible world w,
a. ffO]" defined iff 3f E {AFF, -,}& we dom (Xw'.[[even]h(f.[[p"')=l)
we hardP v we easyP
b. i[Ow' defined iff Vf E { AFF, -,, we dom (Xw'.([evenDr(f.fp]j")=1)
wE hardP A we easyP (1)
If Heim's theory turns out to be the correct approach to projection in wh-environments, then the
Question-Based approach is empirically unsatisfactory, because it would make the prediction that
a wide scope reading of even in question would carry an inconsistent presupposition. This would
systematically exclude this reading and we would loose our account for bias and easy
presuppositions altogether. On the other hand, if Beaver's system turns out to be the most adequate
to cope with how presuppositions project in general under wh-quantification, than the
Question-based approach would be only redundant.
To see this, let's grant, for the moment, to the Question-based Approach that, in fact,
presuppositions project in this structures as Beaver would predict. If this is so then the question as
a whole would carry a very weak semantic presupposition, i.e. that either p is the least likely or p is
the most likely.
When defined its denotation would be the, by now, familiar set of two propositions with
opposite presuppositions, that the question denotes also under the other approach:
(63) If defined then If[iJW= {I w. ([[evenllw(p) = 1, Xw. ([evenH]~ - (p) =1 )
If this question is uttered in a context where the easy presupposition is true then it is semantically
defined (since for every world in the context set we hardP v we easyP) however it can only be
answered negatively. Given this, the question turns out to be biased. The reason why the question
as a whole appears to presuppose EasyP, rather than hardP v easyP is again a pragmatic one. The
presupposition of the question corresponds to the presupposition of the only felicitous answer.
Vice versa, when hardP is true, only the yes answer to the question under this reading survives,
and the question ends up pragmatically presupposing hardP. When neither is true, the question is
undefined and unanswerable at the same time.
Given this, on top of its purely semantic presupposition (hardP v easyP) , the question
always carries a stronger pragmatic one (either an easy one or a hard one), so that the semantic
presupposition is never really doing any work. Therefore, also in this case, the Question-based
approach is clearly redundant, in a way that the Answer-based approach is not.
Conclusions:
In this section I offered a comparison between the two approaches to presupposition projection in
questions hypothesized in Chapter 1. I have shown that, on the one hand, the Answer-based
approach can straightforwardly account for the presuppositions of even in questions. On the other
hand, the Question-based Approach does so only in a massively redundant way and requires the
perhaps controversial additional assumption that assignment-dependent presuppositions in
wh-quantification project 'existentially', as dictated by Beaver's theory, rather than universally.
Before concluding, it is also worth pointing out that the additional principle required by the
Answer-based Approach (i.e. the Question Bridge Principle, repeated below) turns out to be
particularly enlightening, once questions with 'unbalanced' presuppositions are admitted by the
semantic-pragmatic system.
(64) Question Bridge Principle
A question is felicitous ONLY IF it can be felicitously answered.
Specifically, the principle allows us to distinguish infelicity from bias. According to this principle,
for a question to be felicitous it is not necessary that all its answers have true presuppositions (an
implicit requirement assumed in Higginbotham 1993/1996 among others) but only that at least
one of the answers does.
Therefore, the empirical generalization that we predict is the following: a y/n question is
infelicitous when all its possible answers have false presuppositions, while it can be felicitous,
but biased when one, but not the other, of its answers is felicitous in the context. This
generalization is empirically supported by contrasts like the following:
(65) Common Ground entails that Mary never smoked.
# Has Mary quit smoking? Infelicitous
Set of felicitous answers = 0
(66) Common Ground Information entails that Problem 2 was the easiest
Did Mary even solve prob! -m 2? Biased but felicitous
Set of felicitous answers: {that Mary didn't even solve problem 21
2.6 Ambiguity Theory vs. Scope Theory of Even: an Overview of the Debate
In the previous sections I have shown how an analysis of even in questions based on scope allows
us to account for a number of puzzling aspects of these questions and how this account sheds light
on the general issue of presupposition projection in interrogative environments. In addition I have
shown that if a lexical ambiguity of the type hypothesized by Rooth was endorsed, the account of
bias would no longer hold. This 'ead me to the conclusion that questions with even provide
evidence for the scope theory.
As I mentioned above, however the current literature on even is still divided up into two
camps: one supporting the scope theory and the other Rooth's ambiguity theory. This section
presents an overview of this debate.
Above and beyond making the correct predictions regarding questions with even, the scope
theory is, at first sight, the more compelling alternative as it resolves the puzzle of the
presuppositions of even in negative contexts in terms of the very well motivated notion of scope,
while the ambiguity theory builds on the additional stipulation that expressions like even are
lexically ambiguous. Given this, all things being equal, the scope theory should •e preferred.
In simple negative sentences things are indeed equal, as Rooth's second lexical entry for
even was precisely crafted to mimic the meaning of even with wide scope over negation.
Importantly, however, when we take into considerations more cases of even in DE contexts, the
predictions of the two theories diverge. In this territory one seems to find evidence in either
direction. In the next subsection (2.6.1) I will report some of the most compelling arguments that
have been presented against the scope theory; in the following one, Wilkinson's argument in favor
of it. I will conclude that the issue regarding which theory is correct remains unresolved until the
problems undermining either of the two camps will be satisfactorily addressed.
2.6.1 Arguments against the Scope Theory: The Exceptional Scope of 'Even'
In this section I will concentrate on three main arguments challenging the scope theory of even. A
general objection based on syntactic considerations regarding covert movement (Rooth 1985,
Rullmann 1997, Barker and Herburger 2001); a related but more specific objection regarding the
peculiar constraints the scope theory needs to stipulate for the scope of even (Rullmann 1997); and,
finally, an argument based on the semantic predictions of the two theories (Rooth 1985). There is a
fourth argument in favor of the ambiguity hypothesis, that is based on the observation languages
different form English overtly signal the difference in meaning between the two evens Rooth
hypothesized by exploiting different expressions. This last argument will be left aside for the
moment, because Chapter 4 will be entirely devoted to it.
Islands Violations:
The first, and perhaps most serious problem, for the scope theory, is that is requires movement
operations that violate well known constraints on scope. For example, in order to derive the correct
presupposition in (67)and (68), i.e. an 'easy' presupposition, even needs to move out of the
antecedent of a conditional and out of a relative clause, respectively.
(67) Every student who handed in even [one]f assignment got an A
Presupposition: For n 1, the proposition that every student who handed in at least n
assignments got an A is more likely than the proposition that every student who handed in
at least I assignment got an A
(68) If you hand in even [one]f assignment, you will get an A.
Presupposition: For every n * 1, the proposition that if you hand in at least n assignment
you get an A is more likely than the proposition that if you hand in at least n assignment
you get an A.
However, both the above environments are islands for movement in general and therefore for
covert movement as well (as shown in (69)and (70)). Crucially, other focus particles are no
exceptions to this generalization, as shown in (71) and (72).
(69) a. If you hand in every assignment you get an A.
b. Every assignment is such that if you hand it in you get an A.
(70) a. Every student who handed in every assignment got an A.
b. Every assignment is such that every student who handcd it in got an A.
(71) a. If you hand in only [one]f assignment you fail the class.
b. Only if you hand in [one]f assignment you fail the class.
(72) a. Every student who handed in only [one]r assignment, failed the class.
b. Only every student who handed in [one]f assignment failed the class.
Analogously, movement over the trace of whether in y/n question should be ruled out by similar
restrictions on covert movement, if we want to account for the following facts:
(73) a. Did some students come?
b. 4 [whetherl [?[ tl [some students [came]]]]]
A: Yes some students came
A': No, it is not the case that any student came.
c. * [whether, [?[ some student [t [camel]]]] (neg. answer: Nobody came)
A: Yes, some student came.
A': #No, some student didn't come.
(74) a. Did you only meet [Mary]f?
b. I [whetherl [?[ tl [only [ you met [Mary]f ]]]]]
A: Yes I met only Mary
A': No, I met other people too.
c. [whetherl [?[ only [t, [ you met [Mary]f ]1]]]
A: Yes I met only Mary
A': # No, I only didn't meet Mary.
(75) Did you also meet Mary?
A': Yes, I met also Mary
A": No I didn't meet also Mary.
A"': #No, I also didn't meet Mary.
Summing up, the scope theory needs to stipulate that the movement of even is less
constrained than movement operations of a more familiar type. This seems to deprive this theory
of much of its initial appeal, a criticism that has often been brought into the debate by defenders of
the alternative lexical ambiguity view.(cf., e.g., Rooth 1985, Rullmann 1997 and in Barker
Herburger 2001).
Schwarz 2000 shows, however, that such an argument is not conclusive. His claim builds
on the following contrast, first noticed in Heim (1984):
(76) a. Every student that even handed in [one]f assignment, got an A.
b. # Every student thai even handed in [one]f assignment, was wearing blue jeans.
Heim points out that, in general, minimizers and the combination of even + the lowest end
of a scale is acceptable in the restrictor of a universal only if the relation between the restrictor and
the nuclear scope is non-accidental. Schwarz observes that, although exceptional, movement of
even from the restrictor of the universal to a position dominating the entire sentence, as the scope
theory has it, can account for Heim's generalization, while the ambiguity theory cannot. Let us see
why.
According to the ambiguity theory, the NPI lexical entry for even is interpreted within the
scope of the DE expression that licenses it. Therefore the prejacent should be the same in both (76)
a and (76) b and the two sentences are predicted to carry the same presupposition, despite the
different content of their nuclear scope:
(77) Scope of even in (76)a and (76) b: [ tl handed in [one]f assignment]
Presupposition of (76)a and (76)b according to the ambiguity theory:
For every student, for every n # 1, handing in at least I assignment is more likely than
handing in at least n assignments.
Since the presupposition is the same in the a and the b case, the contrast between the two
remains unexplained.
On the other hand, according to the scope theory, the entire sentence ends up in the scope
of even, and therefore the different nuclear scopes of (76) a and (76) b, contribute to the
presuppositions of these sentences, in ways that help understanding the detected contrast.
Specifically, only one of these presuppositions is perfectly natural, i.e. the one expressing a
generalization that is not contingent:
(78) a. Presupposition of (76)a: For n - 1, the likelihood of the proposition that every student
who handed in at least n assignments got an A is greater than the likelihood of the
proposition that every student who handed in at least I assignment got an A.
b. Presupposition of (76)b: For n # 1, the likelihood of the proposition that every student
who handed in at least n assignments is wearing blue jeans is greater than the likelihood of
the proposition that every student who handed in at least 1 assignment is wearing blue
jeans.
(78)b is extremely odd because it suggests that there is a relation between the number of
assignments students hand in what they happen to wear at the time the sentence is uttered, such that
that we should expect that the bigger is the number of assignments they handed in, the bigger the
chance that they happen to be wearing blue jeans .19
Schwarz's observation is important as it shows that, after all, it must be the case that some typical
restrictions on scope do not apply in the case of even and that contexts that appear at first to be
problematic for the scope theory turn out to provide supporting evidence in favor of it. Before
drawing this conclusion, though, one additional qualification is needed.
Schwarz's argument holds only insofar as the notion of likelihood is never understood
merely in terms of entailment, i.e. if it is not sufficient that p entails q for p to be less likely than
q. 20 In fact, if this was the case, also the scope theory would fail to account for the oddness of the
example in (76)b above. The reason is that the prejacent in that example entails all the alternatives
in C.
(79) For any n # 1, that every student who handed in at least I assignments is wearing blue
jeans ENTAILS that every student who handed in at least n assignment is wearing blue
jeans.
19 Of course we can think of a peculiar context where this relation ,olds. In such contexts the b sentence in (76)
becomes perfectly natural. The following scenario is an instance: The students in this class generally allow themselves
to dress casually only when they have done a good job. Their implicit rule is the following: they can wear blue jeans
when they hand in more than one assignment, and even a T-shirt, when they hand in more than 2. However,
apparently this semester they must have made their dressing code less restrictive because today ...every student who
even handed in [onelf assignment, is wearing blue jeans.
(79) is logically true because for any n, handing in at least n assignments entails handing in at least
1 assignment. Given this and since every is DE in its restrictor, for every predicate P, everybody
that handed in at least 1 assignment P entails everybody who handed in at least n assignments.
This means that no matter what P is, the prejacent is the strongest among the alternatives.
Therefore, if the truth of (79) above was sufficient to guarantee the truth of (80) below,
which is the presupposition of (76)b, then the latter should always be felicitous.
(80) For n # 1, that every student who handed in at least n assignments is wearing blue jeans is
more likely than that every student who handed in at least I assignment is wearing blue
jeans.
This is why the scope theory wouldn't fare any better with Heim's facts than the ambiguity
theory, unless something else besides entailment can be shown to be necessarily at stake, when the
relative likelihood of two presuppositions is evaluated in natural language.
At this point I can only offer some speculations on how this notion should look, in order to
overcome the above problem. What is needed for resolving this problem is a notion of likelihood
where strength is only a necessary but not a sufficient ingredient. This is plausible if we think
about likelihood in terms of expectations. Indeed, although if p entails q, we certainly will not
expect p to be true when q is false, this does not prevent us from having no expectations
whatsoever with respect to which of the two propositions has a better chance to be true, a situation
that would make them equally likely for the participant to the conversation. Plausibly, more is
needed than logical entailment to trigger our expectations with respect to the truth of certain
universal generalization, something that has to do with what usually happens in the world where
we live, connections between events and behaviors that tend to co-occur or that we even see as in a
causal relation with respect to each other. When these correlations are absent, we tend not to have
stronger or weaker expectations. We simply do not have any.
Since the presupposition of even requires that the prejacent is strictly less likely that the
alternatives, if likelihood is intended as above, when no ranking along the dimension of our
20 This problem was pointed out to me by Kai von Fintel.
expectations is provided, as in the case discussed above, the sentence is expected to be infelicitous.
Insofar as expectations, intended along these lines, are at the basis of the notion of
likelihood involved in the interpretation of even, then the scope theory does in fact help
understanding the above facts, while the ambiguity theory fails to do so.
The above considerations, if on the right track, might lead us to conclude that ultimately,
although the scope theory needs to assume movement operations of an exceptional kind, evidence
for such movement operations comes form the very presuppositions of sentences involving even
within DE islands. In absence of any alternative explanation for these presuppositions, all we can
do is to bite the bullet and recognize that even is exceptional in its scope possibilities. Questions
with even offer additional support to a move in this direction, because only the scope theory can
help understanding their bias, at the expense of stipulating that even can take wide scope where
other quantificational expressions cannot.
Peculiar Constraints on the Scope of 'Even' (Rullmann 1997)
Besides being exceptional in the sense that it violates typical movement constraints, Rullmann
(1997) claims that the scope of even, as the scope theory must have it, patterns in a very peculiar
way. In fact, while it can violate islands whenever crossing a DE expression, this does not seem to
be the case when even occurs in a relative clause headed by a non-DE determiner. In support of this
claim, Rullmann offers a comparison between the two following sentences:
(81) a. We hired a linguist who even read [Syntactic Structures]f.
b. We even hired a linguist who read [Syntactic Structures]f.
If even could scope outside the relative clause in (81)a, this example would have a reading
equivalent to (81)b. Crucially, under this reading the sentence would be expected to carry the same
existential presupposition of (81)b , i.e. the following presupposition:
(82) There is a book x, s.t. x # Syntactic Structures and we hired a linguist that read x.
Notice that for (82) to be true, the linguist who read SS and the linguist who read some other book
do not necessarily need to coincide. Under the narrow scope (NS) reading of even, the existence
presupposition is, instead, stronger and does impose this condition:
(83) There is some book x different form Syntactic Structures such that the linguist we hired
read x as well.
As a matter of fact (81)a is infelicitous in contexts where we hired two different linguists, one who
just read SS and the other who read only some other book, but felicitous if the linguist we hired
read some other book besides SS. On the basis of this observation, Rullmann concludes a WS
(wide scopes) reading of even must be impossible in this case.
The discrepancy between scope possibilities of even between DE and non-DE
environments is indeed quite suspicious. Thus Rullmann's observation offers a particularly
compelling argument against the scope theory.
Although I have no response to Rullman's point I'd like to point out two apparent
exceptions to Rullmann's generalization. The first exception concerns examples analogous to
Rullmann's but involving what looks very much like a higher contrastive topic. One such example
is provided in (84):
(84) This department is known for always hiring senior faculty. However this tendency has
been changing in the last couple of years. For example last year we hired a linguist who
graduated in 1998, and, ... [This]cr year we hired a linguist who even graduated [a week]f
before her appointment started!
Assertion: This year we hired a linguist who graduated a week before starting.
WS Existential presupposition: There is a time t e the day which was a week before the
appointment was supposed to start, s.t. we hired a linguist who graduated at t.
NS Existential presupposition: There is a time t 0 the day which was a week before the
appointment was supposed to start, s.t. the linguist we hired graduated at t.
Since linguists typically graduate only once in their life, the NS existential presupposition is
unlikely to be true. This notwithstanding, all the speaker I consulted found the sentence completely
acceptable in the above context, which suggests that even in this case is able to take WS outside the
relative clause here. 21
Another exception to Rullmann's generalization is found when we consider the case of
even in questions. Let us see why.
The examples in (85) show that covert movement of even out of a definite NP and out the
complement of predicates like claim is ruled out.
(85) a. #Mary didn't hear the rumor that John even solved [the easiest]f problem.
b. # Mary didn't claim that John even solved [the easiest]f problem.
(86) shows that questions where even is found in one of these two environments and
associates with the lower extreme of a scale are infelicitous as well.
(86) a. #Did Mary hear the rumor that John even solved [the easiest]f problem?
b. #Who claimed that John even solved [the easiest]f problem?
This confirms one of the findings of this chapter, i.e. that only under a WS reading of even
above the trace of whether the association with a scale low endpoint is felicitous. Since in these
two cases the trace is outside an island for the movement of even this reading is ruled out and
therefore the question is infelicitous.
(87) [Who[whether[?[twherher [ twhoclaimed that J. even solved [the easiest]f problem?]]]]
* even> twhether
However, when even occurs inside a relative that is headed by an indefinite expression, like in
Rullmann's cases, the question is felicitous and biased, which suggests that movement of even out
of this type of relative clauses ought to be possible.
21 Within the very same paper, Rullmann argues that actually even does not introduce an existential presupposition,
but rather triggers, together with the assertion, an implicature to the same effect, in virtue of introducing a scalar
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(88) a. Did Mary choose a house that even meets [one]f of her needs?
b. Who has a theory that addresses even [one]f of these problems?
(89) a. LF [whether[ ? [ even [t<t,L Mary choose a house that meets [one]f of her needs?]]]
b. ý Even> twhether
The two cases just discussed show, contra Rullmann, that some relative clauses headed by
non-DE expressions do not after all necessarily qualify as islands for even. Importantly, however,
since readings where even scopes outside these clauses become available only under special
circumstances, Rullmann concern towards the scope theory cannot be addressed unless an
explanation of why this is so is provided.
The Semantic Argument (Rooth 1985)
The perhaps most notorious counterexample to the scope-theory is due to Rooth. Rooth's example
is reported in (90)(cf. Rooth 1985, Chapter 5):
(90) Because they had been stolen from the library, John couldn't read The Logical Structure of
Linguistic Theory. Because it was always checked out, he didn't read Current Issues in
Linguistic Theory. The censorship committee kept him from even reading [Syntactic
Structures]f.
Rooth notices that the two theories of even make different predictions in this case. The scope
theory predicts the existential presupposition in (91)a, while according to the ambiguity theory the
sentence carries instead the weaker presupposition in (91)b.
(91) a. There is a book x, s.t. x / SS and the censorship committee kept John from reading x.
b. There is some book x different form SS, s.t. John didn't read x
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presupposition. One might wonder whether this does undermine Rullmann's conclusion. The answer is that it actually
doesn't. To see why see footnote number 27.
(90) shows that (91)a doesn't have to be true for the sentence with even to be felicitous, therefore
the ambiguity theory appears to make the right prediction, while the scope theory fails to do so.
Wilkinson's (1996) responds to this counterexample by suggesting that even in the above
case associates also with the subject of the sentence. If this is correct, the alternatives to the
prejacent are in (92)a. and the existential presupposition of the scope theory, is unproblematic.
(92) a. {p: 3x,y & p= that x kept John from reading y}
b. There is an x and a y, s.t. x # SS, and y# The censorship committee, s.t. y kept John
from reading x.
The following observation, due to Rullmann, suggests that something along the lines of Wilkinson
solution is on the right track: The variant with even overtly scoping in the matrix clause, given
below, is also judged to be natural in the above context (cf. Rullmann 1997, p.55):
(93) Because they had been stolen from the library, John couldn't read The Logical Structure of
Linguistic Theory. Because it was always checked out, he didn't read Current Issues in
Linguistic Theory. The censorship committee even kept him from reading [Syntactic
Structures]f..
2.6.2 Wilkinson's Argument in Favor of the Scope Theory
Although the scope theory has been considered problematic, in the face of the facts discussed in
the previous section, there are cases in which it fares better than the ambiguity theory. These facts
are brought into the debate by Karina Wilkinson (cf. Wiklinson 1996).
Wilkinson discusses examples like the following, where even occurs in the scope of factive
adversative predicates like sorry, be surprised and regret and is associated with a focus which
denotes the lowest point on some scale:
(94) a. Mary is sorry that she even [opened]f that book.
b. I am surprised that you even made [one]f mistake.
c. I regret that I even missed [one]f episode of Buffy.
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To appreciate Wilkinson argument, let's consider in turn what presuppositions the two
theories attribute to one of the above sentences.
Given the position of the focus associated with even on the scale, the examples above are
compatible only with contexts in which the 'easy' presupposition is true. According to the
ambiguity camp, this condition is imposed only when the NPI k :ical entry of even is involved.
According to the scope camp, on the other hand, this condition emerges when even takes scope
above the above matrix predicates, which are scale reversal operators. 22
Therefore the ambiguity view predicts that the sentence in (94)a should carry an existential
presupposition like the one described in (95)a:
(95) Mary failed to do something else with the book, different from opening it
If this was correct, then the sentence should be infelicitous in contexts where Mary did all other
possible things with the book (say read the first chapter, read half of it, read it all) besides just
opening it, but this is clearly not the case.
The scope theory, on the other hand, seems to fare much better with cases of this sort. The
existence presupposition this theory attributes to the sentence under consideration is given in (96).
(96) There is something different from opening it, that Mary is sorry having done with the book,
In fact, this presupposition does not entail that there is something else Mary hasn't done with the
book but that there is something else she did with the book.
Although the above facts do seem to be evidence against the ambiguity theory, the
argument in favor of the scope theory becomes weaker than it appears when other factive
predicates are considered. In fact, Wilkinson notices that also the scope theory runs into problems
when we turn to factive predicates that are not DE. She considers the predicate glad.
Also under glad, even can be associated with the low endpoint of a scale. For example, the
following sentence has a reading where these tickets are meant to be less desirable for the speaker,
22 Specifically, factive predicates like surprise, sorry and regret are Strawson Downward Entailing (cf. von Fintel
1999).
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when compared to the alternatives (cf. also Kadmon and Landman 1991 and Krifka for discussion
of similar cases):
(97) I am glad we even got [these]f tickets.
The scope theory derives the following presupposition by scoping even above the matrix predicate:
(98) For any relevant tickets X, s.t. X t these tickets, being glad to have gotten X is
more likely (for the speaker) than being glad to have gotten these tickets.
If it is less likely that the speaker is content with the tickets he got than he would be with others, the
tickets must be less desirable than others for her. The ambiguity theory can account for this reading
only insofar as it can show that glad can license the NPI reading of even (see Schwarz 2002, for
discussion).
The problem for the scope theory emerges, instead, when we turn to the existence
presupposition this view seems attribute to this sentence:
(99) There are some other tickets different form these that I am glad we got.
Given the factivity of glad, this presupposition can be true only if it is true that we got other tickets
as well. This prediction is obviously wrong as the sentence itself suggests that the tickets are the
only ones we got.
Notice that once we stipulate that evenNpl would be licensed under glad the existential
presupposition of the ambiguity theory would instead be unproblematic:
(100) There are some other tickets different form these that we didn't get.
This notwithstanding, Wilkinson does not consider Upward Entailing (UE) factives like
glad to provide support for the ambiguity theory. Instead, she suggests that the factive component
of glad must be factored from the alternatives even quantifies over. In other words the
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presupposition of even is computed solely on the truth-conditional content of the prejacent.
Let's see how this would solve the problem for the scope theory. To illustrate the point we
can substitute x is gad that p with x would be glad ifp, which is a close enough paraphrases of the
former minus factivity. When factivity is factored out, the existence presupposition predicted by
the scope theory is correct:
(101) There are other tickets different form these that I would be glad if we got.
Notice that, Wilkinson solution seems to make the correct prediction in other cases as well:
(102) People didn't seem to feel like dancing last night, even [Bill]f danced only with Sue.
Although only introduces the presupposition that Bill danced with Sue, (102) is felicitous
even when nobody else danced at all. This shows that this presupposition is ignored when the
existential presupposition of even is compute.
If all cases where like the two discussed above, we could entertain the hypothesis that it is part of
the meaning of even to ignore the presuppositions of its argument and therefore rescue the scope
theory from the apparent problem with glad. Unfortunately, however, it is not at all clear that
Wilkinson's proposal generalizes to all cases. One problematic example is given in (103) the
following sentence:
(103) Don't worry, there will be no smokers at the dinner. My sister and my mother never
smoked and #even my friend Willow quit smoking/ no longer smokes.
Both quit and no longer introduce the presupposition that sometime before the reference time the
property in their complement (here smoking) was true of the subject (here Willow). If this
presupposition was factored out from the existence presupposition of even, the sentence above
should only presuppose that someone different from Willow is not a smoker. However, if this was
the case then the sentence above should have been felicitous as there are other people that do not
smoke in the context. Since, however, there is nobody who used to be a smoker the use of even in
this case is inappropriate, which suggests that the existence presupposition of even does require
that someone else not only is a non-smoker at the time of the utterance but also used to be one
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sometime before.
Summing up, there seems to be a certain degree of variation with respect to which
presuppositions even can ignore and which seem instead to be taken as definedness conditions also
of the alternatives this particle quantifies over. The presupposition that the prejacent is true carried
by only and factive predicates appear to be ignorable, but other presuppositions don't. It is hard to
see how this variation could be derived just from the meaning even.
To conclude, while occurrences of even in factive DE environments is problematic for
Rooth's ambiguity theory of even, the interaction between even and presuppositions in its scope
needs to be better understood in order to establish whether this evidence does provide a convincing
argument in favor of the competing theory.
2.6.3 Conclusions
This section showed that the analysis concerning the behavior of even in DE contexts is still
subject to debate. Arguments have been presented against and in favor of each of the two possible
analyses of these cases, the scope theory and the ambiguity theory. Hopefully the discussion above
has given the reader a taste of how these arguments are based on yet to be fully understood facts.
2.7 More on Even: Likelihood, Universal Force and Existential Presupposition
Besides their scope theory, other three components of Karttunen&Peters' analysis of even, which I
have endorsed in this chapter, have been challenged: (i) that the relevant scale involved in the
meaning of even should (always) be a likelihood scale, (the likelihood view) (ii) that the prejacent
should be the least likely among the alternatives (rather than, e.g. less likely than most of them)
(iii) that the existential presupposition should be part of the lexical import of even.
The aim of this section is to provide a discussion as comprehensive as possible of the
nature of the debate and to show which, if any of the objections against Karttunen&Peters'
proposal directly affect my analysis of questions with even (cf. also Rullmann 1997 for an
extensive survey and discussion, from which much is taken here).
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2.7.1. The Scales of 'Even'
Following up on a criticism already expressed in Horn (1979) and Kay (1995), Rullmann (1997)
presents the following example as counterevidence for the likelihood hypothesis:
(104) A: Is Claire an ASSISTANT professor?
B: No, she's even an ASSOCIATE professor.
Rullmann claims that it is not necessary that being an associate professor be less likely for Claire
than being an assistant professor for this dialog to be felicitous. Specifically, he argues that the
example is felicitous even in a context where it is mutually believed, by all the participants to the
conversation, that Claire is an established scholar, with very good teaching record in a well
standing department and whose tenure case has been already discussed.
The speakers I consulted, however, find the example completely unacceptable in a scenario
of this kind. In fact it seems to be the case that A's question itself suggests that A believes that
being an associate professor is not very likely for Claire. Moreover the variant of Rullmann's
example like given in (105), uttered in a context where Claire still has her job, is patently
infelicitous, which suggests, contra Rullmann, that the example above is completely degraded in
contexts where it is common and relevant knowledge that being an associate is more likely for
Claire than being an assistant professor rather than the other way around. And, in fact,
(105) A: Is Claire an ASSISTANT professor?
B: # No, didn't you know that all assistant professors have been fired? Claire is even an
ASSOCIATE professor.
Similarly, when being an assistant professor is taken to be as likely for Claire as being an associate
professor, and when the relative likelihood of the two possibilities for Claire is irrelevant, a
sentence like (104)B. This is shown in (106):
(106) A: Claire is an assistant professor or an associate but I don't remember which.
B: #She's even an ASSOCIATE professor./ She is an associate professor.
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If A's utterance indicates that A considers the two options (being an associate or an assistance
professor) equally likely. This is sufficient to render impossible for B to use even in his reply.
My conclusion is that Rullmann's claim is incorrect because the example he discusses does
not aftcr all provide compelling evidence against the likelihood hypothesis, but rather confirms it.
2.7.2 The Quantificational Force of the Scalar Presupposition
The second objection addresses the second aspect of the classic Fauconnier-K&P analysis,
i.e. the claim that the prejacent is the least likely among the alternatives rather than less likely than,
say, some or most of them (universal scalar presupposition hypothesis). Examples like the one in
(107), due to Paul Kay, appear to challenge this hypothesis:
(107) Not only did Mary win the first round match, she even won the semifinals.
The problem for the universal scalar presupposition view is that it wrongly predicts (107)
to be infelicitous because the semifinals do not represent the highest point of the relevant scale and
the prejacent is not the lowest on a scale of likelihood. Notice however that the alternative
suggesting that prejacent must be less likely then MOST alternatives (cf. Francescotti 1995)
doesn't seem to fare any better with analogous facts. For example, such a proposal would
incorrectly predict the following sentence to be infelicitous if the tournament includes, say, 20
rounds:
(108) Not only did Mary win the first round match, she even won the third round match.
Moreover, the above sentences do present a problem for the universal hypothesis only
insofar as we are forced to assume that the finals are actually considered among the relevant
alternative in the context. Given this, one could defy Kay's and Rullmann's argument, if one could
show that it is possible that the proposition that Mary won the finals is simply not even considered
as a relevant alternative. In fact, if this was the case, the proposition that Mary won the semifinals
would be the least likely among the relevant alternatives, and therefore the scalar presupposition
of even in the examples under consideration would be satisfied.
108
At first sight, examples like (109) appear to challenge this solution:
(109) Not only did Mary win the first round match, she even won the semifinals, but of course
she didn't win the finals.
It seems to be the case that a felicitous context for an utterance of (109) should be such that
winning the finals is one of the relevant alternatives.
However, further considerations regarding the semantics of even might show that actually
this counterproposal can account for (109) as well. What makes this possible is a dynamic
perspective within which one can hypothesize that the context has shifted in the transition between
the first and the second conjunct and that the set of alternatives C, which is contextually
determined, is influenced by this shift as well.
Specifically, the idea is that the context with respect to which the first conjunct in (109) is
interpreted is such that the alternative that Mary won thefinals is not even considered, for instance
because completely implausible. This assumed, we can entertain the additional hypothesis that the
contextually determined set of alternatives C doesn't contain this proposition either.
By the time the second conjunct is interpreted, the information conveyed by the first
conjunct, i.e. that Mary won the semifinals, is already added to the CG and this makes the
possibility that she could have won the finals as well more plausible than it was before. 23 Under
our current additional assumption that the set of alternatives C also widens when we transit from
the first to the second conjunct, then the second conjunct is interpreted with respect to a C' which
does contain the alternative that Mary won the finals. This much would suffice to account for the
above sentence without modifying our theory of even.
The above-mentioned assumptions find at least some independent motivation when we
consider the nature of one of the ingredients in the meaning of even. Notice, first, that the notion of
likelihood obviously involves modality. Extending von Fintel's (2001) analyses of
counterfactuals, we can assume that sentences involving even, in virtue of the modal aspect of this
particle, are interpreted with respect to an admissible Modal Horizon (MH). An admissible MH is
a function, which generates, for each possible world a set of possible worlds that are most
23 Alternatively, the possibility that Mary won the finals might be made relevant by the very sentence that refers to it.
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accessible to it with respect to the relevant ordering source (i.e. a well-behaved Lewis sphere
around the evaluation world, von Fintel 1999 p. 141 and von Fintel 2001).
If we intend likelihood in terms of speaker's expectations, the ordering source has to be one
that ranks worlds with respect to how close they are to the speaker's expectations in the actual
world, which, in turn, depend on what the speaker actually believes. Given this it is at least
plausible that the MH with respect to which the above example is initially interpreted is one where
the worlds where Mary wins the finals are excluded, because they are too far from what is
expected. If, as a consequence, the proposition that Mary won the finals is excluded from C, the
universal scalar presupposition of even is satisfied.
In von Fintel's dynamic analyses of counterfactuals, one feature of Modal Horizons is that
they extend continuously, as the conversation proceeds and new information is added to the CG.
Also in our example, at the time the second conjunct is interpreted the MH has widened as to
include the worlds in which Mary does win the finals. This might be possible because this
possibility is referred to in the second conjunct itself or because once the information that Mary
won the semifinals is processed, the expectations regarding Mary's performance become more
optimistic, thus making the possible scenarios in which she wins the finals closer to the actual
world than they were before (c.f. ft. note 23).24 This explains why in the last conjunct this
possibility can be considered and still marked as even less likely.
If this anL iysis is on the right track there is no reason to weaken the scalar presupposition of
even in order to account for Kay's and Rullmann's facts. Given this and in the absence of a valid
alternative, I will keep assuming with Stalnaker, K&P, Rooth and many others that the scalar
presupposition introduced by even is after all a universal one.
2.7.3 The Existential Presupposition
The third objection to the traditional view on even targets the claim that even introduces the
presupposition that there is some true proposition among the alternatives in C other than the
prejacent (existence presupposition hypothesis). The skepticism towards this existential
presupposition originates from the observation, due to von Stechow (1991), that examples like
24 I'd like to thank Kai von Fintel for pointing out this option to me.
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(110) are acceptable, although given the presence of only in the sentence such a presupposition
would contradict the assertion.
(110) Yesterday at the party, John even danced only with [[Sue]f]f.
Assertion: John didn't dance with anybody different from Sue
Existential Presupposition: There is some x different from Sue such that J. danced only
with x.
Importantly, the claim that this example should represent a problem for the existence
presupposition hypothesis crucially relies on the not necessarily uncontroversial assumption that
even and only associate with the same focus.
Therefore, before dismissing the existential presupposition of even altogether, some further
consideration regarding the acceptability conditions of the above example might be important.
According to a significant number of speakers, the above sentence is acceptable only in two types
of contexts: (i) in contexts where it is commonly known and salient that John at the party or in
some other occasion did something else, also surprising, than dancing uniquely with Sue and (ii) in
contexts where instead somebody else danced uniquely with a person different from Sue.
Although these intuitions are quite solid, it is not completely obvious what they are due to.
On the one hand they suggest that there is a reading of the above sentence where an existential
presupposition of some sort is after all triggered by the presence of even. Moreover, under this
reading, this presupposition is perfectly compatible with the truth-conditional import of only. On
the other hand this is so because the alternative propositions that seem relevant for such a
presupposition are different from what they should be if the focus of even was just the NP Sue.
Specifically, alternatives to the entire VP danced only with Sue, in one case and alternatives to
John in the other seem to play a role in determining the existential presupposition I'm talking
about, as if the focus even associates with was in fact either the whole VP or the subject and the
object NP, rather than just the object NP Sue.
The above observation does not merely show that the above sentence has one possible
reading, with the focus of even actually bigger than the focus of only, that carries an existential
presupposition, but it also shows that the sentence fails to have a reading where even and only
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share the same focus and the existential presupposition is absent. This is so because such a reading
should be felicitous in contexts where speaker and addressees do not know whether John or
anybody else did anything different from dancing with Sue, while the sentence is not.
We do instead predict that the above sentence is acceptable in the two types of contexts
described above if either the entire VP was the focus of even or even was associated with two foci,
i.e. the NP Sue together with the subject John:
(111) a. John even [danced only with [Sue]f]f.
Existence Presupposition: There is something else that John did besides dancing only
with Sue.
b. [John]f even danced only with [Sue]f.
There is some x # John and some y • Sue s.t. x danced only with y.
The first option is straightforward, as intonational prominence on the object NP is compatible with
a focus as big as any constituent containing it, thus the VP as well. The hypothesis that the second
option is also a possibility is inspired by a solution found in Wilkinson (1996) of related cases
where the traditional view on even also appears to make incorrect predictions as far as the
existential presupposition is concerned (c.f. Wilkinson 1996 and discussion in the next session),
and depends on the assumption that even, differently from only needs to dominate its focus only at
LF.
While the above discussion shows that it is far from so clear that examples like (109)
should provide any evidence against the existential presupposition view, other facts, appear
instead to challenge more seriously the claim that such a presupposition is part of the meaning of
even. One instance is the dialog in (102), already considered above:
(112) A: Is Claire an ASSISTANT professor?
B: No, she's even an ASSOCIATE professor.
B's utterance indeed appears to involve an instance of even that cannot possibly introduce
the presupposition that some alternative proposition is true, besides the prejacent, because all the
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focus-determined alternatives are mutually exclusive. 25
On the basis of examples like the above, Rullmann concludes, with von Stechow, that the
existence presupposition is not part of the meaning of even, but points out that, if we drop this
assumption, examples like the following should still be explained:
(113) a. #We even invited [Bill]f, although we didn't invite anyone else.
b. #John even drank [beer]f, but that was the only thing he drank.
(Rullmann 1997, p.18)
In order to explain the effect of the existence presupposition in the cases where it is present,
Rullmann suggests deriving it in the form of an implicature from the assertion and the scalar
presupposition of even, on the basis of the following Gricean reasoning:
i. The speaker asserted p
ii. The speaker conveyed that p is the least likely to be true among the relevant alternatives
Conclusion: The speaker must have intended me (the addressee) to infer that some more likely
alternative is also true.
Importantly, the above reasoning goes through only insofar as the alternative relevant
propositions are related by entailment. This is what explains the absence of an existential
25 There is actually an alternative way to understand this example and all cases where the relevant scale appears to be
one where the alternatives are mutually exclusive, without giving up the existence presupposition of even. One could
entertain the hypothesis that even requires a scale where actually all the alternatives are related by entailment (or
perhaps 'lumping' in the sense of Kratzer 1989). Even when the relevant ranking appears to be violating this
condition, a pragmatic mechanism of 'conversion' can transform it in a well-behaved entailment scale. What this
mechanisms needs is a salient gradable property, like 'at least as good as' or 'as least as desirable as' or 'at least as far
in his carrier as' etc. When such a property is available, then each element in the ranking can be transformed into an
element on an entailment scale by modifying it with the relevant gradable property to it. For instance, in our case
above, while the alternatives to be an Associate professor, to be an Assistant professor, to be a temporary
lecturer...are mutually exclusive, the correspondent to be at least as far in her career as an Associate professor, to be
at least as far in her carrear as Assistant professor, to be at least as far in her carrier as a temporary lecturer...are all
related to each other by entailment (Something along these lines might be independently needed in order to resolve a
puzzle pointed out in Schwarz (2002), and discussed in the next chapter). If this picture is on the right track, we might
also understand the degree of acceptability of sentences like (112)B as a function of how easily a gradable property
that is adequate for turning the ranking into an entailment scale is can be made available in the context.
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implicature in examples like (112). What blocks the 'implicature' here is that the relevant
alternatives are mutually exclusive, therefore no inference can be drawn:
(114) A: Is Claire an ASSISTANT professor?
B: No, she's even an ASSOCIATE professor.
Since there is no entailment between being a full professor, an associate, an assistant, and a
post-doc, no inference can be triggered from the assertion of the prejacent and the presupposition
that the prejacent is the lowest element on the scale. 26, 27
The appealing feature of Rullmann's proposal is that it exploits independent pragmatic
mechanisms to resolve a very mysterious puzzle. However, for his indirect account to extend to all
cases, Rullmann needs to assume that the inference leading to an existential implicature is
supported also when the relevant alternatives aren't in a relation of logical entailment:
(115) Mary even likes [sprouts]f.
Existence presupposition: Mary likes some other food besides sprouts.
In this case, since liking sprouts does not entail liking other kinds of more tasty food, from the
assertion (that Mary likes potatoes) together with the presupposition that liking sprouts is less
likely than liking other kinds of food, we are actually not entitled to conclude that Mary likes
26 Rullmann claims that such an indirect account explains away also some counterexamples to Rooth's ambiguity
theory. I will return to this issue the end of this chapter.27 Recall that one of Rullmann's arguments against the scope theory was based on observations regarding the
existential presupposition of sentences containing even. We are now in the position to address the question raised in ft.
21, i.e. whether the claim that even does not per se introduce a presupposition of this type does undermine that
argument. As mentioned in that footnote 21 this is actually not the case. In fact, also in Rullmann's indirect approach,
the intuition that a speaker uttering (81)a is committed to the truth of the stronger (83) can only be accounted for if
even has necessarily narrow scope (NS): Only the NS scalar presupposition, together with the assertion can generate
this stronger existential implicature. The WS and the NS scalar presuppositions are given below:
(i) For every x, s.t. x # SS, Hiring a linguist who readx is more likely than hiring a linguist that read SS.
(ii) For every, s.t x 4 SS, reading x is more likely for y (the linguist we hired/ every linguist) than reading SS.
Because of the two different scalar presuppositions, the WS and the NS readings also generates different implicatures:
(iii) The speaker asserts that the speaker's department hired a linguist that read SS and Presupposes (i)
Conclusion: The speaker must have intended me (the addressee) to infer (82)
(iv) The speaker asserts that the speaker's department hired a linguist that read SS and Presupposes (ii)
Conclusion: The speaker must have intended me (the addressee) to infer (83)
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something else. Although Rullmann does discuss the problem, he does not provide a convincing
solution to it.
In conclusion, since the evidence concerning the existence presupposition is not
conclusive, and since the results of my analysis of even in questions are independent from whether
or not we ultimately assume even to carry an existence presupposition, in remainder of this these I
will keep assuming this presupposition but focus solely on the scalar presupposition, repeated
below:
(116) IIeven I w(C)(p) is defined only if Vq eC [ q : p 4 q >LIKELY P
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Chapter 3
Presuppositions and Bias in Wh-questions
The focus in the previous chapter was on the presuppositions and meaning of polar questions
containing even and minimizers. This chapter aims to bring into the picture the case of wh-
questions as well.
Ladusaw (1979) observes that the way minimizers affect the interpretation of a hosting
constituent question is the same as the way they affect the interpretation of a y/n question: unlike
any and ever, minimizers force a negative bias reading in these questions as well. Specifically
wh-questions containing minimizers express the speaker's expectation that the open sentence
inside the proto-question is true of no relevant individual in the restrictor of the wh-phrase. In
other words the kind of answer the speaker expects when she asks a wh-question with a
minimizer is nobody, nothing or, e.g., no student depending on the restrictor of the wh-word.
In this chapter we will also see that, the correlation between questions with minimizers
and questions with even, pointed out in the previous chapter, fully extends to the case of wh-
questions as well: also wh-questions with even are ambiguous between a biased and a neutral
reading (c.f. Wilkinson 1996) and also in this case bias systematically coincides with cases
where the question carries an 'easy' presupposition, while under a neutral reading the question
carries a 'hard' presupposition. The contextual information regarding the position of the focus of
even resolves the ambiguity: if the focus is the lowest on the scale then the first reading is the
only one available. If the focus is the highest, then the second reading is. In all other cases the
question as a whole is infelicitous.
Since wh-questions and y/n questions with even exhibit the same distributional pattern of
bias and presuppositions, a unified analysis of the effect of minimizers and even in the two types
of questions is highly desirable.
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My main goal in this chapter is to extend the analysis proposed in Chapter 2 to the case of
constituent questions. This will amount to showing that, due the presupposition of even, only the
universal negative answer to a wh-question containing even+the lowest scale point is felicitous.
In doing so, an immediate complication in the H/K system adopted here (unlike in G&S's) will
need to be addressed, which is due to a very basic difference between the denotation of y/n
interrogatives and of wh-interrogatives in this system: while the denotation of y/n questions
includes a negative answer the one of wh-questions does not.1 What is needed in order to extend
the analysis developed in Chapter 2 to wh-questions is, instead, a denotation of the questions that
includes negative answers as well. In addition it is crucial that the way this type of denotation is
obtained is such that the scope of even relative to negation in the negative answers follows
compositionally from its scope in the question. I will show below that this can be achieved
within the HIK theory of questions if this theory is slightly modified as to include the possibility
that also wh-questions (optionally) contain a hidden whether.2
The assumption of a hidden whether alone will be shown to be sufficient to explain in
terms of scope also the bias and presuppositions of wh-questions with even+ a scale low end-
point. Besides this immediate advantage, this assumption will call for some independent
justification, since it departs a bit more radically from a Karttunen-Hamblin's syntax semantics
of questions, than the one made in Chapter 2 about y/n question.
The cost of the additional assumption of whether in wh-questions is compensated by the
fact that such an assumption turns out to provide a new perspective on a number of interesting
aspects of the semantics of wh-questions, the semantics of certain embedding predicates and the
distribution of minimizers in embedded interrogatives, which reveals previously overlooked
interesting correlations between them. Moreover, suggestive evidence in favor of the analysis
developed in this chapter comes from Bulgarian, where wh-questions can actually contain a
phonologically realized whether (i.e ii), whose distribution is as predicted within the a novel
perspective developed here.
1 This is not necessary in G&S semantics of questions. But see ft. note 2.
2 Since, differently from H/K's semantics of wh-questions, G&S's does include, among the other possible complete
answers, negative answers one can actually derive bias and presuppositions of wh-questions within this system
without postulating the presence of whether, but introducing a type lifted meaning for even as illustrated in the
appendix. The motivation for adopting H/K system, instead, of G&S will become clear in sections 3.4 and 3.5.
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These considerations will suggest that a system which requires the presence of whether in
order to introduce negative answers in a question and therefore license minimizers (like H/K's) is
to be preferable to one that does not (like G&S's, see appendix).
In the concluding section of this chapter, I will present a problem pertaining to two
aspects of the semantics of constituent questions: the distinction between strongly and weakly
exhaustive interpretations and the one between de re and de dicto readings. Specifically, I will
show some potentially problematic implications of how my proposal in this chapter derives
strongly exhaustive de dicto readings
The Chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.1 presents an overview of the relevant
facts regarding minimizers and even in questions. Section 3.2 addresses the problem of deriving
an 'easy' presupposition for these questions within HIK semantics. Section 3.3 shows how the
presence of whether in the structure of wh-questions solves this problem and allows us to derive
both bias and presupposition of even questions where the focus is the low end-point of the
contextually relevant pragmatic scale. Section 3.4 discusses the implications of the assumption of
a hidden whether in wh-questions and introduces the evidence for this assumption coming from
Bulgarian. Finally section 3.5 introduces the problem of strongly exhaustive de dicto
interpretations.
3.1 The Facts
In this section I will offer a brief overview of the relevant facts. I will start by illustrating the
behavior of minimizers in wh-questions (in section 3.1.1), and then turn to the more general case
of even in section 3.1.2.
3.1.1 Minimizers in Wh-questions
The examples from (1)-(4) show that the puzzling contrast between minimizers and any/ever we
found in y/n questions, replicates itself in wh-questions as well.
(1) a. Who will lift a finger to help us? Negatively Biased
b. Who will do anything to help us? Neutral
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(2) a. Who uttered a single word? Negatively Biased
b. Who said anything? Neutral
(3) a. Who contributed a red cent to this cause? Negatively Biased
b. Who offered any money to this cause? Neutral
(4) a. Who is advising even a single student? Negatively Biased
b. Who is advising any students? Neutral
For the purpose of better qualifying these intuitions, it's worth recalling two distinctive
properties of negatively biased questions identified in the previous chapter: first, negatively
biased questions cannot be uttered felicitously in a context where the speaker has clearly no clue
regarding their true answer; second they cannot be simply answered affirmatively. I will take
these two properties to provide a diagnostic for negative bias in wh-questions as well.
First, like in the case of y/n questions, that wh-questions with minimizers are biased is
confirmed by the observations that they are systematically infelicitous in contexts where the
speaker is clearly unbiased as to what the true answer to her question would be like and therefore
her question is clearly meant to be a neutral and genuine request of information. In this respect
they differ form wh-questions with any, as shown in (5).
(5)
Scenario 1:
My roommate Sue and I gave a party, some friends helped organizing it. At the end of the party I
decided to send cards to thank all those who helped us. I don't want to forget anybody, so I ask
Sue...
a. Who did anything to help? /ANY
b. # Who lifted a finger to help? # Minimizer
Scenario 2
I am trying to buy coffee at a vending machine that takes only coins. I need just one more penny
to get my coffee. Some colleagues happen to come by...so I ask them
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b. Guys, who can lend me a penny?
c. #Guys, who can lend me a red cent?
Secondly, just like polar questions also wh-questions with minimizers can't be simply
answered affirmatively, but 'call for some further expansion in case the hearer wants to answer
them affirmatively' (Ladusaw 2002):
(6) A: Who contributed any money for this cause? ANY
B: Mary (did).
(7) A. Who contributed a red cent for this cause? Minimizer
B: # Mary (did).
B': Well, Mary did give some money, don't you remember?
B": Actually, Mary contributed a considerable amount of money, don't you remember?
B"' [Mary] Contrastive Topic did.
Summing up, constituent questions fully replicate the pattern of y/n questions: when they
contain an NPI like any they can be interpreted as neutral, but when they contain a minimizer,
they are obligatorily biased. The assumption borrowed in the previous chapter form Heim
(1984), that minimizers contain even while any and ever do not will account for the difference in
the wh-cases as well. To illustrate why this is so, the next section investigates the effect of even
on constituent questions.
3.1.2 'Even' in Wh-questions
Like y/n-questions, also wh-questions are ambiguous between a neutral and a biased
interpretation when they contain even. In addition also these questions can either carry an 'easy'
or a 'harp' presupposition. Moreover, in this case as well, neutrality and bias are each linked to
just one of the two presuppositions, in the same way as in y/n questions. This section illustrates
the relevant data.
I start by showing that wh-questions with even are biased whenever even associates with
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expressions referring to the lower end-point of a contextually relevant pragmatic scale, and
neutral when it associates with expressions that refer to the high end point of it. This is shown in
(8) below.
(8) a. Who even answered [Question 2]f?
< Question 2, ..., Question 15.... the easiest question> Neutral
< The hardest question, Question 15,..., Question 2> Negatively biased
b. Does your truck even fit an [elephant]f? Neutral
c. Does your truck even fit a [fly]f? Negatively biased
When the context entails that Question 2 is the hardest, the question in (8)a is neutral,
when it entails that it is the easiest it is biased. In some cases, like (8)b and c, it is already clear
out of context what position the focus occupies on the scale, this is why (8)b is unambiguously
neutral and (8)c unambiguously biased.
(9) replicates the first of the two tests for bias, mentioned above, and shows that wh-
questions where even associates with the lower element on the scale are infelicitous in contexts
where the speaker has no expectations concerning the answer, unlike cases without even or with
even+ highest element in the scale.
(9)
Scenario 1:
Two TAs are grading a test together. TA B is a less advanced student, therefore she is reading
only the answers to the easiest question and then reports to TA A, who is instead correcting the
harder questions and then grading the whole test. The night before the grades are due, A cannot
find the tests, but she has written down all the results for the questions she had corrected, which
were mixed results. To be able to give the grades, though, she also needs to talk to B to know
how the students did on the easiest question. Therefore she calls up B and asks her:
a. Who answered the easiest question? /without even
b. Who answered even [the easiest question]f? # with even
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Scenario 2:
Two TAs are grading a test together. TA B is reading the answers to the hardest question and to
the easiest question and then reports to TA A, who is instead correcting all other answer and
then grading the whole test. The night before the grades are due A cannot find the tests, but she
has written down all the results for the questions she had corrected, which were mixed results.
To be able to give the grades, though, she needs to talk to B to know how the students did on the
easiest and on the hardest question. Therefore she calls up B and asks her:
a. Who answered the easiest question and who answered even the hardest question?
# b. Who answered even the easiest question and who answered the hardest?
Wh-questions with even pattern with y/n questions in another respect. Consider once
more the question repeated in (10)a We saw above that this question is compatible with contexts
where Question 2 was the hardest and with contexts where Question 2 was the easiest. But this
amounLs to saying that the question is ambiguous between a reading carrying a hard
presupposition (in (10)b) and a reading carrying an easy one, in (10)c (cf. also Wilkinson 1996).
(10) a. Who even answered [Question 2 ]f?
b. 'Hard' presupposition: For every contextually relevant person, having answered Q2 is
less likely than having answered any other question.
c. 'Easy' presupposition: For every contextually relevant person, having answered Q2 is
more likely than having answered any other question.
When it is clear out of context that the position of the focus of even is the highest or the lowest
on the relevant scale, the question unambiguously carries a hard or easy presupposition,
respectively:
(11) a. Who even answered [the hardest]f question?
'Hard' presupposition: For every contextually relevant person x, it is LESS likely that
x answered the hardest question than that x answered any other
question (from a relevant set of questions, e.g. in a test) .
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b. Who even answered [the easiest]f question?
'Easy' presupposition: for every contextually relevant person x, it is MORE likely that
x answered the easiest question than that x answered any other
question (from a relevant set of questions, e.g. in a test).
Since the two presuppositions above state respectively that a hard presupposition and an easy
presupposition hold of every x in the domain of the wh-phrase, I will refer to them as 'universal
hard' and 'universal easy' presuppositions respectively.
In this chapter I will use the two abbreviations, easyP and hardP introduced in the
previous one to refer instead to the two following 'open' propositions, for reasons that will
become clear below:
(12) hardP: Solving problem 2 is LESS likely for x than solving any other problem
easyP: Solving problem 2 is MORE likely for x than solving any other problem
The correlation between these possible presuppositions, 'easy' and 'hard', and the neutral and
biased readings considered above is quite straightforward because contexts where the focus is the
lowest/weakest element on the relevant scale are such that the 'easy' presupposition is true,
contexts where it is the highest element are necessarily such that the hard presuppositions is true:
(13) a. Negatively biased reading iff c c that Question2 is the easiest
b. *For any relevant individual x, answering Q2 is MORE likely than solving any other
relevant problem
(14) a. Neutral reading iff c c that Q2 two is the hardest
b. *For any relevant individual x, answering Q2 is LESS likely than solving any other
relevant problem
In the face of the above facts, and given that minimizers occupy the lowest position on
theirs scale, also in the case of wh-questions, an account of the bias and the presupposition of
even+ the lowest element on the scale automatically extends to the bias of minimizers.
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Since an account which explains the co-occurrence of an 'easy' presuppositions with bias
must be preferred to one explaining this presupposition alone, in this case as well the ambiguity
of questions with even must be understood in terms of the scope of even in these questions. This
is so because an explanation in terms of a lexical ambiguity of even, as Rooth has it, would fail
to account for the effect of bias, as argued already in the previous chapter. However, in this case,
a scope-based explanation will require to modify more radically the Karttunen's analysis of wh-
questions. The next section explains why this is necessary. The section after next will illustrate
how the required modification can be achieved.
3.2 The Problem of Accounting for 'Easy' Presuppositions in Wh-questions
Adopting the same strategy as in the previous chapter, I will start by addressing the question of
how the two possible opposite presuppositions of wh-questions with even (illustrated again in
(15) can be derived, and then return to the problem of bias.
(15) a. Who even solved [Problem 2 ]f?
b. 'V Hard' presupposition: For every contextually relevant person, having solved P2 is
LESS likely than having solved ad any other problem.
b. 'V Easy' presupposition: For every contextually relevant person, having solved P2 is
MORE likely than having solved ad any other problem.
The hard presupposition can be derived directly in Karttunen's system as follows. First
notice that, since, even introduces the requirement that the proposition in its scope is the least
likely among the alternatives, the effect of even in a wh-question is to introduce a hardP like
presupposition in each possible instantial answer. Let us see why.
(16)a. is the Karttunen style-LF of (15)a. (16)c shows how the denotation of this question
is computed from the bottom to the top of the structure.
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(16) a. LF:
0
tl,e solved pr. 2
b. [?Ii= Xp. {p}
c. Abbreviations: p= that g (1) solved Pr.2, prs. =person, S= even[ t;solved [Problem 2]f J
For every world w and assignment function g:
[[ ]"wg = [solved Pr2]j(g(1)) by FA
[0 ]wg = f even]]W (that g(1) solved Problem 2) by IFA
[[ ~W" = {W w: Se dom ([I"w). [Ieven] w (p)=1} by IFA*
[[0 w,'g = XXe. {X w: Se dom ([]w) . [ even]"w (that x solved Problem 2) =1 } by X-A
[[0 ]1wg = {q: 3x [prs.(x) & q= Xw: se dom i[]"w.[even]jW(that x solved Problem 2)=1]} by K
{ p: 3xe [ person(x) & (p= Xw: V q E C [ q >LIKELYW That x solved Pr. 2 ]. x solved Pr 2 in w}
{ p: 3xe [ person(x) & (p= Xw: hardP. x solved Pr 2 in w }
First, since the wh-phrase quantifying over individuals of type e moves above ?, the sister
node of even (i.e. the node marked as '0' below) denotes an assignment dependent sentence
(type t). The rule of IFA combines the meaning of even of this open sentence and generates
again, as the denotation of node 0, an assignment dependent value: a partial open sentence
presupposing hardP and asserting what the open prejacent asserts. The latter combines with the
meaning of ? by an application of the revised IFA* rule, retuning a set containing a proposition
which is both assignment dependent and partial (node 9). At node 0, X-abstraction applies thus
binding the variable inside the truth-condition of the partial proposition in the set. Finally, the
meaning of the wh-phrase is quantified in by an application of the Karttunen Wh-quantification
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rule. The result of this last step is a set of alternative partial propositions that for each relevant
person x contains an answer asserting that x solved Problem 2 and presupposing that solving
problem 2 was less likely for x than solving any other relevant problem (i.e. hardP):
(17) { that Mary even solved Problem 2, that Bill even solved Problem 2, that Kim even ... }
The answer to this question in a given world amounts to the conjunction of the propositions in
this set that are true in that world.
The question that needs to be addressed at this point is why a question with a denotation of this
sort should presuppose as a whole a 'universal hard' presupposition like the one illustrated in
(15)b.
At first, on the basis of the Question Felicity Principle alone, we would expect the
question to be felicitous in a context where just one of its instantial answers is defined, as this
would be sufficient for the question to be answerable. In other words on the basis of this
principle alone it appears that the question should carry the following 'existential hard
presupposition':
(18) 3x [ person (x) & Vp [ pe {p: 3y # Pr2 & p = that x solvedy} & p # that x
solved Pr 2 - that x solved y >likelyW that x solved Pr2]]
'There is at least one relevant person x, s.t. solving P2 was less likely for x than solving
any other problem'
However, this presupposition is too weak. In fact, reporting the intuitions of native speakers, in
(15) above I described the presupposition of the question as a 'universal hard presupposition'.
Such a claim was based on the following observation: in most contexts where only the weaker
existential presupposition is true the question is still infelicitous, while in contexts where the
universal presupposition is also true the question becomes acceptable. There are however some
interesting exceptions to this generalization.
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(19) Scenario:
A class of 5 students took a test: Four linguists and one philosopher. The test contained a
question (Problem 2) on wh-movement, which was of intermediate difficulty for
somebody with some linguistic background. For the philosophy student, however, this
question was the hardest in the Problem set. Both speaker and addressee know that the
philosopher would find this problem very hard:
Guess, who even solved Problem 2? Biased
In this scenario, the question seems to be felicitous. In addition it is biased and biased towards
the answer: the philosopher did! A fact that follows from the theory of bias proposed in this
thesis: this answer is the only one whose presupposition is satisfied.
However, besides these special cases in which it is meant to be biased towards an
instantial answer, the intuition is that a question like the above carries a universal presupposition.
This can be understood, within the present view, as follows. A speaker uttering a question in a
way that for every individual x the answer That x solved Problem 2 presupposes that the problem
was hard for x, knows that for any arbitrary individual in the restrictor of who, if the addressee
answers that that individual solved the problem, he will automatically presuppose that the
problem was difficult for that person. Moreover, if the speaker is unbiased, she doesn't know in
advance (and has no expectations regarding) which propositions will be chosen by the addressee
as the true answer to her question. Given this, it must be the case that she is taking for granted
that the problem was hard for every arbitrary x in the restrictor of who. Since the addressee will
be able to infer this much, the question is a presupposition failure unless this condition is indeed
satisfied in the context of the conversation. 3
3 Notice that the above discussion is reminiscent of the case of uniqueness and existence presupposition of personal
pronouns. For a sentence containing a referential use of a pronoun to be be used in a cooperative way it is not only
required that the addressee knows that there is a unique relevant and salient individual in the context, but must also
be able to identify such an individual (see discussion in Soames 1989 and Stalnaker 1999). The analogy with this
case is the following.
The speaker can take for granted a merely existential hard presupposition only if he has some evidence that
this presupposition is true (i.e. if he has some way of identifying the individuals verifying this presupposition) and
only if this evidence is available to the addressee as well. This is possible only when the speaker is biased, and the
addressee is in the position of knowing what answer he is biased towards, because only in this case the addressee
will be in the position to determine whether the presupposition of HIS answer is the one the speaker is taking for
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How about the V-easy presupposition? Deriving this presupposition is less
straightforward. In fact, the scope theory predicts that a presupposition like easyP, is generated
only when the scope of even contains negation. In the previous chapter I showed that a wide
scope reading of even in a y/n question generates precisely this structural configuration in the
negative answer in its Hamblin set.
However, if we assume a Hamlin-denotation also for wh-questions, this analysis doesn't
seem to be available for the case of constituent questions, as no proposition in the Hamblin-set is
a 'negative' answer. In fact, as shown in (20), the Hamblin set of a wh-question only contains,
for each individual in the restrictor of the wh-phrase, the proposition representing the affirmative
instantial answer relative that individual, i.e. the proposition that that individual verifies the open
sentence denoted by the syntactic sister of the ? morpheme:
(20) a. Who solved [Problem 2 ]f?
b. { p: 3x [person x and p=Xw. x solved problem 2 }
c. { That Mary solved Problem 2, that Bill solved Problem 2, ... }
Given this, in HIK system, as is, there is no way of scoping even in the question that derives an
easy presupposition and the bias effect this presupposition is generally accompanied by.
Unfortunately, Rooth's ambiguity theory of even, doesn't fare better with this problem.
This view explains easyP as the presupposition introduced by evenNp, and therefore predicts that
it should always be possible in wh-questions, because wh-questions as well are licensing
environments for NPIs. However, despite this apparent advantage, the argument given in the
previous chapter, showing that the ambiguity theory fails to explain the effect bias triggered by
this reading, extends to the case of wh-questions as well. Given this, the solution to the problem
must be found somewhere else.
3.3 A Solution in Terms of Scope: Whether in Wh-Question:
This section shows that an account of bias and easy presuppositions of questions with even+ the
low-end point of a scale in terms of scope is possible, after all.
granted. In all other cases, what the speaker is taking for granted must be about how difficult is the problem is for
any arbitrary individual, because he cannot identify which one the addressee will pick in his answer.
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3.3.1 'Whether' in Wh-questions
The first task ahead of us, consists in identifying the component in questions like (15) that even
scopally interacts with as to introduce different presuppositions. This problem is reminiscent of
the one concerning y/n questions with even and can be solved in an analogous way. Let's see
how.
The solution developed in the previous chapter for the case y/n questions was that an
'easy' presupposition can be derived without further stipulation about the meaning of even or the
denotation of y/n questions (as proposed in Hamblin 1973). All we needed to assume there is that
the way we arrive at such denotation involves a wh-quantifier over functions of type <t,t>, i.e.
whether, with the meaning repeated in (21).
(21) I[ whetheri = Xf <<tt>.t. 3 h <t.t. [ h =Xt.t= 1 or h=Xt. t--O] and f(h)= 1
In the case of y/n questions, this assumption leads to a quite standard question denotation. In the
case of wh-questions, as we saw above, it is necessary to depart a bit more radically from a
Karttunen/Hamblin's semantics of questions. What we need is a set containing both affirmative
and negative answers for each relevant individual in the restrictor of the wh-word, and to arrive
at this set in such a way that the possibility for even to scope over negation in the negative
answers follows compositionally from its scope in the question. To achieve this result, however,
it is sufficient to assume that also constituent questions (can) contain a whether with the same
denotation and the same syntactic properties as in y/n questions (a proposal already made in
Higginbotham 1993). Before turning to the complex case of questions with even, let us first see
how this affects the denotation of a simple question as desired.
Consider the questions in (22)a. According to our current assumption this question has
the LF structure given in (22)b 4, i.e. the structure of a multiple wh-question. The computation of
its interpretation will therefore proceed by applying the usual semantic mechanisms and will
generate a set of alternative propositions representing all the positive and negative instantial
answers to the question. (22)c shows the details of how this work.
(22) a. Who called?
4 But see footnote 13 in Ch 2 and the last section of this chapter.
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b. LF:
O
whether 0
2 O
who @
1 O0
t2, <tLt>
t1, e called
b. Relevant lexical entries:
f whether] = Xf ,<ttt> . 3 h <t,t. [hE { AFF, -} and f(h)= 1]
I[who]-- XP<e,t,. 3Xe [person (x)and P(x)=l]
c. For every world w and assignment function g:
9[[ "w'g = I[called ]W'g(g(1))
[ O ]w',g = g(2) (If called ]'(w.g(l)))
[11 ]I".g = {Jw. g(2)(I called] w "(g(l)))=l }
I[ 1"w,g = XXe. { Xw. g(2) (1[ called I W(x))=l }
I[f ]1],g = p: 3x [person(x) and p =Xw. g(2) ([[called lj(x))=l1]
[[ ]".g = Xf. {p: 3x [person (x) and p =Xw. f(fIcalled]Jw(x))=l]}
110 1 ,g = Ip: 3xe 3h<t,>. [prs.(x) & h =Xt.t= 1 or h=Xt.t=O) & p=Xw. h(jcalled ]w (x))= l] by K
{p: 3Xe [prs.(x)& (p=Xw. AFF(Icalled ]"w (x))= or p=Xw. -(UIcalled ]'w (x))= l] I
{p : 3x [person (x) and (p = that x called or p = that x didn't call)] }
Just like for other wh-questions containing two wh-words, this set contains as many alternatives
as the cardinality of the Cartesian product of the sets denoted by the restrictor of the two wh-
phrases. In this special case, since one of these sets contains just two elements (AFF and -), the
denotation of the question contains for each relevant individual x in the restrictor of who two
propositions, one representing the affirmative answer (that x called) and one the negative answer
(that x didn't call) relative to that individual. For example, if the set of relevant individuals is
{Mary, Kim), the denotation of the question in (22)a is the following set.
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(23) {that Mary called, that Mary didn't call, that Kim called, that Kim didn't call}
Given this, the denotation of a wh-question containing whether differs from the H/K
denotation in the desired way: it contains also all possible instantial negative answers. Before
discussing the implications generated form this difference, let us see how the presence of
whether in wh-questions allows us to understand the effects triggered on them by even.
3.3.2 Scope Ambiguities of Wh-Questions with 'Whether' and 'Even'
Once we allow the possibility that also wh-questions contain whether, we predict that questions
that do contain whether and contain also even are scopally ambiguous: Like in the case of y/n-
questions, even can scope either above or below the trace of whether in these wh-questions as
well. This is illustrated in (24): a question like (24)a can have either of the two LFs in (24)b or c:
(24) a. Who even solved Problem 2?
b. [Whetherwho 2[Q [t2,<t,t>[even [t.e, solved [Pr2]f] tracewhether > even
c. [Whether2[whol[Q [even [tz,<,t> [tl,e solved [Pr 2]f] leven > tracewhethe
This section and the next one illustrate how this ambiguity accounts for the two possible
readings of wh-question with even and the two presuppositions they come with. I will start by
showing that under the reading in (24)b. the question carries a V-hard presupposition while
under reading (24)b., the possibility of a V-easy presupposition emerges. I will return to the bias
effect that co-occurs with the latter presupposition in the next section.
We know, from the example above in (22), that, given the presence of whether the
denotation of a question like (24)a will contain for each individual the proposition representing
the negative answer and the one representing the affirmative answer relative to that individual.
We also know, from the discussion of example (16) in section 3, that given the presence of even
each proposition in the set is partial. What we need to see now is what presupposition each of
these propositions carry under each of the above reading. Let's start with LF1.
Given that even scopes below whether in LFI, the presence of whether in the
computation of its presupposition is going to be irrelevant, therefore, under this reading, we
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expect to derive a set of propositions all presupposing hardP, just like in (16).
this is in fact the result (cf. also the appendix for the details of this derivation):
(25) shows' iat
(25) a.
Wheti
who
t2,.<t,t>
even C
tl.e solved Problem 2
Abbreviations: p= that g (1) solved Pr.2, prs. =person
b. For every world w and assignment function g:
[ ]w",g = leven]w (C)(p) is defined iff p is the least likely proposition in C.
If defined, then D[ evenlw (C)(p)= 1 iff (g(l)) solved problem 2
10 11wg = g(2)([ even]~W (p)) defined iff is defined iff p is the least likely proposition in C.
if defined then = g(2)([even]]w (p)) =1 ff g(2) (fsolved Pr2](g(1)) =1
[le ]jwg = Xxe. {Iw: hardP. g(2)([ evenllW (that x solved Problem 2)) =1 }
i[ ]" '  = {q: 3x [prs.(x) & q= Xw: hardP. g(2)(f[evenj W(thatx solvedProblem 2))= ] i
[[0 w1'g = {p: 3xe [prs.(x) & (p = Xw: hardP. AFF(Ievenl w(that x solved P2)) =1 v p =Xw:
hardP. -, ([Ieven]J (that x solved P2)) =1)])
This set contains, for each relevant person x, two partial propositions (i.e. (A) and (B)), which
are partial in exactly the same way (i.e. they presuppose hardP).
A. Assertion: that x solved Problem 2
Presupposition: Solving P2 was LESS likely for x than solving any other problem. hardP
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Z'
B. Assertion: that x didn't solve problem 2.
Presupposition: Solving P2 was LESS likely for x than solving any other problem. hardP
As a consequence, all the possible answers to the question under this reading presuppose hardP.
As shown in the previous section for structures like (16), when this happens, the question as a
whole carries a universal hard presupposition.
Let us now return to the second possible LF of the question under consideration. Contrary
to the previous case, under this reading the presupposition of even is affected by the presence of
whether in the question. In particular for each individual in the restrictor of who, the denotation
of the question under this reading will contain two possible answer (a negative and an
affirmative one) carrying opposite presuppositions (i.e. easyP and hardP respectively). This is
shown in (26) (see also appendix):
(26)a.
Whetd
•Tracenwt> even
who
even C
solved Problem 2
b. For every world w and assignment function g: (abbreviation: solved problem 2 = P2)
I[0 ]l" 'g  is defined iff (Xw'. g(2) (1[P2 ]]W'(g(1))=1 ) is the least likely proposition in C
if defined then [[0 ]]wg = g(2) ([[P2 ]"(g(l))=l )
[f0 11 ,g = Xxe. {fw. [[even]" I(Xw'. g(2) ([[P2]]'(x))=l)=l}
ff0 w.g = {p: 3x [prs(x) & p= Xw. [[even ]" (Xw. g(2) (1[P2]]W"(x))=1)=1]}
f0 1 wg = {p: 3x [pr(x) & [(p = Xw:VqE C [q>LIKELYW (Xw. AFF 1[P21 w-(x)= )] . AFF 1P2]w(x)=l)
v (p = Xw: V qeC [q >LIKELYW (Xw'.- [IP2I W'(x) = 1)]. -I[P2 ]] w(x)= 1)]] }
{p: 3x [prs(x)) & [(p = Xw: hardP. x solved Pr2 in w) or (p = Xw: easyP x didn't solve Pr2)]] }
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Let's have a closer look at what kind of propositions we find in this second set. Given the
contribution of even, also this set contains two partial propositions for each relevant person x.
This time, however, the two propositions are partial in different ways. The proposition
corresponding to the 'positive answer' (i.e. that x solved problem 2) presupposes hardP and
therefore it is identical to A above, while the proposition corresponding to the 'negative answer'
(i.e. that x didn't solve problem 2), presupposes easyP:
A. Assertion: that x solved Problem 2
Presupposition: Solving P2 was LESS likely for x than solving any other problem. hardP
C. Assertion: that s didn't solve problem 2.
Presupposition: Not solving P2 was less likely for x than solving any other problem. easyP
4- Solving Problem 2 was MORE likely for x than solving any other
Given this, the presence of a covert whether in wh-questions and the possibility of even to take
wide scope relative to its trace accounts for the possibility of easyP presuppositions in the
negative instantial answers to wh-questions with even, just like in the case of polar questions.
This simply shows that under the latter interpretation some of the answers have an easy
presupposition. The next questions that need to be addressed is how the question as a whole can
end up carrying a 'universal easy presupposition' and why this presupposition emerges always
and only in situations where the question is obligatorily biased. The next section provides an
answer to these two questions.
3.3.3 Bias and Presuppositions Explained
In order to account for the pattern of biased vs. neutral readings of wh-questions with even and
their presuppositions, illustrated again in (27), we need to investigate what happens when a wh-
question with even is uttered in one of two types of contexts: contexts where the 'universal easy
presupposition' is true and contexts where the 'universal hard presupposition' is. Let's consider
these two cases in turn.
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(27) a. Who even solved [Problem 2 ]f?
b. 'V Hard' presupposition: For every contextually relevant person, having solved P2 is
LESS likely than having solved ad any other problem.
b. 'V Easy' presupposition: For every contextually relevant person, having solved P2 is
MORE likely than having solved ad any other problem.
If a question like (27)a is uttered in a context where Problem 2 is the easiest for
everybody, a presupposition like(28)c, i.e. hardP, is false, for every choice of x among the
relevant people while, the easyP presupposition is true for every x.
(28) a. c C 'V easy' presupposition
a. HardP: Solving problem 2 is LESS likely for x than solving any other problem
b. EasyP: Solving problem 2 is MORE likely for x than solving any other problem
Therefore, in a context of this sort, the reading where even has narrow scope relative to the trace
of whether, is pragmatically excluded by the Question Bridge Principle because there is no way
to provide a felicitous answer to it. This is so because, as we saw above, all the possible answers
to the question under this reading presuppose hardP.
Figure 1: Tracewhether> even = Answers presupposing hardP and therefore infelcitous
On the other hand the principle does not exclude the other possible reading to this question (i.e.
even > tracewhether), as some of its answers are felicitous in the context we are considering.
Specifically all the possible negative instantial answers to the question are defined in all the
worlds in the context set because each one of them presupposes easyP. The positive instantial
answers, on the other hand presuppose hardP and therefore they are all infelicitous in such a
context:
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Mary didn't solve Pr2I
Bill didn't solved Pr
Kim didn't solved Pr2
0.4
Figure 2: even > Tracewhether M = Answers presupposing hardP and therefore infelcitous
C3 = Answers presupposing easyP and therefore felicitous
This is sufficient to account for why the question who even solved Problem 2? is biased towards
the universal negative answer that nobody did in a context where the universal easy
presupposition is satisfied. Indeed in a context of this sort the addressee can safely conclude from
the very way the question is worded that no matter what person x s(he) picks up, the speaker is
biased towards the negative instantial answer relative to that individual: that x didn't solved
Problem 2. In addition, since this is the case for any arbitrary relevant individual, the addressee
can draw the general conclusion that the speaker intended to express bias towards all the
negative answers in the set, and therefore towards the answer that nobody solved problem 2.
We can now turn to the second type of contexts mentioned above, namely contexts where
the 'V- hard presupposition' is true, instead. What needs to be explained is why in such contexts
the question under consideration is not obligatorily biased.
If the context is such that Problem 2 is the hardest problem for everybody, the situation
predicted by the present analysis is not completely symmetric to the one pictured above. Let's
start considering the aspect in which it is symmetric. Like above, we predict all the answers to
LF2 presupposing easyP to be factually unavailable:
------------------------- ---------------- ------------------11n.
-- - --- ------
----------
---- 
---------- - ----
S = Answers presupposing easyP and therefore infelcitous
re = Answers presupposing hardP and therefore felicitous
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Mary solved Pr2
[Bill solved Pr2
Kim solved Pr2
I e ...
Figure 2: even > Tracewhether
io
-- I
However this will not trigger bias for the following reason: that LFI is pragmatically available,
contrary to what happens in the contexts considered before, because all the answers to the
question under this reading presuppose hardP and are therefore are felicitous.
Mary solved Pr2 Mary didn't solve Pr
Bill solved Pr2 Bill didn't solved Pr
Kim solved Pr2 Kim didn't solved Pr!. '-
Figure 1: Tracewhether> even M = Answers presupposing hardP and therefore felcitous
Indeed LF1 does leave open the possibility to the addressee to give a complete answer which for
any individual can entail either the affirmative or the negative instantial answer relative to that
individual. This per se is sufficient for the questions to have a neutral reading because a biased
interpretation is forced only if the addressee is prevented to assert any combination of affirmative
instantial answer.
The asymmetry between the two cases is illustrated in the following table, which
summarizes the findings of this section.
Scope: Trace whether > even even > Trace whether
Answers:
x did solve Pr2
x didn't solve Pr2 /
Table 1: c c V hard presupposition
Scope: Trace whether > even even > Trace whether
Answers:
x did solve Pr2 / V
x didn't solve Pr2 /
Table 1: c c V easy presupposition
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3.3.4 Conclusions
In this section I presented an analysis of the relation between bias and easy presuppositions in
wh-questions with even. The proposal extends automatically to both Hindi NPIs (see Lahiri
1998), and to English minimizer NPIs. Since the meaning of both sets of expressions involve
even and a focus which is the lower end-point of a pragmatic scale, the bias they trigger in
questions is fully predicted.
My account relies on the unconventional assumption that the structure of these
interrogatives contains a silent whether and that, as a consequence, their denotation contains
negative answers.
Before concluding, it is worth pointing out that such a proposal leads to the following
prediction. Wh-questions containing even + the high end-point of a pragmatic scale do not need
to contain whether, as this combination is compatible with a hard presuppositions, which can be
generated also in the absence of whether, as we saw in section 3.2. To the contrary, wh-questions
where even associates with the lower end-point of the relevant pragmatic scale (and therefore
with minimizers as well) can be acceptable only if they contain whether, because compatible
only with easy presuppositions, which in turn can be derived only in the presence of whether.
Although this prediction is hard to test in English, where whether is not phonetically
realized, Bulgarian provides an adequate testing ground as in this language wh-questions do
optionally contain an overt instance of whether. The next section shows that distribution of this
wh-word in Bulgarian confirms my prediction. The Bulgarian facts will therefore suggest that an
analysis of bias and presuppositions in English wh-questions with even that requires the
additional assumption of a hidden whether is to be preferred to one that doesn't (see ft.2).
3.4 Whether in Wh-Questions: Implications and Evidence
The assumption of an (optional) unpronounced whether in English wh-questions generating a
denotation containing 'negative' alternatives departs significantly from the semantics and syntax
of wh-questions in H/K system.
The aim of this section is to provide independent evidence for it, illustrate precisely in
which respects this novel view on wh-questions differs from the traditional H/K's view and
explore further implications these differences yields.
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3.4.1 'Whether' in Wh-Questions: Evidence From Bulgarian.
The hypothesis that English constituent questions can optionally contain a covert whether and
that whether becomes obligatory in questions with minimizers is obviously very hard to test,
because in the presence of another wh-word this wh-quantifier is always unpronounced. In order
test this hypothesis one needs to look into languages different from English. Bulgarian appears to
provide the adequate testing ground.5
Both matrix and embedded y/n questions in Bulgarian obligatorily contain the 'question
clitic' ii (or its non clitic variant dali):
(29) b. Iska *(li) kafe?
want-3sg li coffee
'Does he/she want coffee?'
b. Cudja se/ ne znam iska *(li) kafe
wonder-lsg refl/not know-lsg want-3sg ii coffee
'I wonder/ I don't know whether he/she wants coffee'
Interestingly, ii can, but doesn't have to co-occur with wh-words in both matrix wh-questions
and in wh-questions embedded questions under wonder:6
(30) a. S kogo li se e sres^tnal vcAera?
With whom li refl is met-participle yesterday?
'Who did you meet yesterday?'
b. S koi li studenti se e sresAtnal vcAera?
With which li student refl is met-participle yesterday?
'Which student did you meet yesterday?'
Which students did you meet yesterday?
c. CAudja se kakvo li iska
wonder-lsg refl what ii want-3sg
'I wonder what he wants'
5 The judgments and reported in this section were provided to me by Roumi Pancheva.
6 The fact that ii splits the wh-phrase which student is merely due to its clitic nature.
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Although the particle li is generally thought as a question complementizer (i.e., the overt
realization of ?), its nature is not yet fully understood. 7 Since the facts reported in this section
and in the next show that this clitic has many distributional properties in common with the
whether hypothesized in this chapter, it is at least very plausible that li is the Bulgarian
counterpart of whether.
As mentioned above, if Bulgarian li is indeed the overt counterpart of whether the
analysis presented in this chapter makes very precise predictions regarding its distribution in wh-
questions with minimizers and with even: li should be obligatory in questions with minimizers
and in question where even associates with the LOWER end-point of the relevant pragmatic
scale, but it can be dropped when even associates with the HIGHER end-point. (31)-(33) show
that this prediction is on the right track:
(31) Mra-dval ??(li) si e njakoga pra-sta? Negative Bias
move-participle ??(li) refl is sometimes the-finger
'Has he ever lifted a finger'?
(32) Koj *(li) dori e res^il naj-lesnata zadacAa? Negative Bias
Who li even is solved most-easy problem
'Who *(li) even solved the easiest problem?'
(33) Koj (li) dori e resAil naj-trudnata zadac^a? Neutral
Who li even is solved most-difficult problem
'Who (li) even solved the hardest problem?'
The data reported in this section is fragmentary and not conclusive. More tests should be
run to precisely establish the nature of li and its distribution in a wider variety of embedded
contexts. This notwithstanding, this data provide at least preliminary evidence supporting the
analysis of bias and presuppositions of wh-questions with even and minimizers developed in the
previous section.
7 For example, Boskovid has recently proposed that "li" is not a complementizer but a focus-marker attached to
phrases or the verb, which then have to move to the CP domain.
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3.4.2 Wh-questions with and without 'Whether': Weak and Strong Exhaustivity
The denotation of wh-questions with whether differs from Karttunen's and Hamblin's and
resembles instead Groenendijk&Stokhof's in the following important respect: it generates
strongly exhaustive readings instead of weakly exhaustive ones (in the sense of G&S (1985)).
Let's see what this means.
The significance of the distinction between strong and weak exhaustivity emerges in
embedded context, for instance in the complement of question embedding predicates (QEP
henceforth) like know. In general, 'exhaustivity' is the aspect of the meaning of sentences like
(34)a, that guarantees the following type of entailments:
(34) a. Ann knows who called.
b. Bill called.
c. (Bill is relevant)
.'. Ann knows that Bill called.
In order to establish whether Karttunen's and Hamblin's semantics is exhaustive in this
sense, we need a semantics for question-embedding know. Specifically, assuming with H/K that
questions are set of propositions representing their possible answers, the meaning we want for
question-embedding know can be roughly paraphrased as follows: for any individual x, any
possible world w and question Q, x knows Q in w iff x believes in w the true complete answer
to Q in w (see Karttunen 1977, p 17 and ft. 11 on p.18, see also Heim 1994).
Since the notion of true and complete answer to a H/K-type of question in a world can be
systematically derived from the question denotation via Heim's Ansi operator (in (35)b), the
lexical entry of know can be described in terms of Ansi:
(35) a. For every individual x, world w and questions Q,
II know ] (Q) (w) (x) = 1 iff x believes AnsI (Q) (w)
b. Ansl(Q) (w) = r {p: p E Q & p(w) =1 }
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(36) shows that, given (35)a and b, H/K semantics does indeed support the inference in (34)
above, thus qualifying as 'exhaustive' in the above sense. This is shown in (36), where j[who
called]jwK refers to H/K-denotation of the question who called.
(36) a. [[Ann knows who called]W = liff Ann believes in w Ansi ([[who called] wK)(w)
b. That Bill called e ([[who called]jWK)
c. If Bill called in w then Ans I([[who calledlHwKXw) => That Bill called from a&b
d. Bill called in w
.*. [[Ann knows who called]W= 1 only if Ann believes in w that Bill called from c&d
On the other hand, given this meaning of know, H/K denotation doesn't support the inference in
(37), as shown in (38), and therefore does not qualify as strongly exhaustive.
(37) a. Ann knows who called.
b. Bill didn't call.
c. (Bill is relevant)
.". Ann knows that Bill didn't call.
(38) [[Ann knows who calledjw = liff Ann believes Ansl([[who calledjawKXw) in w
That Bill didn't call v ([[who calledl]HIK)
Bill didn't call in w
#> fAnn knows who calledlw = 1 only if Ann believes in w' that Bill didn't call
On the contrary, G&S's partition semantics of questions does predict the above inference
to be valid as well (cf. G&S 1985), an apparent advantage of the latter system over H/K view.
It is worth noticing, however, that if a wh-question also contains a hidden whether,
entailments like in (37) become valid, as shown in (40). In fact, the answer we derive by
applying Ansi to a question containing whether differs from the one we derive form a question
which does not, precisely in that it entails also all the true instantial negative answers to the
question.
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(39) a. For every w and every set of propositions Q:
Ansl(Q) (w) = n {p: p E Q & p(w) =1}
b. Ans 1 (w) ({that m called, that s called, that b called... = that Mary called
c. Ansi (w) ({that m called, that m didn't call, that s called, that s didn't call... }=
= that m called and s didn't call and ...nobody else called
(40) a. [[A.knows (whether) who called] --=1 iff A. believes Ans l([I(whether) who called] )(w) in w
b. That Bill didn't call e [[(whether) who called)
c. If Bill didn't call in w, Ansl([[(whether)who calledj)Xw)=>That B. didn't call from a&b•
d. Bill didn't call in w
. [Ann knows (whether) who called]w = 1 only if A. believes in w that B. didn't call lrom c&d
Given this, the proposal made in this chapter allows us to derive strongly exhaustive readings in
a system like H/K as well, simply reducing the distinction between strong and weak exhaustivity
to the presence vs. absence of whether, respectively. In addition, by viewing strong exhaustivity
as contingent to the presence of the y/n-quantifier whether, this perspective directly captures the
parallelism between strongly exhaustive readings of wh-questions and the necessarily strongly
exhaustive semantics of y/n questions (shown in (41) and (42)).
(41) Ann knows whether Bill called
Bill didn't call
.*. Ann knows that Bill didn't call.
(42) a. P[4. knows whether Bill calledj] = 1 iff A. believes Ansl([[whether Bill calledjjH/K )(w) in w
b. That Bill didn't call e [[whether Bill called] HwK
c. If Bill didn't call in w, Ansl([[whether B. calledwH/KXw) => That B. didn't call from a&b
d. Bill didn't call in w
.. [[Ann knows whether Bill calledlw = 1 only if A. believes in w that Bill didn't call 1from c&d
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A uniform treatment of strong exhaustivity in y/n and wh-questions is a feature which
makes this approach preferable to the existing alternatives. Let us see why.
Heim (1994) shows, that strong exhaustivity can be also accounted for in Karttunen's system, by
allowing the lexical semantics of QEP which support inferences like (39), to make reference to
the following derivative notion of answer, Ans2, defined in terms of Ansl:
(43) For every individual x, world w and question Q,
Ans2 (Q) (w) = Xw'. [Ansi (Q) (w) = Ansl(Q) (w')]
(44) For every individual x, world w and questions Q,
[Iknowll (Q) (w) (x) = 1 iff x believes Ans2 (Q) (w)
This second notion of answer is equivalent to the de dicto G&S's question denotation 8 therefore,
just like the latter, it accounts for strong exhaustive readings as well. Heim's proposal, however,
differs from G&S's in the following important respect. While G&S encode strong exhaustivity as
a characteristic property of the denotation of any question, Heim locates it in the lexical
semantics of QEPs. Therefore Heim's system is more flexible in that it allows, in principle, a
certain degree of variation between predicates that is impossible in G&S's theory. Specifically
Heim predicts the possibility that some QEPs support strongly exhaustive readings (Strong
Exhaustive QEPs henceforth), while other support only weakly exhaustive ones (Weakly
Exhaustive QEPs), depending on which of Ansi or Ans2 their meaning refers to (see Heim 1994,
Beck and Rullmann 2000 and Sharvit 2002).
Evidence in favor of a flexible approach, and therefore problematic for G&S's, might
come, according to Heim, from emotional question embedding predicates like surprise. At first
approximation, the meaning of question embedding surprise can be described as follows: for
every individual x and question Q, Q surprises x is true iff x expected the negation of the
complete true answer to Q. If this is correct, the problem for G&S semantics is the following: in
a theory where questions are always strongly exhaustive, if Bill didn't call and Ann instead
8 This is true insofar as the proto-question contains only Individual Discriminating Predicates (see Heim 1994, p
133-134, and 140; c.f. also Sharvit 2002 and Lahiri 2002 for discussion)
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expected him to, but also correctly expected that all those who in fact called would call, the
following sentence is incorrectly predicted to be true (cf. also Bermann 1991):
(45) It surprised Ann who called.
In order to understand this argument one should keep in mind the following semantic property of
surprise (cf. Lahiri 1991, 2002). Q surprises x means that x expected the negation the
conjunction of the true instantial answers in Q. 9 Given this, Lahiri observes that surprise, just
like negation, does not distribute over parts of that conjunction, because EXPECT NOT (A&B)
does not entail EXPECT (NOT A and NOT B). This seems to be correct, indeed what surprises
can be the particular combination A and B, even when A and B taken in isolation were expected.
(46) illustrates this point:
9 More recently, Sharvit (2002) argues that also facts like (i) show that surprise is a weakly exhaustive QEP, in the
sense of Heim (1994):
(i) # It didn't really surprise Ann who came to the party. For example it didn't surprise her that Bill didn't come.
At first Lahiri's (1991, 2002) observation that surprise does not distribute over parts of a conjunction,
appears at first to undermine Sharvit's argument. In fact, one could think that, given Lahiri's semantics for surprise,
the oddness of (i) should be predicted, regardless of whether surprise was strongly or weakly exhaustive. Here is
why. If Lahiri and Heim are right in claiming that Q surprised x does not entail that x expected any of the instantial
answers to Q, taken in isolation, to be false, then that x did correctly expect one true instantial answer, be it positive
or negative, to be true is not a sufficient condition to make Q surprised x false. Therefore, even if the complete
answer to Q entailed the true negative instantial answers, as G&S have it, that x expected a true negative answer to
be true is not a sufficient reason to deny that x was surprised about Q, unless he also expected all the other true
instantial answers to be true (this is shown in (ii)).
(ii) Suppose that the complete true answer to who called was that Mary called, Bill didn't call and Kim called.
It surprised Ann who called = Ann expected that Mary didn't call or Bill called or Kim didn't call.
Therefore It didn't surprised Ann that Bill didn't call =/=> It didn't surprise Ann who called.
Given this, in Lahiri's perspective, one could argue that the example in (i) is odd, even if we assumed a strongly
exhaustive semantics for surprise, because it suggests that the second conjunct in it should provide a reason for the
denial in the first conjunct, but it does not.
Notice, that ,because its structure is the opposite, Heim's argument is not affected by the above mentioned
problem, and therefore it appears to be more reliable:
Q surprised x is true iff x expected the negation of the complete answer to Q
Therefore that x actually expected one instantial conjunct in that answer to be FALSE should be sufficient
for Q surprised x to be TRUE.
However, a comparison between (iii) and Sharvit's example (repeated in (iv)) immediately suggest the
explanation given above for the oddness of (iv) cannot be correct, because, if it was we would expect (iii) to be also
odd, while instead it is judged to be perfectly fine.
(iii) It didn't really surprise Ann who came to the party. For instance, Bill came and she expected him to.
(iv) # It didn't really surprise Ann who came to the party. For example it didn't surprise her that Bill didn't come
The above contrast suggests that while the correct expectation of a negative instantial answer is not sufficient to
motivate the denial of Q surprised x, the correct expectation of a positive instantial answer CAN be. Given this (iii)
is a puzzle, in light Lahiri's observation. However see Sharvit (in preparation) for an analysis of suprise that builds
on Lahiri's original insight but predicts the facts in (iii) and (iv).
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(46) It surprised me that Mary and Bill came to the party, since one of them had to take care of
the baby, but it didn't surprise me that either of them I particular came.
This is relevant to the above example, because it shows that, as a consequence of the
meaning of surprise, it is sufficient to not expect just one of the instantial true answers to a
question in order to be surprised by the complete answer. Heim's point follows. Recall that the
strongly exhaustive answer to a question entails all the true negative instantial answers to that
question as well. Therefore, if the meaning of surprise was strongly exhaustive answer, as G&S
predict, then not expecting one negative instantial answer to a question Q should be sufficient to
make x surprised about Q, contrary to our intuitions. On the other hand, Heim's system can
avoid this prediction and capture the lack of strong exhaustive readings with surprise by simply
assuming that the lexical meaning of surprise refers to Ans 1, rather than Ans2.
Although the strength of this argument is contingent to a more comprehensive
understanding of the semantics of predicates of surprise (Heim p.c.), if it is on the right track
than a flexible account of exhaustivity is to be preferred.
At this point it is worth noticing that, unlike G&S's, the proposal made in this chapter,
exhibits the same flexibility as Heim's insofar as the presence of whether in constituent questions
is taken to be optional. In order to guarantee that verbs like surprise turn out to be weakly
exhaustive all we need is a semantics or a syntax for these verbs that excludes the possibility for
them to embed whether questions all together. If we wanted to encode this restriction in the
syntax, would need to derive a constraint of the following type:
(47) * surprise whether
One way to implement the restriction this sort in the semantics, instead, is by the means
of a presupposition like (48)a:
(48) For every x, w and Q
a. [Isurprise]] (Q) (x) (w) is defined iff n {p: pe Q} I 0
b. if defined then, [[ surprise ] (Q) (x) (w) =1 iff x expected in w - Ansi (Q)
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The above lexical entry introduces the definedness condition that there should be at least one
possible world where all the propositions in Q are simultaneously true. This condition is
sufficient to exclude questions with whether under surprise, because whether-questions contain,n
for each individual in the restrictor of the wh-phrase, two propositions that are mutually
exclusive. Given this there can be no world in which all the propositions in such a question are
simultaneously true. Given this, embedding a question with whether, would systematically result
in a presupposition failure. On the other hand, if the question doesn't contain whether this
requirement can be satisfied as the question would not contain mutually exclusive propositions
and therefore their conjunction isn't a contradiction.
No matter whether we go for a semantic or a syntactic constraint, under the present
proposal, strength is captured in terms of the presence vs. absence of whether and would predict
that this predicates affected by the constraint never supports a strongly exhaustive reading, as
desired.
To sum up, I illustrated here two alternative ways to derive strong exhaustivity: one
exploiting the notion of Ans2 (as Heim has it), the other the presence of a hidden whether. In
addition, I have shown that both approaches allow for the possibility of readings that are weakly
but not strongly exhaustive. Therefore, if these readings are empirically attested, both Heim's
and my approach to exhaustivity turn out to be superior to G&S. I also recalled that the behavior
of predicates like surprise provide at least suggestive evidence in this direction. 0
At this point it might be worth to see whether there is any reason to prefer a whether--
based account over Heim's. Although the considerations below are not conclusive, I believe they
might ultimately provide us a motivation for doing so.
By uniformly treating strong exhaustivity of whether-constituent-questions and of y/n
questions in terms of the presence of whether, the whether-based view leads to the additional
desirable prediction that predicates lacking strong exhaustive readings when embedding
10 Heim also observes the soundness of the following inference provides additional support for a flexible account:
(i) Premise 1: John knows that Bill and Sue called.
Premise 2: That Bill and Sue called happens to be the answer to the question who called?
Conclusion: John knows the answer to the question who called?
Specifically, she observes that (i) shows that knowing the answer to Q, in suitable contexts can be understood as
knowing Ansi. Notice that the whether-based approach to exhaustivity accounts for this possibility as well.
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constituent questions can never embed y/n questions either (as shown in (49)), a fact which to the
best of my knowledge has been so far remained unexplained:
(49) a. #It surprised Ann whether Bill called.
Since y/n, in virtue of containing two mutually exclusive propositions, are inherently strongly
exhaustive, a uniform account of the absence of strongly exhaustive readings and the
unacceptability of y/n questions under QEPs like surprise is certainly desirable.
A uniform account of this sort is not available, however, if strong exhaustivity is
understood in terms of Ans2. Notice in fact that positing a semantics of surprise in terms of Ans 1
would not by itself suffice to exclude (49), as nothing prevents Ansi to apply to a y/n question as
well, nor to assert that the subject expected the negation of the resulting proposition.
The problem is that excluding the possibility that predicates of surprise refer to Ans2 in
their semantics, does not in fact completely exclude by itself strong exhaustive readings under
surprise: Ansi is sufficient to derive a strongly exhaustive reading whenever the embedded
question is a y/n question. The unacceptability of (49), however, suggests that the incompatibility
of surprise with strong exhaustivity extends to y/n questions as well, a fact that would therefore
need to be accounted for in some other way.
Given this, if the weakly exhaustive nature of surprise is real, we have an indirect
argument for the whether-based approach.
Finally additional evidence for this view comes once more from Bulgarian. While in
English what confirmed our predictions that strong exhaustivity is linked to the presence whether
is the impossibility for weakly exhaustive predicates to embed y/n questions, if it is correct that
Bulgarian whether is always phonetically realized, Bulgarian allows us to test the prediction in
wh-questions as well. The outcome of this test is given below. Although very colloquial,
sentences with constituent questions are acceptable under surprise, but only when they do not
contain li (Pancheva, p.c.).
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(50) a. Maria se iznenada koj (*li) dojde
M. refl surprised who (li) came
a. Iznenadaja koj (*li) dojde.
Surprised her who (li) came
'It surprised her who came'
The facts above show that that our prediction is correct, and therefore confirm that it is not mere
coincidence that weakly exhaustive QEPs do not admit y/n question complements.
3.4.3 The Problem of Strongly Exhaustive 'De Dicto' Readings
This last subsection introduces a potential problem for the view on the semantics and syntax of
wh-question presented in this chapter. Specifically I will show how so called de dicto readings
can be derived, within this view, in tNvo different ways. I will then show that while, on the one
hand, only one of these ways allows us to account for certain attested strongly exhaustive de
dicto readings, on the other hand it fails capture our intuitions of what counts as congruent
answers to de dicto interpretation of questions containing negation and about the asymmetrical
status of the restrictor of a wh-phrase and the predicate in the proto-question. The problem
affects G&S's theory as well but does not affect Heim's.
The idea of having whether in wh-question was already entertained and rejected in
Karttunen (1977). Karttunen's motivation for ruling out this possibility was that wh-questions
with whether would end up to be semantically equivalent to their negations, contrary to the
intuitions. In fact, if we limit our attention to the readings considered so far (i.e de re readings, as
we will see below), the proposal I presented does in fact predict such an equivalence. Both (51) a
and b are identical to the set in (51)c. (see appendix).
(51) a. I[(whether) which student called w
b. fI (whether) which student didn't call w]
w
c. {p: 3x [ I[ student I (x)= 1& (p = that x called or p = that x din't call)] }
This extends also to the G&S's readings considered so far, namely their de re readings (c.f. G&S
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1985, and appendix):
(52) [[which students calledJ(w) =
{w': Xx. x is a student in w & x called in w = x. x is a student in w & x called in w'} =
{w': Xx. - (x is a student in w & x called in w) = Xx. - (x is a student in w & x called in w')} =
I~which students didn't call ]l(w)
The equivalence between positive and negative questions appears at first problematic, since it
incorrectly predicts that sentences like the following should be contradictory:
(53) Ann knows which students called but she doesn't know which students didn't call.
This sentence has two non contradictory readings. The first reading is the one Karttunen has in
mind and states that Mary knows of all those that are students and called that they called but not
necessarily that they are students, while with respect to those that are students and didn't call
either she has no opinion or she falsely believes that they called. This reading is true, for
example, in the following scenario:
(54) The students were all in front of Ann. John pointed to each of them and asked her: 'was
(s)he at the party?'. Ann gave the correct answer for all of them that indeed where at the
party but she was sometimes wrong or didn't have any idea about those who were not.
Unlike G&S's, Karttunen's view, where only weak readings are derived, predicts this
reading for this sentence.
Karttunen's objection applies only to a view on wh-questions according to which whether is
always involved in their structure. On the other hand, the whether-approach I propose correctly
predicts besides a contradictory 'exhaustive' reading, in (55)b, the above non contradictory
reading of this sentence, if both embedded questions lack whether, in (55)a.
(55) a. Ann knows which students called but she doesn't know which students didn't call.
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b. Ann knows (whether) which students called but she doesn't know (whether) which
students didn't. (1)
Given this my proposal and Karttunen's make the same predictions regarding the above
described reading. There is, however, another non contradictory interpretation of the above
sentence, which Karttunen cannot account for. In fact the sentence above seems to have also an
interpretation according to which Mary's knowledge is 'exhaustive', in the sense that Mary
knows that Kim, Bill and Sue are students and were at the party an no other student was at the
party, and still she doesn't know who are the students who weren't at the party, because she does
not know who all the students are. This second reading is one where Mary's knowledge (asserted
in the first conjunct and negated in the second) qualifies as de dicto rather than de re knowledge.
The distinction between de re and de dicto readings is thoroughly discussed in G&S'
work (c.f. G&S 1985 and subsequent work, see also Heim 1994, Beck and Rullmann 1999 and
Sharvit 2002 for discussion of how to derive these readings in a set-of-answers semantics of
questions). The two readings can be roughly described as follows: if Ann knows which students
called, and her knowledge is de dicto, then she believes of those individuals that are students and
called in the actual world, that they are students and called; under a de re reading, on the other
hand, she simply knows of those who happen to be students that called, that they called.
While G&S's account of de re and de dicto readings fails to predict the existence of the
'weakly exhaustive de re' reading that Karttunen pointed out, because it derives only strongly
exhaustive readings, it does correctly predict that the sentence in (55) under a de dicto strongly
exhaustive reading is not contradictory. Let's briefly see why (cf. also G&S 1985, and Lahiri
2002, p15 8 and following for discussion). The way de dicto readings are captured in G&S's
system is by interpreting the restrictor of the wh-phrase relative to the locally bound world,
rather than the actual world. This is shown in (56)a (compare with the above mentioned G&S's
de re reading in (56)b):
(56) [I which students called ]](w) =
a. { w': Xx. x is a student in w & called in w= Xx. x is a student in w' & called in w') de dicto
b. { w': Xx. x is a student in w & x called in w= Xx. x is a student in w & called in w' } de re
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(57) shows the two readings for the corresponding negative interrogative:
(57) Il which students didn't call ]](w) =
a. {w': x. - (x is a student in w & x called in w)= x. - (x is a student in w' & x called in w')} de dicto
b. {w': x. - (x is a student in w & x called in w)= ax. - (x is a student in w & x called in w')} de re
While the set of worlds in (56)b is identical to the one in (57)b, as we saw above, the two sets in
(56)a and (57)a are distinct (see G&S 1985 and appendix). Given this Ann's knowledge of the
former proposition is not incompatible with her lack of knowledge of the second, hence the
availability of the reading of (55) we are after.
Let us now return to the whether-approach. Notice, that the readings I described so far in
my proposal are all de re, in the sense of the above informal description. Whether this system
can capture the above mentioned reading of (55) depends on whether and how this approach can
derive de dicto readings as well.
One way to derive de dicto readings in this system is by slightly modifying Karttunen's
theory and assume that wh-phrases are indefinites (i.e. restricted variables) rather than existential
quantifiers, which are interpreted either in situ or in any intermediate landing i$te under ? (as
shown in (58)a and b). The variables these indefinites introduce are then bound by a ? morpheme
with the meaning given in (58) c. "
(58) a.
2
whether 2
which, student called
b. f[ whether2 Jg = Xtt. [(g(2)) =AFF or (g(2)) = - & g(2)(t)=1]
c. II? R]= XPg<s,al ...a,t>. {P: 3xl...xn E Da.p= Xw. P(w) (xl)...(xn)=1)
" This lexical entry is a version of von Fintel &Heim's (2001) generalized here to all types of arguments for p)
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As for which-phrases, there are two alternatives regarding how to interpret the predicate
restricting the variables they introduce: either as part of the truth conditions (just like in Heimian
indefinites) or as introducing a presupposition (as proposed in Beck and Rullmann 2000). The
two options are shown in (59)a and b respectively:
(59) a. For every assignment function g and world
[[which, student ] g = XP<e,t. [I[ student ]]g (g(1))=1 & P(g(1))=l]
b. For every assignment function g
[ which studentl Ilg = XP<e,t>: I student Ig (g(1))=1. P(g(1))
The rest of this section argues that if the meaning in (59)a is adopted, the de dicto
readings of a constituent whether-questions can be shown to be distinct from the same type of
reading of the correspondent interrogative containing negation, as desired. Given this, this option
allows us to directly derive the non contradictory strongly exhaustive de dicto reading we
detected in (55). On the contrary, if Beck and Rullmann's analysis is adopted, instead, then
constituent whether-interrogatives end up being equivalent to their negations under a de dicto
reading as well, and therefore one of the readings of (55) remains unexplained. However, since
Beck and Rullmann account of de dicto readings finds compelling independent support
elsewhere, we will be left with a dilemma. I will ultimately speculate that 'local accommodation'
might provide a solution that allows me to maintain an analysis of strongly exhaustive readings
in terms of whether and at the same time endorse Beck and Rullmann's view on de dicto
readings.
Let's first consider in turn what predictions the above two alternatives analysis of which
student lead to. (60) illustrates the structure and the de dicto meaning of which student called,
under the assumption that which student is a regular heiman indefinite:
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(60) 0
2
1
whether 2
which student, called
De Dicto:
[ ]",g = [[ student ]gw (g(1))=1 & [I called ]g (g(1))=1]
([[E ew,g = [g(2) =AFF or (g(2)) = --,] & g(2) (Istudent]g'w (g(1))=1 & I[called] g'w (g(1))=l)=l
[ ]wg = Xx. [g(2) =AFF or (g(2)) = -] & g(2)([studentl]'w (x)=l & [[called] 'w (x)=l)=l
[[ I",g = Xf. Xx. [f =AFF or f = -n] & f ([[student] g'W(x)=l & [called] g' (x)=l)=l
[[f) wg -
{p: 3xe, f<t,> [f =AFF or f = - & (p = ,w'. f (fstudentl]g' (x)=1 & g[called]g'w (x)=1)=1)=
{p: 3xe & (p = that x is a student and called or p = that x is not a student or x didn't call))
Let's now turn to the negative counterpart of this question, given in (61)a. Assuming that the
which-phrase originated in subject position moves by successive cyclic movement before spell
out and that at LF it can be interpreted in any intermediate landing site of this movement (as
legitimated by scope and economy), the negative counterpart of the question above has an
exhaustive de dicto reading that is not equivalent to (60), but is equivalent to G&S's de dicto
interpretation. This reading is illustrated in (61).
(61) a. Which student didn't call?
b.
0
? aO
2 0
whether 2
which student, 0
3 0
NOT
t 3.e called
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c. De Dicto:
i[ ]wg" = 1 iff [ called ]g,w (g(3)) = 0
[[ ]w"' = xe. X[ called gw (x) = 0
[[ ]"wg = [I student ig (g(1))=1 & [f called g,'W(g(1))--O
[ O ]1wg = [g(2) =AFF v (g(2)) = -] & g(2)([f student ]g(g(l))=l & f[ called I gW(g(1())0)=)=
1[ ]"wg = Xx. [g(2) =AFF v (g(2))= -1] & g(2)(f[ student g (x)=1 & [I called g' (x)--)=l
[[ 0 ]]"wg = Xf. [f =AFF v f = ] & f ([f student ]g(x)=1 & [f called g'W(x)---O)=l
{p: 3xe, f<t,t> [f =AFF v f = - & (p = Xw'. f (i[ student ]g (x)= & I[ called g, (x)-=0)=l }=
{p: 3xe & (p = that x is a student and called or p = that x is a student and x didn't call)}
Given this, if which-phrases are interpreted as heimian indefinites, the whether-approach leads to
the right prediction regarding the possible meaning of the sentence in (53) (repeated in (62))
which attributes to Ann strongly exhaustive de dicto knowledge:
(62) Ann knows which students called but she doesn't know which students didn't call.
On the contrary, if we posit a meaning for which-phrases s.t. their restrictor contributes a
presupposition, as Beck and Rullmann have it, the problem with this example would remain: the
sentence under a strongly exhaustive interpretation would be predicted to be contradictory no
matter whether the which-phrase is interpreted de re or de dicto. In fact, the two embedded
questions would be equivalent also under a de dicto reading. Let us see why.
Suppose which student receives the following interpretation:
(63) For every assignment function g
i[ which student, I]g = XP<e,,,: I[ student I g (g(l))=1. P(g(1))
Since negation is a hole for presuppositions, the strong exhaustive meaning of (whether) which
student called will receive the de dicto interpretation in (64)a. For the same reason, no matter
where which student is interpreted relative to negation in the negative question, the resulting de
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dicto interpretation of the corresponding negative question is the same set , i.e (64)b (see
appendix).
(64) a. {p: 3xe & (p = Xw: x is a student in w. x called in w v p = Xw. x is a student in w. x
didn't call)}
b. {p: 3xe & (p = Xw: x is a student in w. x didn't call in w v p = Xw. x is a student in
w. it is not the case that x didn't call in w)}
Give this, if which phrases are presuppositional, as Beck and Rullmann have it, the whether-
approach fails to account for one of the attested readings of (62): namely the reading according
to which Ann has strongly exhaustive de dicto knowledge regarding which students called and
still doesn't know which students didn't, because she doesn't know who the student are
Here, it becomes important to illustrate what are the independent reasons that make Beck and
Rullmann's a very appealing proposal. First, a presuppositional view on wh-phrases nicely
captures the asymmetry between the status of the restrictor of a wh-phrase and the main
predicate in the proto-question, thus helping distinguishing the meaning of pairs of questions like
the following:
(65) a. Which student smokes?
b. Which smoker is a student?
Beck and Rullmann's proposal also provides a very convincing solution to a problem, which has
come to be known as the Donald Duck problem. The following dialog illustrates the problem:
(66) A: Which philosopher didn't come to the party.
B: Donald Duck didn't (/did).
In order to generates a de dicto reading of which philosopher, this phrase must be
interpreted under ?, however, if its contribution was truth-conditional rather than
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presuppositional we incorrectly expect both variants of B's nonsensical answer above to be
congruent answers to A's question, as shown in (67):
(67) a. That Donald Duck didn't come to the party E
{ p: 3x & p= that x is not a philosopher or didn't come to the party }
b. That DD came to the party e
{ p: 3x & p= that x is not a philosopher or didn't come to the party
A presuppositional analysis of the which-phrase resolves this problem.
At this point we are faced with a dilemma: on the one hand the treatment of strong
exhaustivity in terms of whether is promising in a number of respects, as it provides a unified
view on this semantic property in both y/n and constituent questions and because it nicely
predicts the Bulgarian facts mentioned above, while Heim's analysis does not seem to exhibit
either of these two advantages. On the other hand the whether-based view seems to be committed
to a truth-conditional, rather than a presuppositional, analysis of wh-phrases and therefore it fails
to explain the DD-problem and the asymmetry between the predicate restricting a wh-phrase and
the predicate formed in the proto question via wh-movement. Heim's account of strong
exhaustivity, which Beck and Rullmann adopt, does not run into this problem.
Here is a tentative solution of this dilemma that rescues the whether approach. It might be
the case that this view does not need to commit to a non-presuppositional analysis of wh-phrases
after all, if a process of local accommodation can be shown to be triggered in cases like (68),
from above:
(68) Ann knows which students called but she doesn't know which students didn't call.
Specifically, it is possible to attribute a presuppositional semantics to which student, assume that
the two embedded questions do contain whether and still derive a non-contradictory strongly
exhaustive de dicto reading of this sentence, insofar as we can take the negation of in the second
question to negate the presupposition of the wh-phrase as well. This option is allowed if local
accommodation of that presupposition takes place.
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What makes this option at least plausible is a view on local accommodation under
negation according to which this process becomes available precisely and only when it is
necessary. One instance is when it prevents a contradiction between assertion and presupposition
(cf. Heim 1991). The following sentence has been indeed analyzed in these terms:
(69) The king of France doesn't exist.
In the above example the assertion entails that there is no King of France but the presupposition
introduced by the definite determiner entails that there is one. If the presupposition is
accommodated lower than negation, this contradiction does not arise.
The present case is very similar, if accommodation in the negative question is triggered
the sentence becomes consistent. Moreover, Beck and Rullmann solution to the DD-problem is
not compromised: in DD-sentences local accommodation is not legitimated as these sentences do
not result in a contradiction without accommodation.
Conclusions:
In this section I have illustrated a potential problem for the whether-based analysis of strong
exhaustivity. There are a number of phenomena (like the DD-problem illustrated above) that hint
to a presuppositional nature of wh-phrases. However, the whether-approach appears to be
committed to a non presuppositional semantics of these phrases, in order to derive distinct
strongly exhaustive de dicto readings of questions and their negations. This however can be
shown to be unnecessary if a process of local accommodation is assumed to be possible in the
problematic cases.
3.5 Conclusions
In this chapter I have provided an explanation of why also in constituent questions with even can
trigger bias and unusual presuppositions.
My account is based on the unconventional assumption that constituent questions as well
optionally come with a hidden whether. I provided two arguments in favor of this assumption.
The first argument builds on Bulgarian questions, the second on the distribution of embedded y/n
question under weakly and strongly embedded predicates.
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Finally I presented a puzzle regarding strongly de dicto interpretations of constituent
questions and suggested that the notion of 'local accommodation', exploited elsewhere to resolve
similar cases (c.f. Heim 1991), provides a solution to it.
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Chapter 4
Even Across Languages and the Scope Theory
In Chapters 2 and 3, I argued that the effect of even in questions provides indirect evidence for
Karttunen & Peters's (1979) scope theory of even and against an ambiguity theory as Rooth
(1985) has it. Specifically, I illustrated there that the scope theory allows us to provide a unified
account for both the bias and the unexpected 'easy' presupposition of questions that contain even
in association with the lowest point of the relevant scale; on the other hand the availability of a
second, NPI, even as hypothesized by Rooth would at best account for the presupposition of
these questions but fails to explain why this presupposition systematically co-occurs with
negative bias. At the end of Chapter 2, I pointed out that other facts seem to go in the opposite
direction, i.e. they seem to support the ambiguity hypothesis instead.
In this chapter I will focus on one more argument in favor the ambiguity hypothesis that
often recurs in the literature on even. This argument builds on the following cross-linguistics
considerations: languages like German, Dutch, and Italian (among others) exploit different
expressions to ultimately convey 'hard' and 'easy' presuppositions. Specifically, on the one
hand, sogar, zelfs and addirittura are used in affirmative declaratives in order to convey a 'hard'
presupposition in German, Dutch and Italian respectively. On the other hand, auch nur (lit. 'also
only'), ook/zelfs maar (lit. 'also/even only') and anche solo (lit. 'also only') ultimately induce in
the three languages, the effect of an 'easy' presupposition in negative declaratives. In addition
the distribution of the latter three items closely resembles that of NPIs like any.
The existence, in languages other than English, of distinct expressions that apparently
introduce the same presupposition as Rooth's evennpi and that also are NPIs, has been considered
by many scholars to represent compelling evidence for the ambiguity analysis (cf. Rooth 1985,
von Stechow 1991, Rullmann 1997, Barker and Herburger 2000 and Giannakidou 2003).
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In the same spirit, Barker & Herburger (2000) and Giannakidou (2003) have pointed out
the presence, in Negative Concord languages, of n-words introducing an 'easy' presupposition as
well (Spanish ni siquiera and Greek oute kan respectively) and have taken these expressions as
well to provide compelling support for the hypothesis of an NPI even in English.
This chapter argues that, after closer scrutiny, at least the German, Italian and Dutch facts
are not only compatible with a scope theory of even, but actually provide additional support for
it. In addition to this I will point out that Barker and Herburger's and Giannakidou's arguments
based on evidence from NC languages seem to rely on arguable assumptions on the meaning and
the of n-words and the constraints they are subject to in these languages.
The chapter is structured as follows. In section 4.1, I will start by providing a more
detailed illustration of Rullmann and Rooth's argument and of the data which it relies on. In
section 4.2 I observe that, just like even, the alleged NPI evens in German, Italian and Dutch
trigger a negative bias interpretation, a fact that, as argued earlier, an ambiguity theory cannot
account for. Furthermore, in section 4.3, I observe that Rooth and Rullmann's argument needs to
stipulate a non-compositional analysis of these items, i.e. an analysis that treats, e.g., auch nur as
an idiom that is not further analyzable from the semantic point of view. The obvious drawback of
such an assumption is that the fact that German, Italian and Dutch make use of the same
combination of focus particles (also and only) to express the meaning of even in negative
contexts would fall out as a mere coincidence.
Given this, in section 4.4, 1 will propose an alternative analysis of the alleged EVENNPIS
in these languages. I will argue that the analysis I propose is preferable to Rooth's and
Rullmann's in at least the following important respects. First, it provides us with an account of
the bias these items trigger in questions, while Rooth & Rullmann's does not. Second, it treats
these items compositionally, i.e. in terms of the meaning of auch and nur, thus explaining why
the combination of these two items produces the effect of even in negative contexts. In addition
to this, the analysis will prove appealing because it derives the restricted distribution for these
items from their lexical properties, along the lines of Lahiri'98 account of Hindi NPIs, rather
than stipulating it. Instead of assuming an ambiguity of English even, my analysis builds on the
assumption that, in the languages in question, expression generally glossed as only in the three
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languages are ambiguous. In other words the proposal is to trade in an ambiguity of English even
for and ambiguity of German nur, Italian solo and Dutch maar.
Novel empirical evidence in favor an ambiguity of only comes from Shank's (2002) work
on Straits Samish, a Salish language spoken in British Columbia presented in section 4.5.
Section 4.6 discusses Barker and Herburger (2000)'s argument based on the above
mentioned facts in Negative Concord languages. For our purposes it will suffice to notice that ni
siquera and nemmeno differ from English even in respects in which n-words in these two
languages differ from NPIs like any, ever in English and from minimizers in general. However,
whether n-words in Negative Concord languages can be taken as evidence regarding the meaning
of NPIs (like any) in non NC-languages is a complicated question whose answer crucially
depends on what is the correct analysis of NC to begin with (c.f. Ladusaw 1992, Zanuttini 1991,
Valldouvi 1994, Giannakidou 1997 and 2000, Herburger 2002, Guerzoni & Ovalle 2002 etc.). In
this section I bring about some considerations that might be useful in determining how this issue
relates to our conclusions regarding English even. I'll conclude that on the basis of what little we
know about n-words words meaning even, Barker&Herburger's observations do not seem to
seriously challenge a scope view on English even.
Finally, in section 4.7 I will discuss Giannakidou's (2003) argument for the ambiguity
hypothesis as well. Giannakidou claims that Greek contains not two but three different items
meaning even. One of her evens, is a negative word, like ni siquera, and neppure. Assuming that
this is correct, the consideration in section 4.6. about the latter should extend to this Greek
complex expressions as well. The second particle is just a PPI even (like K&Ps). The third EVEN
is claimed by Giannakidou to be a 'concessive' even. This latter particle is claimed to be a
narrow scope polarity sensitive item which in addition triggers negative bias in questions. In the
last section I will show that, in spite of what Giannakidou claims, her data and even her analysis
of this last item do not really provide an argument for the ambiguity thesis. To the contrary, they
support the scope theory as well.
4.1 The Cognates of Even: Rooth' (1985) and Rullmann's (1997) Argument
In affirmative sentences sogar in German, addirittura in Italian and zelfs in Dutch appear to
make the same contribution as English even: they introduce a 'hard' presupposition in (5).
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(1) John even greeted [Mary]f.
(2) Der Hans hat sogar [die Maria]f begruesst. German
The John has even the Mary greeted
(3) Giovanni ha addirittura salutato [Maria]f. Italian
John has even geeted Mary
(4) Johan heeft zelfs [Maria]f begroeten Dutch
John has even Mary greeted
(5) Presupposition: Mary was the least likely person to be greeted (by John) & 'hard'
somebody else was greeted (by John).
Just like even, all the expressions above do not seem to make a direct contribution to the
truth-conditions of the hosting sentence. Each of the sentences in (2), (3), (4), above is truth-
conditionally equivalent to its counterpart without the focused particle, given below:
(6) Der Georg hat die Maria begruesst.
The John has the Mary greeted
(7) Giovanni ha salutato Maria.
John has greeted Mary
(8) Johan heeft Maria begroeten
John has Mary greeted
'John greeted Mary'
When we turn to negative sentences (or other NPI-licensing environments) we find out that these
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languages exploit different expressions to convey the presuppositions of even:' German auch
nur (lit. 'also only), Italian anche solo (lit. 'also only'), and Dutch zelfs maar (lit 'even
only')/ook maar (also only).
Natural translations of (9) in German, Italian and Dutch are given, (9), (10) and (11),
respectively: 2
(9) Nobody even greeted [Mary]f.
(10) Niemand hat auch nur [die Maria]fbegruesst. German
Non one has also only the Mary greeted
(11) Nessuno ha salutato anche solo [Maria]f. Italian
No one has greeted also only MAry
(12) Niemand heeft ook maar [Maria]f begroeten. Dutch
Non one has also only Mary greeted
'Nobody greeted even Mary'
(13) Presupposition: Mary was the MOST likely to be greeted & 'easy'
someone else wasN' T greeted.
These sentences as well are truthconditionally equivalent to their variants given below:
(14) Niemand hat die Maria begruesst.
Nobody has the Mary greeted
(15) Nessuno ha salutato Maria.
Nobody has greeted Mary
'Interestingly these expressions is felicitous with adverbial negation not. Neither the analysis I develop in this
chapter nor Rooth's and Rullmann's approach can offer any explanation for this mysterious restriction.2 Sogar, addirittura and zelfs are judged very marginal if not completely unacteptable in the surface scope of a local
negation. This might suggest that these items are positive polarity items (just like English even) which however
(unlike English even) cannot covertly move to escape negation.
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(16) Niemand heeft Maria begroeten.
Nobody has Mary greeted
'Nobody greeted Mary'
While all the above items lack truth-conditional import, they all introduce a
presupposition depending on what is focused in the sentence, which appears to be the same as
the one due to the presence of English even in the same environments. Specifically sentences like
(2), (3), just like (1), are felicitous only if the following information is either already taken for
granted in the utterance context, or the addressees have no objection to treat it as if it was:
(17) That John greeted Mary was less likely/more noteworthy than for him to greet any other
person among the contextually relevant people.
The sentences in (10), (11) and (12) are felicitous only if (18) is taken for granted, just like their
English counterpart with even in (9).
(18) For somebody to greet Mary was MORE likely/LESS noteworthy than for somebody to
greet any other contextually relevant person.
In other words, (2), (3), (4) ultimately carry a 'hard' presupposition, while (10), (11), and
(12) ultimately carry an 'easy' one.
(19) Mary was the least likely person to be greeted (by John) & 'hard'
somebody else was greeted (by John).
(20) Mary was the MOST likely to be greeted & 'easy'
someone else wasN' T greeted
Finally, recall that when negation is not local to even, we detect an ambiguity between
the two readings 'easy' and 'hard', in English. This ambiguity is lexically resolved in the
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languages in question. I illustrate this point for German in (22):
(21) a. It surprised us that even John was there.
READING I: That John was there was least likely/ most noteworthy
READING II: That John was there was the most likely/least noteworthy.
(22) a. Es hat uns iiberrascht , das sogar der Hans da war. German
It has us surprised that also only the John there was
'It surprised us that even John was there'.
ONLY READING I!
b. Es hat uns Uiberrascht, das auch nur der Hans da war.
It has us surprised that also only the John there was
'It surprised us that even John was there'.
ONLY READING II!
The defenders of the ambiguity thesis have interpreted the above facts as follows: while
sogar, selfs and addirittura, mean what ordinary even means; auch nur, ook maar and anche solo
mean what Rooth's evenNpl does:
(23) IDogar/zelfs/addirituutrafr(p) = [[evenlf(p):
I~ogar/zelfs/addirituutraQ (p) defined iff Vqe C[q # pP-q>likelyp]&3qE C[q # p&q(w)=l ],
if defined then so [[even r(p) = p(w) hardP
(24) I[auch nur/anche solo/ook maar f(p) = I[ evennpillw(p):
[[auch nur/anche solo/ook maar](p) is defined iff
Vqe C[q * P"q<likelyp]& 3qE C[q # p & q(w)=O] easyP
if defined then [[auch nur/anche solo/ook maar Ir(p) =p(w)
Given this, they argue that since there are languages that mark explicitly the distinction between
the two meanings by using different lexical items, in English too there ought to be two
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semantically distinct lexical items (Rooth's even and evenNpr), which so happen to be
homophonous, but still introduce two different presuppositions.
What seems to add even more plausibility to Rooth's hypothesis, is that just like the
easyP presupposition induced by evenNp, also the distribution of auch nur and its Italian and
Dutch cognates, is limited to the scope of entailment reversal expressions, a property that is
known to be characteristic of Negative Polarity Items like any: (cf. Rullmann 1997)
(25) a. Es hat uns tiberrascht , das auch nur der Hans da war. German
It has us surprised that also only the John there was
'It surprised us that even John was there'.
b. * Auch nur der Hans war da.
Also only the John was there
'Even John was there'.
(26) a. Ci sorprese che anche solo Giovanni era presente. Italian
Us surprised that also only John was present.
'It surprises us that even John was there'
b. * Anche solo Giovanni era presente.
'Even John was there'.
(27) a. Ik denke niet dat hij ook maar EEN meter ver kan springen. Dutch
I think not that he even ONE meter far can jump
'I don't think that he can jump even ONE meter'.
b. *Ik denke dat hij ook maar EEN meter ver kan springen.
I think that he even ONE meter far can jump
'I think that he can jump even ONE meter'.
Summing up, Rooth's and Rullmann's argument goes roughly as follows: in English
declarative affirmative sentences, the presence of even ultimately produce a 'hard'
presupposition, while in negative environments it can induce an 'easy' presupposition, but other
languages differ from English in that they exploit different lexical items to generate the two
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different meanings in the two types of environment. Thus, given the syntactic problems the scope
theory encounters (see previous chapter) and on the basis of economy driven considerations
regarding the lexicon of Universal Grammar, it is probably the case that also in English, the
above ambiguity is lexical in nature.
4.2. Why Scope : The Bias of Auch Nur in Questions
If the data presented in the previous section do indeed show that, across languages, specific
lexical items directly introduce an 'easy' presuppositions, which, in addition, are limited in their
distribution to the same contexts where English even appears to trigger this presupposition, we
should be strongly tempted to conclude, like many scholars have, that after all English as well
involves two semantically distinct evens: even and evenNpl. There are, however, good reasons not
to take the above data as to indicate that auch nur, anche solo and ook maar are NPI evens after
all. This section illustrates one of them.
So far, the literature regarding auch nur or ook maar has mostly focused on their
appearances in declaratives (cf. Rooth 1985, von Stechow 1991, Hoeksema and Rullmann 1997).
However, in order to fully understand the significance of the existence of these items, we should
investigate their effect in interrogative environments as well. Unsurprisingly, all these items are
acceptable in questions and trigger an 'easy' presupposition:
(28) a. Hat der Hans auch nur [die Maria]f begruesst? German
Has the John also only the Mary greeted
b. Giovanni ha anche solo salutato [Maria]f? Italian
John has also only greeted Mary?
c. Heeft Johan ook maar Maria begroeten? Dutch
Has John also only Mary greeted?
'Did John even greeted Mary?'
(29) Presupposition: For George to greet Mary was MORE likely/LESS noteworthy than for
him to greet any other contextually relevant person. 'easy'
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Both Karttunen & Peters' and Rooth's theory of even correctly predict this much.
However, to the best of my knowledge, the following fact has been so far overlooked:
Interestingly, the above questions obligatorily receive a negative bias interpretation, unlike their
counterparts without auch nur, anche solo, and unlike their counterparts containing sogar and
addirittura:
(30) a. Hat der Georg auch nur [die Maria]f begruesst?
Has the Georg auch nur the Maria greeted?
b. Hat der Georg die Maria begruesst?
Has the Georg the Maria greeted?
c. Hat der Georg sogar [die Maria]f begruesst?
Has the Georg sogar the Maria greeted?
(31) a. Giorgio ha anche solo salutato [Maria]f?
Giorgio has anche solo greeted Maria?
b. Giorgio ha salutato Maria?
Giorgio has greeted Maria?
c. Giorgio ha addirittura salutato [Maria]f?
Giorgio has additirrtura greeted Maria?
Negatively biased
Neutral
Neutral
Negatively biased
Neutral
Neutral
Thus, here as well we seem to be facing another instance of the generalization discussed
in the last two chapters: the emergence of an 'easy' presupposition coincides with a biased
interpretation. While this coincidence might not be too surprising from the perspective of a
scope-theory, we saw in chapters 2 and 3 that the ambiguity theory fails to account for it.
Recall that according to the scope theory 'easy' presuppositions are due to even scoping
above negation. Given this, only negative answers can be felicitous, if that presupposition is true.
If one could show that the presupposition introduced by auch nur and anche solo also results
from wide scope relative negation, the bias of (28)a and (31)a would also follow (cf. section 4.4).
On the other hand, as we saw in Chapters 2 and 3, auch nur, anche solo and ook maar
had the meaning of Rooth's evennpi (in (24)), both answers to the questions containing these
items would be in principle felicitous and the bias would remain unexplained. In fact, recall, that
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being NPIs and therefore ungrammatical in affirmative sentences does not, per se, suffice to
trigger bias towards the negative answer, as questions with NPI any and ever are not biased:
(32) a. Did George greet anybody? Neutral
b. Have you ever been to LA? Neutral
To sum up, when we limit our attention to declarative environments the behavior of
expressions like auch nur appears to strongly support an ambiguity of English even, but when
their effect in questions is taken into account, they actually provide evidence against the
ambiguity theory. In order to resolve this apparent inconsistency I propose that we should drop
Rooth's and Rullmann's assumptions regarding the meaning of these items and analyze them
compositionally, instead. The next section provides one more motivation for doing so.
4.3 Cross-linguistic Motivations for a Compositional Analysis
Besides the case of questions, Rullmann's and Rooth's argument is unsatisfactory in another
respect. Recall that the argument crucially relies on the assumption that from the semantic point
of view expressions like auch nur and ook maar are to be taken as un-analyzable units which
introduce an 'easy' presupposition:
(33) lkauch nur/anche solo/ook maar ](p) = [[ evennpi' (p):
I[auch nur/anche solo/ook maarf(p) is defined iff
Vqe C[q p-')q<likelyp]&3q[q p& q(w)=0] easyP
if defined then g[auch nur/anche solo/ook maar j(p) =p(w)
However, in the languages under consideration, the items allegedly corresponding to evenNpl are
complex expression, unlike those related to normal even. Moreover, in these three languages they
consist of a focus particle meaning also or even (i.e. an 'additive focus particles, according to
Koenig's 1991 classification) followed by another focus particle which typically translates as
only (i.e. an 'exclusive' particle).
The assumption that auch nur, anche solo and ook maar and the like are non
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decomposable idioms, as Rooth, Rullmann and von Stechow must have it, might be missing an
important cross linguistic generalization: in languages where it is acceptable, the combination of
an additive particle immediately followed by an exclusive one is an NPI and coveys the same
meaning as even. If this generalization is correct, in order to capture it, a compositional
semantics of auch nur and the like is called for.
4.4 A Lahirian analysis:
'Easy' Presupposition, NPI-hood, Bias and Compositionality
This section proposes a novel account of auch nur, ook maar and anche solo, which covers the
facts in questions discussed in section 4.2. Since the account is fully compositional, it also
explains why also+only in some languages has the effect of introducing an 'easy' presupposition,
thus satisfying the desiderata introduced in section 4.3. Finally, and most importantly, this
analysis will be argued to be superior to the analysis that the ambiguity camp needs to assume, in
that it derives the restricted distribution of these items, from their lexical properties, rather than
just stipulating their NPI-hood. In this sense, the proposal is very much in the spirit of Lahiri's
work on Hindi NPIs, to which the idea presented here owes a considerable intellectual debt.
4.4.1. Ambiguity of 'nur'3
The intuition behind my analysis is the following: we can avoid assuming an ambiguity of
English even by hypothesizing one for nur (and solo), instead. Before introducing the details of
the analysis, let's see why an ambiguity of nur is called for.
The first step towards compositional analysis of auch nur consist in identifying what
should be the building blocks of its meaning, i.e. what the two focus particles auch and nur mean
when taken in isolation.
On the one hand auch and anche, are equivalent to English also, in that they make no
contribution to the assertion and introduce an additive existential presupposition:
3 In some cases, just for the sake of keeping the exposition simple, I will often talk about German alone to illustrate
the proposal. I trust that the reader will be able to see how it extends, mutatis mutandis, to Italian and Dutch as well.
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(34) a I[auch/also/anchellw (C) (p) is defined iff 3 q[qe C & q #p] & q(w)=l
b. if defined, then l[auch/also/anchelw (C) (p) = p (w)
On the other hand, generally nur, like only, contributes exclusivity to the truth-conditions
besides introducing a 'factive'-like presupposition, i.e. the presupposition that the prejacent is
true (as in (35) (i)), and the scalar presupposition illustrated in (35)(ii) (cf. Lerner and
Zimmermann 1981):
(35) [[nur/only/solo ]]w (C) (p) is defined iff
(i) p(w)=l
and (ii) -3q EC [q 4 p + q >iikely/insignificant...P]
if defined then [Inur/only/solo ]]w (C) (p) = VqE C [p q q " q (w) = 0]
(36) a. Maria ha solo incontrato [Giovanni]f
b. Die Marie hat nur [den Johan]f getroffen
c. Assertion: Mary didn't meet anybody different from John.
d. Factive Presupposition: Mary met John.
e. Scalar Presupposition: That Mary met John is very little noteworthy.
Factivity
Scalarity
Exclusivity
Whether the scalar presupposition is always part of the meaning of
controversy (see discussion in, e.g., Konig 1991). As the core of my
ambiguous lies in how the labor of assertion and presupposition is divided
exhaustivity, I will initially ignore the issue. I will return it in section 4.3.3.
only is a matter of
proposal that nur is
between factivity and
Before presenting my proposal, it is worth pointing out an immediate advantage in
analyzing the meaning of auch nur as the combination of the meaning of auch and the meaning
of nur" Given what auch and nur mean when taken in isolation, a compositional analysis would
help us understanding why auch nur is unacceptable affirmative contexts. This is so because the
exclusivity conveyed by nur and the additivity presupposed by auch are incompatible. In an
affirmative sentence this systematically results in a contradiction between assertion and
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presupposition, as shown in (37):
(37) *Der Hans hat auch nur [[die Maria]f ]f getroffen.
The John has also only the Mary met
Assertion: John met nobody other than Mary.
Presupposition of auch/also: John met some x # M
There is however, an immediate problem that a compositional view needs to face. In the
contexts under consideration (i.e. in construction with auch) the truth conditional exclusive
component illustrated in (35) is systematically absent. Consider once more the sentence repeated
(38)a.
(38) Niemand hat auch nur [[die Marielf]f begruesst.
Nobody has also only Mary greeted
'Nobody greeted even MARY'
Indeed, as mentioned above, this sentence, modulo presuppositions, is equivalent to (39).
(39) Niemand hat die Marie begruesst.
'Nobody greeted Mary'
However, no matter what scope is assigned to nur relative to negation, the lexical entry in
(35) would not generate these truth conditions for (38)a. If nur takes scope under the negative
quantifier, the assertion according to (35), should be (40)b. 4
(40) a. LF 1: [niemandl [auch [ nur [ tj hat [ [die Maria]f ]f begruesst. (niemand> nur)
4 Notice that scoping auch differently will not generate different truth-conditions, as this particle does not contribute
to the truth conditions.
(i) a. [ auch [niemand, [ [nur[die Maria] 12] [ t2 hat ft2 If begruesst]]]]
b. Assertion: Everybody greeted somebody different from Mary)
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b. Assertion: Everybody greeted somebody other than Mary
Xw.Vx [x person in w-)- - 3q[q(w)=le •p:3y[y is a person in w & y•M & p= thatxgreetedy}
= Xw. Vx [x is person in w- 3q[q(w)=le {p:3y[y is a person in w & y-M & p= thatx greetedy)
= Xw. Vx [x is person in w- 3y[y is a person in w & y•M & x greeted y in w]
On the other hand, if nur takes scope over negation, the predicted TCs would be as in (41)b
(41) a. [Nur [niemand hat auch [[ die Maria]f ]f begruesst] (nur> niemand)
b. Assertion: Everybody other than Mary is s.t. somebody greeted him
w. - 3p [ p(w)=1 & pe {p: 3y [ y is a person in w & yM & p= that nobody greetedy)
Xw. - 3 y [ y is a person in w & y-M & nobody greeted y in w]
Xw. V y [y is a person in w & y-M - it is not the case that nobody greeted y in w] =
Xw. V y [y is a person in w & y•M -- somebody greeted y in w] = (41) b
Neither of these two truth conditions matches with the speakers' intuitions regarding the
meaning of this sentence. Therefore nur here cannot mean what it usually does.
Once we have granted that nur in auch nur means something different form what it usually
means, the following question arises: what precisely is its meaning in this construction and how
is it related to its usual meaning?
I propose that the meaning of nur in this construction is as shown in (42), where the
'factive' 5 presupposition and exclusive truth conditional import are swapped (compare with (43)
repeated from above):
(42) a.[[ nur2 / solo2]lW (C)(p) is defined iff
(i) -3 q E C [q 4 p & q(w)=1]
and (ii) Vq EC [q # p 4 p >likely/insignificant... q]
b. If defined, then [[nur2 / sol0o2 w (C)(p) = p(w)
Exclusivity
Scalarity
Factivity
5 This term traditionally refers to embedding verbs presupposing the truth of their propositional complements (cf.
Karttunen 1973). Here I use the term in a different and looser way to indicate the propositional content of the
presupposition itself triggered by any proposition-taking function that presupposes the truth of its argument.
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(43) a. ( nur/only/solo ]1W (C) (p) is defined iff
(i) p(w)=1 Factivity
and (ii) Vq eC [q 4 p 4 p >likely/insignificant... q] Scalarity
b. if defined then I[ nur/only/solo ]" (C) (p) = Vqe C [p (Z q -' q (w) = 0] Exclusivity
Notice that rather than a garden variety ambiguity, what I am proposing here is better described
as a case in which some expressions meaning only are taken to be unspecified with respect to
which of exclusivity andfactivity is asserted and which is presupposed.
Notice that i[ nur2]] has the effect of a partial identity function, because its truth
conditional import leaves its argument unchanged: the truth value of the prejacent in the
evaluation world. Given this, like auch, also nur2 merely introduces presuppositions. This by
itself accounts for the fact that (38)a is truth conditionally equivalent to (39) (repeated below),
i.e. to its counterpart without he two focus particles auch and nur.
(44) Niemand hat auch nur [[die Marie]f&f begruesst.
(45) Niemand hat die Marie begruesst.
'Nobody greeted Mary'
Before illustrating how the hypothesis of an unspecified nur and a fully compositional
analysis can account for the remaining facts regarding auch nur, I will offer here some evidence
that English just, unlike only, can acquire, in some environments, the meaning of nur2,. Although
I am not in the position to provide a satisfactory explanation of why this phenomenon is possible
in these environments and in these environments only, the facts below show that a non truth-
conditionally exclusive meaning of just must exists.
Generally, English only and just, and German nur are different form nur2, in that under
negation they always asserts exclusivity:
(46) a. Der Hans hat nicht nur [die Marie]r Begruesst.
b. John didn't meet only [Mary]f.
TCs: John met people different from Mary.
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(47) a. I didn't meet only Mary ¢C I didn't meet just Mary
TCs: I met somebody different from Mary
However, there are at least some uses of just, where exclusivity seems to play no role at the level
of truth conditions:
(48) Can you spare just 5 minutes for me tomorrow?
In (48) just does not seem to contribute exclusivity to the truth-conditional meaning of
the question. In fact, this interrogative questions whether the prejacent or its negation is true,
rather than questioning whether it is true that the addressee does not have more than 5 minutes.
(49) Can you spare just 5 minutes for me tomorrow?
Assertion: Whether [you can spare at least 5 minutes] Factivity
In addition, the question carries the presupposition that 5 minutes are not much to ask for
and that the speaker knows that the addressee does not have more than that much time.
(50) Presuppositions: You cannot spare more than 5 minutes Exclusivity
Or "I am not asking for more'
There is no contextually relevant alternative n to 5, s.t. it is easier
for the addressee to spare n minutes than to spare 5 minutes. (5 is
the minimum relevant amount)
In other words, just, in this case appears to receive the switched interpretation of nur2.
In this respect just patterns differently from only. Compare (48)c with (51):
(51) Can you spare only five minutes for me tomorrow?
My informants detect a very sharp difference in meaning between this question and the variant
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with just. (51) is often judged to be odd. As for the speakers to which the question makes sense
at all, they observe that it requires a context where it is already clear that the addressee can spare
5 minutes and not more, and it expresses surprise or the regret that he cannot spare more. Here
are possible linguistic contexts speakers have suggested for the two questions:
(52) Person A: I can spare five minutes for you tomorrow.
Person B: (pissed off) Can you really spare only five minutes for me tomorrow?!
(53) Continuations:
a. Can you spare just five minutes for me tomorrow? I don't need more; five is enough.
b. Can you spare only five minutes for me tomorrow? That's a shame, because I'd like
more.
Other speakers have offered the following paraphrases for the variant with only:
(54) Is it the case that you can't spare more than five minutes for me'?
If only, unlike just, has its usual exclusive truth-conditional meaning in this context we can
understand these reactions. Under this interpretation of only the question is expected to be
truthconditionally equivalent to (55)a, with, in addition, the two presuppositions of only:
(55) a. Can you not spare more than 5 minutes tomorrow?
b. Can you spare only 5 minutes for me tomorrow?
Assertion: Whether the addressee can't spare more than 5 mins. Exclusivity
Presuppositions: The addressee can spare 5 minutes Factivity
5 minutes is the minimum relevant amount of time Scalarity
In virtue of containing negation this question carries the past epistemic implicature that the
speaker used to take for granted that the addressee can in fact spare more that 5 minutes the day
after the question is uttered (see Btiring and Gunlogson 2001 and Han and Romero 2002). Han
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and Romero (2002) propose that negative questions of this sort have the function of asking
whether the speaker should really update the common ground as to correct that previous false
belief, specifically the paraphrases of our example would be:
(56) Are you sure that I should add to the CG that you cannot spare more than 5 minutes for
me tomorrow?
Hence the effect of incredulity and regret some speakers detected.
As for the remaining speakers, that found the question odd all together, they judged it in
isolation, and therefore tried to make sense of the question as a request for help or expressing the
wish of the speaker to meet the addressee for 5 minutes, just like the variant with just. In fact, as
an expression of wish, the exclusive component makes the question pretty odd:
(57) # I'd like you to help me for less than five minutes.
In other cases, where this kind meaning is perfectly adequate to the situation both only and just
are felicitous under this use of the question:
(58) a. Can you use the shower for only/just five minutes?
b. Can you eat only/just half of the leftover, and leave me the rest?
To the face of the above facts, it seems to be the case that only tends to maintain its
regular excusive meaning, to the expense of making a hosting question sometimes unusable for
some purposes, while just is more flexible and can receive the 'swapped' interpretation of nur2,
when the pragmatics of the question and the linguistic context require it.
Interestingly, this pattern of just repeats itself in other linguistic contexts, like imperatives
and conditionals:
(59) Please, give just a minute!/ Hold on just a minute!
4* Please do not hold on for more than a minute
(60) If Bill smokes just 3 cigarettes, his mother gets upset.
* If Bill smokes not more than three cigarettes his mother gets upset
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In order to see that just in (61) does not necessarily assert exclusivity, notice that, unlike (61) b,
the sentence entails any alternative where just 3 is substituted with a bare numeral bigger than 3.
(61) a. If B. smokes just 3 cigarettes his mother gets upset =>
b. If he smokes 4 his mother gets upset
(62) a. If bill smokes not more than 3 cigarettes his mother gets upset
*> If Bill smokes 4 cigarettes his mother gets upset.
These readings are at best very marginal with only. Once again, the exclusive meaning re-
emerges when it is more natural:
(63) a. Please, take just one of my books (I need the others)!
b. If John passes just one class his mother gets upset.
What appears to be going on in the cases above is the following: just generally has the same
meaning as only, for example it asserts exclusivity under negation. However, where the
pragmatics of the type of utterance is somehow incompatible with such a meaning, then
exclusivity is dropped, and presumably it becomes only presupposed.
To conclude, although it is hard to find cases where English only fails to contribute
exclusivity to the truth conditions, at least in questions, imperatives and conditionals the particle
just seems to receive precisely the swapped reading I proposed for nur2
I will now turn to the two presuppositions of nur2 and investigate their effects in sections
4.4.2 and 4.4.3 respectively.
4.4.2 The Exclusive Presupposition of 'Nur2 ': NPI-behavior and Bias Explained
Given (42)-i, nur2 presuppose exclusivity. In this subsection I will show the NPI-like distribution
of auch nur and its bias in questions follows from the interaction of this presupposition with the
additive presupposition of auch.
The exclusivity presupposition of nur2 as defined in (42)-i above is repeated below:
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(64) ([nur2 / solo2]w (C)(p) is defined only if -3 q E C [q # p & q(w)=l]
Notice that exclusivity (whether asserted or presupposed) is systematically incompatible with
the additive presupposition of auch, whenever they share the same focus and the same argument
p. In o-ne case we expect a clash between assertion and presuppositions, in the other case a clash
between presuppositions.
(65) a Ilauch/also/anche]w (C) (p) is defined iff 3q[qe C & q •:p] & q(w)=1
b. If defined [[nur / solo] w (C)(p) =1 iff -3 q e C [q # p & q(w)=l]
c I[nur2 / solo0102] (C)(p) is defined only if -3 q e C [q # p & q(w)=l]
Let's illustrate this with an example. In the following affirmative sentence, if nur is
regular nur, the presupposition introduced by auch would be incompatible with the assertion:
(66) a. * Auch nur [[der Hans]f ]f war da.
Assertic i: Nobody other than John was there.
Presupposition of auch: Some x different form John is s.t. only x was there.
Clash!
If, instead, nar is nur2 it is its presupposition that is incompatible with the presupposition
of auch, as shown in (67):
(67) a. * Auch nur [[der Hans]f ]f war da.
Assertion: John was there.
Presupposition of nur: No individual different from John was there Clash!
Presupposition of auch: Some x different .orm John is s.t. (only) x was there. J
Thus under no interpretation of nur the sentence would never be felicitous. As a consequence,
the compositional analysis I am proposing here makes immediately the desirable prediction that
auch + nur ( under any of its readings) cannot occur in affirmative declaratives.
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In negative (or DE) contexts, this clash can be resolved, under the following additional
assumption: auch in auch nur can outscope the DE expressions. According to this assumption,
the sentence in (68)a has at least two possible LFs, depending on the scope of auch relative to
negation:
(68) a. Niemand hat auch [nur [die Marie]f]f getroffen.
Nobody has also only the Mary met
b. LF 1: [niemand, [auch [nur [ t1 hat [[die Maria]f&f getroffen]]]]
c. LF 2: [ auch [niemand, [ [nur [ t1 hat [[die Maria]fir getroffen]]]]
No matter whether n;ur is regular nur or nur2 LF1 is systematically infelicitous. I'll illustrate the
two options in turn.
If nur is nur2 the presuppositions of LFI are incompatible. The case is parallel to the
affirmative sentence in (67), with one difference: instead of deriving incompatible requirements
regarding John, we derive incompatible requirements regarding the variable in the of the trace
position of the negative quantifier.
(69) a. LF 1:
Niemand > auch> nur2
Niemand
=1 iff g(1) met Mary
For every assignment function g:
a Presupposition of nur2 at node 0:
b. Presupposition of auch at node O:
d. Presupposition at node 0:
there is no person y • Mary s.t. g(l) met y.
g(i) met one person different from Mary
g(l) didn't meet anybody different from M
& g(l) met somebody different from M.
(IL)
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In order to simplify the picture as much as possible, in (69)b I left out the effect of the
presupposition of nur on the presupposition of auch. Since the component of the presupposition
of auch that is problematic here is the one relative to the truth-conditional part of the prejacent,
this omission does not compromise the final result. 6
Given this incompatibility between the presupposition of auch and the presupposition of
nur2, the value of node 0 is always undefined, and therefore the entire structure is systematically
infelicitous.
If nur in LFI has, instead, its regular meaning then the incompatibility is between its
factive presupposition and the effect of its truth-conditional component on the presupposition of
auch. Since the assertive exclusive part of nur is negated by the higher quantifier, the assertion is
ultimately compatible with the presupposition of auch. However the presupposition of auch ends
up entailing the falsity of the prejacent:
(70) a. LF 1:
Niemand > auch>nur
Niemand
=1 iff g(l) met Mary
For every assignment function g:
For every assignment function g:
a Presupposition of nur at node 0: g(l) met Mary.
b. Presupposition of auch at node 0: There is a person x # M s.t. g(l) met only
x => g(1) didn't meet Mary
d. Presupposition at node 0: g(l) met M & g(l) met only somebody
different from M. (1)
Nur/only presupposes the truth of the prejacent. Auch/also, in virtue of containing nur/only in its
6 When this component is taken into account the presupposition of auch is even stronger than (69)b.:
g(l) met only one person, and that person was not Marxy
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argument, has a presupposition that ENTAILS the FALSITY of the prejacent. Therefore this LF1
is systematically excluded as well.
Let us turn to LF2. If nur is nur2, presuppositions and assertion of this LF are all
compatible with each other.
71) 1 h -- M;
auch
Nie'
Lauc4I e Iman....IIU
=1 iff g(1) met Mary
a. Assertion: Nobody met Mary
b. Presupposition of auch: There is some x different from M. that nobody met x.
c Presuppositions of nur2 at 0: There is no x # Mary s.t. g(l) met x.
Since auch outscopes the quantifier, its presupposition is not assignment dependent, and it is as
given in (71)b.7 Nur 2, on the other hand, remains inside the scope of the quantifier. Therefore, at
the node where it meaning applies, its value is assignment dependent, as shown in (71)c. To see
that the final presupposition of nur is not incompatible with the presupposition of auch, we need
to determine how this presupposition projects.
There are two main views on the projection of presuppositions in quantificational
environments, one is Beaver's (2001) theory, which derives in the end an existential
presupposition in the scope of negative quantifiers, the other is Heim's (1988), which, instead
derives a universal one. Thus, if we endorse Beaver's theory, when niemand applies to its partial
argument the exclusive presupposition of nur2 projects as in (72), assuming Heim's (1988) as in
(73).
7 Here again I simplified the presupposition of auch by ignoring the effect of the presupposition of nur. If the
presupposition of nur is taken into account then the presupposition of auch will depend on how the one of nur
project in the scope of the negative quantifier in the following way:
Presupposition of auch: There is some x - M s.t. nobody met anybody different from x and nobody met x. (Heim)
Presupposition of auch: There is some x * M s.t, somebody didn't meet anybody -4 x and nobody met x. (Beaver)
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(72) Presupposition of nur2 at the top node:
(73) Presupposition of nur2 at the top node:
4*
Somebody met nobody 4 M
Everybody met nobody 4 M
Nobody met anybody different from Mary
Both options are compatible with the assertion and the presupposition of auch. For reasons that
will become clear later, in the rest of this discussion I will assume Heim's theory.
(74) a. Presuppositions at top node: Nobody met anybody different from Mary & there is
some x different from Mary that nobody met.
b. Assertion at top node: Nobody met Mary
Let's see now what happens if we had assumed the regular meaning for nur in a configuration
like LF2. Interestingly, also if we attributed to nur the typical exclusive meaning, the presuppositions
and the assertion of LF2 would be all compatible with each other:
(75)
auch > Niemand
Xw: everybody met M. everybody met someone different from Mary
auch 0 Xw: g(l) met Mary. -3x [ s.t. x #M and g(l) met x]
Niemand
nur
ti
hat =1 iff g(l) met M.
[[die Maria]fr getroffen
a. Assertion:
b Assertion of nur at 0:
c. Presupposition of nur at 0:
d. Presupposition of auch:
Nobody didn't meet anybody but Mary * Everybody
met someone different from Mary
There is no x - Mary s.t. g(1) met x.
g(l) met Mary.
There is some x different from M. s.t. everybody met x
and everybody met someone different from x =>
Everybody met someone different form Mary
However, if we assume Heim's theory ,. projection under quantification, that everybody
met someone different form Mary is already entailed by the presupposition of auch! But if the
context already contains this information the utterance of this sentence is 'pragmatically
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tautological', i.e. it never adds any new information to what is already known. Therefore the
sentence, under this reading, systematically violates the pragmatic principle, proposed by
Stalnaker, that an utterance should never leave c unchanged. 8
The fact that regular nur always generate results that are pragmatically unacceptable (or
require the additional process of local accommodation, see ft. note 8) when co-occurring with
auch invites the following speculation: Nur is unspecified with respect to what it asserts and
presupposes between factivity and exclusivity. However, asserting exclusivity is the default. The
swapped meaning emerges when something goes wrong with the default. If this speculation turns
out to be on the right track, it would help us understanding why this second meaning of nur is
restricted to environments where nur is in the scope of auch and the two particles share the same
focus.
The above account generalizes to all and only DE contexts. I will provide just one more
example here. When auch nur occurs in the complement of doubt, the reading where auch out-
scopes this predicate has compatible presuppositions, while there is no reading that has
compatible presuppositions if the predicate is think.
(76) a. Maria dubita che anche solo 2 GIOVANNI sara presente. Italian
Mary doubts that also only John will be present
b. * Maria pensa che anche solo2 GIOVANNI sara presente.e
Mary thinks that also only John will be present
The two possible LFs of ((81) and their presuppositions are given in (77) and (78), respectively:
(77) a. LFI:[Maria dubita [che [anche [sol2 [[Giovanni]f ]fsarh presente]]]]] doubt>also
b. Presupposition of anche: M. believes that there is some x # J s.t. only x will be there
c. Presupposition of solo2: M. believes that there is no x # J s.t. x will be there Clash!
8 Notice, however, that sometimes the reading under consideration becomes available. An example is given below:
(i) Nobody took only[syntax If and nobody also took only [semanticslr.
It is possible that actually what makes the reading available in this case is local accommodation of the
presupposition of only:
(ii)..and nobody. who took semantics also took only semantics.
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(78) a. LF2: [Anche [Maria dubita [che [solo 2 [[Giovanni]f]rsarh presentel]]]] also>doubt
b, Presupposition of anche: There some x # J s.t. M. doubts that only x will be there
c. Presupposition of solo2: M. believes that there is no x # J s.t. x will be there No clash!
Given this, under the reading also>doubt the sentence is correctly predicted to be acceptable.
Now consider the two possible LFs of (81) and their presuppositions:
(79) a. LFl:[Maria pensa [che [anche [solo [[Giovanni]f]fsarh presente]]]]] think>also
b. Presupposition of anche: M. believes that there is some x # J s.t. only x will be there
c. Presupposition of solo2: M. believes that there is no x # J s.t. x will be there Clash!
(80) a. LF2: [Anche [Maria pensa [che [solo [[Giovanni]f]f sarai presente]]]]] also> think
b. Presupposition of anche: There is some x # J s.t. M. thinks that only x will be there
c. Presupposition of solo: M. believes that there is no x # J s.t. x will be there Clash!
(81) a. Maria dubita che anche solo Giovanni sara presente. Italian
Mary doubts that also only John will be present
b. * Maria pensa che anche solo Giovanni sari presente.
Mary thinks that also only John will be present
Under no scope relation of anche relative to the main predicate think the sentence carries
compatible presuppositions.
In conclusion, the exclusive presupposition of nur2 correctly predicts auch nur to be
acceptable only in the presence of a DE operator. In other words, it allows us to provide an
account of the NPI-like distribution of this item in terms of its lexical properties alone, very
much in the spirit of Lahiri's (1998) analysis of Hindi NPIs.
Before concluding this section, I'd like to point out that Rullmann's (1997) following
objection against a scope analysis of auch nur does not extend to the present proposal:
187
The problem facing the wide scope theory is that it has to ascribe properties to NPI forms like
'so much as' or Dutch 'zelfs maar' which seem to be in conflict with each other. On the one
hand, being NPIs, these items have to appear in the scope of an NPI trigger in the surface
syntactic struncture, but on the other hand they must take scope over ii in the semantics. As fizr as
I know, this combination of properties would make them unlike all other NPIs, which have to
appear in the scope of their trigger both syntactically and semantically. (Rullmann 1997, p.12)
According to the analysis I presented in this section nur scopes under negation, as it typically
does. The presence of auch requires a scale reversal operator for it to out scope, in order to
resolve a conflict in presuppositions. Thus, the necessity for auch and nur to take opposite scope
with respect to a DE expression is derived from their meaning and no specific requirement needs
to be stipulated about it. The only requirement that needs to be stipulated here is probably a
surface requirement ruling out cases where auch overtly out scopes negation. Given this
Rullmann's argument does not apply.
Notice, in addition, that the account, just like Lahiri's, explains the acceptability of auch
nur in the latter type of environments in terms of the scope of auch with respect to negation.
Given this, besides accounting for the restricted distribution of this item, the above analysis of
auch nur presents an additional advantage over the analysis implicitly assumed by Rooth and
Rullmann. In virtue of being an analysis in terms of scope relative to negation, it
straightforwardly accounts for the bias auch nur induces in questions.
(82) a. Hat der Georg auch nur [die Maria]f begruesst? Negatively biased
Has the George also only the Mary greeted
b. For every world w, [[yes]" is defined iff
Presupposition of nur: No individual x #M is s.t. George greeted x in w
Presupposition of auch: Some individual x •M is s.t. George greeted x in w
c. For every world w, [[ no ]" is defined iff
Presupposition of nur: No individual x ;tM is s.t. George greeted x in w
Presupposition of auch: Some individual x #M is s.t. George didn't greet x in w
The affirmative answer to (82)a is associated with two incompatible definedness conditions.
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Thus, there is o, world where these conditions are satisfied at the same time and the answer is
doomed to be infelicitous and therefore excluded in every context. On the other hand, the
negative answer has compatible and therefore satisfiable presuppositions. As expected, the
question as a whole is always interpreted as biased towards the negative answer.
4.4.3 Scalar Presupposition: Schwarz (2002)
Recall that, in addition to factivity, only, nur, and solo carry a 'scalar' presupposition (cf. Konig
1991) roughly stating that the target proposition is the leasi noteworthy, interesting, informative
or most likely among the 'focus-alternatives':
(83) -~3q eC [q # p 4 q >likely/insignificant...P] (p the lowest point on the relevant scale!)
Just like nur, also nur2 introduces such a presupposition, i.e. (84)-ii:
(84) For every w,
II nur2 / solo01021 (C)(p) is defined iff
(i) -3 q E C [q # p & q(w)= 1] Exclusivity
and (ii) Vq eC [q # p + p >likcly/insignificant w q] Scalarity
I will first provide some speculations as to how a scalar presupposition of nur2 can be
independently motivated and then illustrate how the presence of this presupposition accounts for
the facts regarding auch nur. Koenig (1991) observes that this type of presupposition is often
associated with exclusive particles meaning only across languages. In English, for example, just
appears to always have this scalar import.
However, the effect of this scalar presupposition in more prominent in some cases and
less in others as shown by the contrast between examples below.
(85) a. He is only a sergeant.
b. It is easy for you because you live in a big city, I only live in Munich!
(86) a. I met only Mary.
b. Only doctors can park here.
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In yet a third type of cases it seems to disappear.
(87) Only the Prime Minister came.
Examples of this latter kind have been taken as evidence that only is ambiguous between
a scalar an a non-scalar meaning. The argument goes roughly as follows: If only was always
scalar, we would expect, incorrectly, a sentence like (87) to I: .suppose that the presence of the
Prime Minister is more likely or less significant than the presence of any other contextually
relevant person. If this was so the sentence would be infelicitous in most contexts.
Lerner and Zimmermann (1981), however, argued that the above instability of the scalar
presupposition is only apparent and that the presupposition is always present. Their proposal is
that the differences considered above are due to the nature of objects only quantifies over and
therefore of the scales that are relevant in each case.
For example, the type of scale with respect to which a sentence like (85) is evaluated
presumably corresponds to a military hierarchy. What the sentence presupposes, according to
scalarity, is that being a sergeant for the subject of the sentence is more likely, less important or
noteworthy than occupying any other position in the military ranking. In other words the use of
only here indicates that the scale that is taken to be relevant is one were there isn't any lower
rank than sergeant. Given exclusivity, the sentence also asserts that the subject does not occupy
any higher position in the military ranking than sergeant.
According to Lerner and Zimmermann cases like (87) are evaluated with respect to
completely different scales. Specifically, they show that the absence of a scalar presupposition is
only apparent if we assume that in these cases only quantifies over sets, which are ranked with
respect to their cardinality. For example the scalar presupposition only introduces in (87) is as
illustrated in (88).
(88) For every m e N, s.t. nm #I { the prime minister )I
That n people came, where n= I { the prime minister }I >LIKELY That in people came
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The scalar presupposition here is that one person came is more likely than that any
bigger number of people came. This presupposition is different from the one considered above in
that it is detached from the lexical content of the focus. In fact, if (86)a is interpreted with respect
to the same scale, it carries exactly the same presupposition:
(89) For every m E N, s.t. m -:t { Mary }
That n people came, where n= I { Mary )} >LIKELY That m people came
Because of this, such a presupposition is satisfied in completely different kind of contexts, i.e. in
contexts where all that matters is that the number of individuals referred to in the prejacent is the
lowest in the set of contextual alternative numbers. Since how these individuals are ranked with
respect to the alternatives is totally irrelevant, the absence of the presupposition stating that the
presence of the Prime Minister is more likely or less significant than the presence of any other
contextually relevant person is accounted for. In addition, since all the alternatives considered
entail the prejacent, the presupposition is always satisfied, hence its apparent suspension.
This view also explains why for examples like (86) to be felicitous it doesn't have to be
the case that Mary is the most likely person for me to meet. The sentence can be evaluated with
respect to one of two different possible scales. The first scale is one where propositions pf the
form I met x, where x is an individual, are ranked with respect to likelihood:
(90) C : { p: 3x [ person (x) & p = That I met x }
a. < I met Susan,
I met Bill,
I met Mary>
If this is the relevant scale, the sentence would in fact carry the presupposition that Mary
was for me the most insignificant person to meet. However, if the option that only quantifies over
sets is chosen than the relevant scale is as follows:
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(91) C: { p: 3n EN & p = That Imet n people }
< I met 15 people,
I met 14 people,
I met 1 person>
As we saw above, if this scale is taken to be the relevant ranking for the evaluation of the
sentence containing only, such a sentence carries a trivial presupposition. This explains the
apparent lack of a scalar presupposition.
Notice that if both quantificational options are possible it really hard to test whether the
scalar presupposition is indeed present. Recall that typically one tests the presence of a
presupposition by testing the felicity of the sentence under consideration in a context where the
hypothesized presupposition is false. If the sentence is infelicitous in such contexts then the
sentence does carry that presupposition. In order to test the scalar presupposition of nur we then
would need to find contexts where it would fail to be true no matter what objects nur quantifies
over.
As we noticed above, however, when the focus is a singular definite or proper name, the
scalar presupposition is trivially satisfied, if the scale is a rank of sets according to their
cardinality. What we need then, is cases with plural foci:
(92) Today I only met [Bill, Susan and Mary]
Scenariol: I have 10 students. But the ones that come for appointments are always Bill,
Susan, Mary is the next most frequent visitor. Yesterday I met Bill and Susan, and today
again I only met [Bill, Susan and Mary]
Scenario 2: I have 10 students. But the ones that most often come for appointments are
Bill and Mary, while Susan is one of the students who come least often. Yesterday I met
Bill and Susan, and today again # I only met [Bill, Susan and Mary]
Scenario 3: I have 10 students. But they never all come for office hours. Generally I
receive groups of 2 people. Among the students Bill, Susan and Mary are most frequent
visitor. Jen, Chris and Max come very seldom. Yesterday I even met Chris and Max, but
today I only met [Bill, Susan and Mary].
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Scenario 1, above, is one where the scalar presupposition is falsified if the relevant ranking was
based on cardinality, but verified if it is a scale of individuals and groups thereof ranked with
respect with how likely it is for me to meet them. Scenario 3, is, on the other hand, is one where
the presupposition is verified if the scale is a rank of cardinalities of sets of individual, but
falsified if the rank is one of individuals. The felicity of the sentence I met only Mary, Bill and
Susan in both kinds of context seems to suggests that both options are always available. Context
2, on the other hand is such that the scalar presupposition would be always false, no matter what
type of objects are ranked in the relevant scale. Thus the sentence is infelicitous.
Turning now to the function the scalar presupposition plays in accounting for the effects
of auch nur, notice that the scalar presupposition defined above is exactly the mirror image of
the scalar presupposition of English even. And in fact, it is due to the presence of this
presupposition of nur2 under negation that auch nur is a natural translation of even above
negation:
(93) a. Nobody greeted even MARY.
b. LF: [even [ Nobodyi [ tl greeted [Mary]f]]]
c. Assertion: Nobody greeted Mary
d. Scalar Presupposition: For every x among the relevant alternatives to Mary, the
proposition that nobody greeted x is more noteworthy or less
likely than that nobody greeted Mary.
- 'Mary was the MOST likely to be greeted by someone or other'
(94) a. Niemand hat auch nur2 [die Marie]r] begruesst.
b. LF: [auch [niemandl [nur 2 [ ti hat [die Maria if begruesst]]J]]
c. Assertion: Nobody greeted Mary.
d. Scalar Presupposition: For every y, there is no x among the relevant alternatives to
Mary, s.t. the proposition that y greeted x is more noteworthy /
significant or less likely than that y greeted M.
S'For everybody it was more likely to greet Mary then greeting anybody else'
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The scalar presupposition in (94)d entails (93)d. 9 The two cases are completely equivalent if, as
many have suggested, the scalar presupposition of nur is actually somewhat weaker than I
assumed above:
((95) For every w,
f[ nur2 / solo21 w (C)(p) is defined only if
and (ii) MOST q in C are less likely/more noteworthy than p Scalarity
If this turns out to be the correct presupposition for only, then the scalar presupposition in (94),
given in (94) d.' below, would be nearly indistinguishable (93)d.:
(94) d.' Scalar Presupposition: For every y, for most x among the relevant alternatives to
Mary, the proposition that y greeted x is more noteworthy /
significant or less likely than that y greeted M.
'For everybody it was more likely to greet Mary then greeting
most other people'
Besides accounting for the apparent equivalence of auch nur and English even, positing a
scalar presupposition as part of the import of nur2 presents one additional advantage in that it
provides us with an understanding of the following puzzle, first noted by Schwarz (2002).
9 Notice that this is the presupposition if Heim 's theory of projection is assumed. According to Beaver's (2001)
theory the resulting scalar presupposition would be too weak I
(i) there is a person x s.t. for every y different from Mary, that x met Mary is MORE likely than that x met v.
This would be problematic for both the present proposal where nur 2 introduces a narrow scope 'easy' presupposition
and the ambiguity hypothesis where evenNpl does the same thing. However, if Beaver's theory turned out to be
preferable, there is a possible solution to the problem. The solution is to treat the 'easy' presupposition as
independent from the assignment function, e.g., by assuming that nur is a property taking operator presupposing that
the prejacent property is the least likely for every relevant individual to have:
[[ nur2 11W (C) (Pe,) (x) is defined iff I [[nur 11" (C) (P<,.c>) (x) is defined iff
(i) VQ E C [ Q #P - Q(w) (x) = 0] (i) P(w) (x) =1
(ii) V Q E C, Vy [ Xw.P (w)(y)=1 >LIKELY' Vw. Q (w) (y)= 1] I If defined then [[ nur2 J1" (C) (P,,,>) (x) =
1 iff
If defined then f[ nur2 J11 (C) (P,,,>) (x) = 1 iff P(w) (x) =1 J VQ E C [ Q #P 4 Q(w) (x) = 0]
This fix however, would leave cases where the focus is a subject unexplained:
(ii) Das hat uns Ulberrausht das auch nur [die Marialf da war.
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Discussing the possible disadvantages of an analysis of auch nur in terms of scope,
Schwarz points out that such an analysis would predict that a sentence containing auch nur in the
surface scope of a DE expression should be equivalent to its counterpart with sogar overtly
outscoping the DE expression. However, he notes, this equivalence is not always attested. While
(96) a and (96) b seem to beequivalent, when we turn to an example where the focus is the
bottom of the scale we detect a difference between sogar and auch nur, as shown in (97):
(96) a. Wir haben jeden zugelassen, der auch nur eine [drei]f hatte.
We have everyone admitted, who also only a C had
'We admitted everyone who even had a C.
b. Wir haben sogar jeden zugelassen, der eine [drei]f hatte.
We have even everyone admitted, who a C had.
'We admitted even everyone who had a C'
(97) a. #Wir haben jeden zugelassen, der auch nur eine [eins]f hatte.
We have everyone admitted, who also only an A had
b. ! Wir haben sogar jeden zugelassen, der eine [eins]f hatte.
We have even everyone admitted, who had an A
!' We damitted even everyone who had an A'
(Schwarz 2002)
(Schwarz 2002)
(97)b. is simply odd because it presupposes that to admit everyone who had the best grade is less
likely than to admit everyone who had any other lower grade. This typically is not the case. In
selective admissions, the better the grade one gets the more likely he is to be accepted. However
one could easily construct a context where things go the other way around. For example, imagine
we are talking about the admissions to a support class, organized for mentoring students who
have learnability problems. In such a scenario, the above presupposition would be true, and in
fact the sentence in (97)b. would become felicitous. (98) a., on the other hand always remains
unacceptable, no matter how we manipulate the context looks.
Similarly, changing the predicate from admit to reject, does not improve the status of
(98)a, but it makes (97)b perfectly fine, since now its presupposition is more likely to be satisfied
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(rejecting everyone with the best grade is in most typical circumstances less likely that rejecting
everyone with the second best grade, and than rejecting everyone with the third best grade, and
so on for all possible grades).
(99) a. # Wir haben jeden abgelehnt, der auch nur eine [eins]f hatte.
We have everyone rejected, who also only an A had
b. Wir haben sogarjeden abgelehnt, der eine [eins]f hatte.
We have even everyone rejected, who had an A
'We rejected even everyone who had an A' (Schwarz 2002)
On the basis of these facts, Schwarz concludes that an analysis of auch nur in terms of
scope ought to be rejected. Clearly the scope analysis Schwarz has in mind is one that attributes
to this complex expression as a whole the same meaning of English even and of sogar and
derives its presupposition from its scope above DE expressions is unsatisfactory. While I agree
with Schwarz conclusion on this non compositional version of a scope analysis of auch nur, I
would like to point out that the variant of the scope analysis proposed in this chapter actually
predicts the above contrasts.
Notice that, according to the present proposal, while auch must take scope of the DE
expression for the sentence to be acceptable, the scalar presupposition of nur2 is computed
locally and therefore it is blind to higher scalar reversing expressions. Given this nur2 can never
combine with a focus denoting something very noteworthy or unlikely, because this would
generate a very odd presupposition.
(100) a. # Wir haben jeden abgelehnt, der auch nur eine [eins]f hatte.
We have everyone rejected, who also only an A had
b. # Scalar Presupposition of nur2: For every grade x different from A and every relevant
person y, it is less noteworthy that y got an A than that y got an x.
In (99)b., on the other hand, the scalar presupposition of sogar takes scope over the entire
sentence, and therefore, even though it scopes above a scale reversal operator, it carries a very
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different presupposition.
(101) a. Wir haben sogar jeden abgelehnt, der eine [eins]f hatte.
We have even everyone rejected, who had an A
'We rejected even everyone who had an A
b. Scalar Presupposition of sogar: For every grade x different from A, it is less
likely/more noteworthy that we rejected everybody who got an A than that we rejected
everyone who got an x.
There is however one potential objection to this explanation: manipulating the contexts as to
make the presupposition in (100) true should rescue the sentence, but it doesn't. One such a
context would be, e.g., one where the professor always gives to everyone the best grade, and thus
where that grade it's the most expected for everybody. The sentence remains unacceptable in
such a context as well. I believe this fact follows from Schwarz (2003) recent discovery that the
import of auch nur contribute in fact an at least to the assertion. Given this, the alternatives we
consider are always related by entailment. For example, for the interpretation of (100), the
relevant alternatives will look roughly as follows: Every body got at least an A, Everybody got at
least a B, everybody got at least a C}. Since the prejacententails all the alternatives, there can be
no context where it could be the most likely proposition.
In conclusion, given the scalar presupposition associated with nur2 we understand the
apparent equivalence between auch nur and Rooth's evenNp. In addition, this presupposition
allows us to solve Schwarz puzzle, without giving up an analysis of auch nur in terms of scope.
Given that only such an analysis explains the bias of auch nur in questions, this is clearly a
desirable result.
4.5 Evidence for an Unspecified only: Samish
The aspect of the proposal presented in the previous section that is by far the most
unconventional is the idea that (at least in some languages) only is unspecified with respect to
which of exclusivity or factivity is its contribution to the truth conditions and which one is
presupposed.
197
The idea, as unconventional as it might sound, has been already argued to be
conceptually plausible. In fact, one finds, in the literature regarding presuppositions, that a
number of scholars have entertained the hypothesis that what we see as two different components
of the meaning sentences involving a presupposition trigger are (or can be) after all the product
of two factors:
One is the tendency to limit assertion to one atomic proposition per rooted sentence. The other that almost
any thought to be expressed will involve many atomic propositions [...] new information will be presupposed if it is
not necessary to assert it. (Abbott 2000, p. 1419).[...] Grammatical presuppositions are a consequence of a natural
limit on how much can be asserted in any given utterance, where what is asserted is what is presented as the main
point of the utterance [...] Anything else will have to be expressed in another way, typically by being presupposed
(Ibidem, p.1431-1432).
The implications of this view on the lexical meaning of expressions that have been so far
taken to be presupposition triggers is made explicit by Bart Geurts:
The content of ani utterance is complex, NOT ONLY AT A SENTENCE LEVEL but also below that. EVEN
THE CONTENT OF A SINGLE WORD will rarely be a simple matter. In view of this complexity, it is natural to
assume that the interlocutors will concentrate their attention to selected parts of the content conveyed by an
utterance; the rest is of secondary importance, IT IS BACKGROUNDED. There may be many factors that can
influence this selection process. (Geurts, undated)
Crucially, one immediate implication of this view is that we should find lexical items
whose meaning is the conjunction of, say, a and 0, that sometimes assert a and presuppose 3,
and sometimes assert 1 and presuppose a (cf. von Fintel 2001).o In this sense, at least the
defenders of the position described above are committed to the possibility, in principle, that an
unspecified item like nur and solo, as I hypothesized exists.
Notice, in addition, that although a traditional view on presupposition is not committed in
the same way to the existence of unspecified items of this sort, it also does not exclude it in any
principled way.
This section shows that the existence of such an item is not only conceptually feasible but
10 The above quote form Geurts suggests that when the selection between what is asserted and what is presupposed
tends to always favor the same component of the meaning of the relevant expression, there should be independent
factors (e.g., see Geurts discussion of aspectual and factive predicates-ibidem p. 27-28). However, if for allcases
we need to find different and independent factors to account for the systematic lack of balance between what an
expression contributes to the assertion and what component of its meaning is doomed to be backgrounded, the view
would to lack empirical plausibility. In other words, unless we attest cases where presupposition and truth conditions
of a presupposition trigger can be switched, it is not clear at all that the above proposal should be any more
appealing when compared with the alternative theory that the information IS after all encoded in the lexical entry of
each presupposition trigger.
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also empirically attested: the relevant evidence comes from work by Scott Shank on Samish, to
whom all the interesting observations reported below are due.
4.5.1 'Only' in Straits Samish (Shank 2002-03)
Shank has conducted fieldwork on a dialect of Salish spoken in British Columbia, Straits Samish,
and has made the following interesting discovery. Samish has a particle, ?al', that means only or
just in affirmative sentences, as shown in (102):"
(102) 7a 41fx'w  7al' apalas k'sa nasf-an
Ink three ?al' apple det Is.pos-nom-eat
'I just ate three apples'
Assertion: I didn't it more than three apples
Presuppositions: I ate three apples
For me to eat three apples is less noteworthy than for me to eat more.
However, in the scope of negation ?al' receives a very different interpretation, much closer to the
meaning of even:
(103) ?aw 7?6a ?al' s ?~pan kwsa kwil '
link not ?al' irr ten det show up
'Not even ten people showed up'
(104) a. 70v 76Sa ?al' s- 17 ler]-at-s k'sa sila?-s
link not ?al' irr-prt see-tr-3.sbj det grandparent-3s.pos
'He didn't (go to) see even his grandparents'
Just like nur above, in some environments ?al', means something different from what it
usually means. Since this second meaning emerges in all an only DE environments, Shank
concludes, that there is a second NPI ?al' distinct from the ?al' in affirmative contexts, and that
" All the Samish data and glosses are from Shank (2002).
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this second lexical item is an NPI (?al'NPI). The question that emerges next is what precisely does
?al'NpI mean and how does its meaning relate, if at all, to the meaning of regular ?al', which is
given below:
(105) Eal'J= just II (i.e. scalar only)
For every w
[[7allW(C)(p) is defined iff
(i) p(w) = 1
and (ii) Vq eC [q # p 4 p >likely/insignificantW q] Scalarity
if defined, then I?al]jw(C)(p) =1 iff -3 q e C [q # p & q(w)=l] Exclusivity
Shank's considerations regarding this question strongly suggest that Samish ?al' is actually
ambiguous between nurl and an NPI with the meaning of nur2.
As the glosses above indicate, there is a close similarity between the contribution of
?al'Np; and the import of even in negative environments. Given this, Shank notices, we might at
first believe that ?al'Np, is equivalent to Rooth's evenNp,however he discards this hypothesis on
the basis of the following general considerations: 'it abandons the possibility that there is any
interesting connection betweLv' the two ?al's' and it forces us to hypothesize an ambiguity
between an exclusive and an additive meaning, so far unattested in languages. Besides Shank's
conceptual objection to the hypothesis he claims that the negative existential contribution this
particle introduces (given in (106)) is stronger than the negative existential presupposition of
Rooth's evenNpl (in (107)). Interestingly the former corresponds to the exclusive presupposition
of nur2:
(106) -3 q E C [q # p & q(w)=l]
(107) 3 q E C [q # p & q(w)=0]
For the purpose of keeping as close a relation as possible between the meaning of ?al'
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and ?al'NPi, Schank explores the following alternative analysis for ?al'Npt:
(108) For every possible world w:
I[?al'NP]]w '(C)(p) is defined iff
(i) p(w) = 0 Neg-factivity
and (ii) Vq eC [q 4 p 4 p >likely/insignificant w q] Scalarity
(109) If defined, then I[?al',,piJw(C)(p) =1 iff 3 q E C [q 2notheworty P & q(w)=l] Neg-Exclusivity
This meaning relates with regular ?al' in a way that is similar to the relation between
even and Rooth's evennpi: the assertion is the negation of its truth conditional exclusive
import only, and the presupposition is the negation of its factive presupposition. In addition
the two lexical entries share the same scalar presupposition. When interpreted in the scope of
negation, this NPI ?al', generates the following results:
(110) a. ?a7 76?a ?al' s- G7 ler-at-s kWsa sila?-s
link not ?al' irr-prt see-tr-3.sbj det grandparent-3s.pos
'He didn't (go to) see even his grandparents'
Assertion: He didn't see his anybody that was less likely than or as likely as
grandparents for him to see.
Presuppositions: He didn't see his grandparents
To see his grandparents was less noteworthy than to see anybody else
his
At this point Shank considers more closely the different ingredients of the above lexical
entry in order to establish whether they all are needed and if they achieve the result of correctly
capturing the effect of the presence of ?al 'NPI in a sentence.
First, he notices that the existential truth-conditional import under negation has the same
effect as exclusivity. In addition the truth conditional status of exclusivity of negative sentences
involving this particle predicts that the truth of alternatives that are more noteworthy than the pre
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adjacent should make the sentence false. For example if the person referred to with he saw some
other more noteworthy people to be seen, then (111) should be false:
(111) Taw ?6wa ?al' s- 7 ler-at-s k'sa sila?-s
link not ?al' irr-prt see-tr-3.sbj det grandparent-3s.pos
'He didn't (go) se even his granparents'
The task of testing this prediction is very hard. Specifically, Shank notices, that is near to
impossible to detect whether in the above scenario the sentence is infelicitous or simply false.
This suggests that it is at least a plausible option that exclusivity is instead presupposed, rather
than asserted by ?al"
Let us now turn to what I dubbed the negative factive presupposition in (108)(ii)., i.e. the
presupposition that the prejacent (that he saw his grandparents, in our example) is false. Shank
points out that the falsity of the prejacentis also always asserted. This is so because the truth
conditional import (in (109)) entails the truth of a proposition as likely as the pre-adjacent. But
given that the particle always occurs under negation, the resulting assertion always entails that
there is no true proposition as likely as the pre-adjacent, which in turns always entails the falsity
of the prejacent itself. Therefore, in cases where the truth conditions are satisfied, the
presupposition does not really doing any work. In cases where they are not, according to the
judgments reported by Shank, the sentence is false rather than infelicitous, as the presence of
such a presupposition would predict. Given this, the factive component of the meaning of ?al ,pi
appears to be rather part of the assertion than a presupposition. This is why Shank eliminates the
factive presupposition and suggest that the following gets closest to the meaning of 7al .pi:
(112) For every possible world w:
a I[[al'Npvl]w(C)(p) is defined iff
Vq e C [q 
€ p 4 p >likely!insignificant w q] Scalarity
b. If defined, then f[[al'npiJw(C)(p) =1 iff 3 q E C [q Žnotheworty p & q(w)=1]Neg-Exclusivity
+ Factivity
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According to this lexical entry a negative sentence with ?al' ~.p asserts the falsity of the
prejacent (factivity) and of all the alternastives (exclusivity) and carries the same scalar
presupposition as ?al' . This very similar to the effect of nur2 hypothesized in the previous
section. Compare (112) with (113):
(113) [[ nur2 / so0lo 2 w(C)(p) is defined iff
(i) -3 q E C [q # p & q(w)=l]
and (ii) Vq e C [q # p 4 p >likely/insignificant... q] )
If defined, then [[?nur2 / solo 2Jwi (C)(p) = p(w)
The only difference between the two meanings lies in whether exclusivity is ultimately asserted
or presupposed. However, given that Shank himself does not establishes that the first option is
the correct one, it is at least very plausible, that after all ?al'NP! has a meaning where exclusive
assertion andfactive presupposition of regular ?al' are simply swapped, just like nur2.
This analysis has obvious advantages. First it is compatible what a sentence containing
?al'Npt seems to assert and presupposes, as shown in (114).
(114) ?aw 7?wra ?al' s- f? ler-at-s kwsa  sila?-s
link not ?al' irr-prt see-tr-3.sbj det grandparent-3s.pos
'He didn't (go) se even his granparents'
Assertion: NOT ( he saw his grandparents)
Scalar presupposition: For every alternative x to his grandparents the likelihood that
he saw x is SMALLER than the likelihood that he saw his grandparents 4' (104)d above
Exclusive presupposition: There is no alternative x to his grandparents such that
he saw x.
(this is the correct 'existential presuppostion , not the one
of I evennpil]w anyway!, see (104)c above)
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On the other hand, it still maintains that there is a strict connection between the meanings of the
two ?al's: also in Samish, only is underspecified with respect to what is its turth conditional
import and what its definedness conditions.
4.5.2 Conclusions and Open Questions
The Samish facts considered above seem support the hypothesis presented in the previous
section that in some languages one can find expressions unspecified with respect to what of
factivity and exclusivity of only is asserted rather than presupposed.
This proposal opens a number of interesting questions. The first question regards the
distribution of the two possible meanings for only in different languages. In other words, it
would be desirable to understand why only2 in Samish is dependent on negation and why it is
restricted to environments where it co-occurs with auch in German, Italian and Dutch. More
recent fieldwork by Shank provides us with a possible explanation (Shank p.c.). What this work
shows is that the 'link' particle occurring at the beginning of each sentence in the language (i.e.
?w') is an additive particle. In addition, it seems to be the case that whenever a focus occurs in its
scope this particle tends to associate to it. This would allow us to extend to Samish the
explanation proposed in this chapter for auch nur. If this turns out to be the correct approach to
the NPIhood of ?al', Samish would turn out to be a language that wears its LF on its sleeves, as
far as the scope of also and nur2 relative to negation are concerned.
The second question is to what extent the under-specification hypothesis can be extended
to English just. In I will leave all this questions open for future research.
4.6. N-Words Meaning EvenNpI
After Rullmann revived Rooth's argument based on auch nur, additional cross-linguistic
evidence in favor of the ambiguity theory of even has been claimed to come from Negative
Concord (NC) languages like, e.g., Spanish and Greek (cf. Barker and Herburger 2000 and
Giannakidou 2003). The argument appears for the first time in Barker & Herburger (2000),
where the following Spanish data are reported:
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(115) a. Dudo que Andres sepa incluso [ calcular el ineres compuesto]f.
(I) doubt that Andres knows incluso calculate the interests compund
b. Dudo que Andres sepa ni siquiera [calcular el ineres compuesto]f
(I) doubt that Andres knows ni siquiera calculate the interests compund
'I doubt that Andrew can even calculate the compound interests'
The data in (115) indicate that also Spanish resolves the ambiguity of even by employing distinct
lexical items. While the sentence with incluso presupposes that computing compound interest is
hard, the one with ni siquiera conveys the opposite presupposition. In this sense incluso patterns
with sogar (and zelfs, addirittura) while ni siquiera appears patterns with auch nur (ook maar
and anche solo) (compare the data in (115) with the German examples in (22)).
However Barker and Herburger point out that there is an important difference between
the Spanish and the German facts. They acknowledge that if we bite the bullet and decide to
disregard the syntactic considerations that would argue against it, the difference between sogar
and auch nur (and between their respective Dutch and Italian counterparts) could be viewed in
terms of scope.
Spanish, on the other hand, they say, precludes this possibility. This is so because ni
siquiera is an n-word (cf. Laka 1991), just like nadie (n-body), nada (n-thing).
The property of n-words that B&H have in mind when making this claim argument is that
they generally are doomed to be interpreted in the scope of negation, in this resembling NPIs like
any and ever,12 (116) illustrates this point this for the Spanish n-word nadie (nobody/anybody).
(117) shows for ni siquiera.
(116) a. * (No) vino nadie. nadie
Not came n-body
12 This is claimed to be true of non sentence initial n-words (see Ladusaw 1992, Herburger 2000 and Alonso Ovalle
and Guerzoni 2002). The difference between sentence initial n-words in Romance, which do not require a negation
and appear to introduce one, and non-initial ones, which require a trigger and are not negative, is a very complicate
matter which has received much attention in the literature on Negative Concord (cf. Longobardi 1984, Laka 1990,
Zanuttini 1991, Ladusaw 1992, van der Wouden and Zwarts 1993, Vallduovi 1994, Acquaviva 1997, Giannakidou
1997 and 1999,Tovena 1998, Guerzoni 2000, Herburger 2002, Alonso Ovalle & Guerzoni 2002). Barker and
Herburger's argument focuses on the NPI-like behavior of non initial n-words. For the sake of keeping the
discussion focused on their argument, I will follow Barker and Herburger's assumption that initial occurrences of n-
words are irrelevant for the comparison between ni siquiera and even and I will leave them out of the picture.
205
(117) a. *(No) vino ni si quiera [ Hector]f ni siquiera
Not came n-even Hector
'Not even Hector came'
The above examples show that these two expressions, just like any, are unacceptable in
affirmative sentences. Additional contexts admitting both any and n-words are the complement
of without, and of before , as opposed to the complement of after and embedded clauses
introduced by doubt, as opposed to those introduced by believe.
(118) a. Maria sali6 sin haber saludado a nadie
'Mary left without greeting anyone'
b. Maria sali6 antes/*apres de haber saludado a nadie.
'Mary left before/*after greeting anybody'
c. Maria duda/*crehe de que tti puedas ayudar a nadie.
'Mar doubts/*things that you can help anyone'
Ni siquiera exhibits exactly the same pattern, thus fully qualifying as belonging to the n-words
class:
(119) a. Marfa sali6 sin haber saludado ni siquiera [a Hector]f.
'Mary left without greeting even Hector'
b. Maria sali6 antes/*apres de haber saludado ni siquiera [a Hector]r.
'Mary left before/*after greeting anybody'
c. Dudo/ *me creho que Andres sepa ni si quiera [calcular el ineres compuesto]f.
'I doubt that Andrew can even calculate the counpount interests'
In all these cases ni siquiera appears to introduce an 'easy' presupposition, like English even in
one of its readings.
It is worth noticing that the phenomenon Barker & Herburger bring to our attention goes
well beyond Spanish. Other NC languages contain n-words that carry the presuppositions of
evenNPI. Just to mention some examples, Italian neppure, nemmeno French ne serait-ce que, and
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Greek oute kan share the semantics and distribution of ni siquiera. Specifically, they require a
licenser from the above identified class. Moreover, they introduce the 'easy' presupposition and
the negative existential presupposition of Rooth's evenNpI. Finally, just like ni siquera all these
expressions involve negative morphology which is semantically inert in non initial position.
(120) illustrates the behavior of Italian neppure/nemmeno (lit. n-also, n-less) (compare with the distribution
of other n-words in Italian illustrated in (121)). (oute kan exhibits the same pattern, as shown in Giannakidou 2003)
(120) a. *(Non) ho visto neppure/nemmeno Maria.
(I) not have seen n-also/n-less Maria
'I didn't see even Mary' / 'also didn't see Mary'
b. Lucia parti senza aver nemmeno salutato [sua madre]f.
Lucia left without greeting n-also her mother
'Lucia left without greeting even her mother'
c.*Calandrino reintr6 a casa prima che lo avesse visto neppure [sua moglie]f.
Calandrino arrived home before that him had seen n-also his wife
c. Non penso che che Andrea possa calcolare neppure gli interessi composti.
(I) dount that A. can calculate n-also the compound interests
(121) a.Lucia parti senza salutare nessuno.
Lucia left without greeting n-body.
'Lucia left without greeting anyone'
b. Calandrino reintr6 a casa prima/*dopo che lo avesse visto nessuno.
Calandrino arrived home before/*after that him had seen n-body
'Calandrino arrived home before/*after anybody saw him'
c. Lucia dubita/*pensa che la possa aiutare nessuno.
Lucia doubts/thinks that her can help n-body.
'Lucia doubts/*thinks that anybody can help her'
" without
* before-clauses
-Negative Embeding
, without
V before-clauses
V doubt
That more Negative Concord languages involve n-words meaning evenNpl appears to corroborate
Barker and Herburger argument. Importantly this group of expressions differs from the
expressions considered in the last section (i.e. auch nur, anche solo and ook maar) in that they
are in every relevant respect just like other n-words.
As I mentioned above, Barker and Herburger capitalize on this distinction to argue that
Spanish provides strong evidence in favor of an ambiguity theory than German or Dutch: while
auch nur can be viewed as a wide scope version of sogar, ni siquiera, like other n-words, simply
cannot be interpreted outside the scope of negation, thus representing a knock down
counterexample to the scope theory. 13
13 How convincing this argument is obviously depends on the specific analysis of N-words one decides to adopt.
Although some scholars have proposed that n-words must indeed be interpreted in the scope of negation, like NPIs
(cf. Ladusaw 1992 and Laka 1990) others have argued that n-words are never NPIs (see Zanuttini 1991) or are
special NPIs that need to be licensed outside the scope of negation (see Giannakidou 1999). Finally, a third camp
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There are at least two potential objections to this conclusion. The first objection has to do
with the assumption that all n-words should be forced to take scope under negation. This is not
so clear at- least for expressions like Italian neanche, neppure (n-also). These two words contain a
negative morpheme pre-fixed to anche and pure, which mean also, as shown in (122).
(122) (Ho visto Maria e) ho visto anche/pure Giovanni.
(I saw Mary and) I saw also John.
Assertion: I saw John
Presupposition: there is somebody else different from Mary that I saw.
Besides their scalar uses where they convey the same presupposition as even in negative
contexts, neppure and neanche can indeed be used also to merely convey a negative additive
presupposition, that, crucially is the same as that of also scoping over negation:
(123) (Non ho visto Maria), e non ho visto neanche/neppure Giovanni.
(I didn't see Mary), and I didn't see John either/ and I also didn't see John.
Assertion: I didn't see John.
Presupposition: There is somebody else that I didn't see.
As for as Spanish ni siquiera, an analysis in terms of scope does also not seem to be in principle
excluded. To the contrary, it turns out that such an analysis is even be desirable. Here is why.
Just like neppure also ni siquiera contains, besides negative morphology, an expression that can
occur by itself. The distribution of siquiera is identical to that of even NPIs. Most notably this
expression, just like English minimizers, triggers bias in questions. As we know by now, this
effect is hard to account for if siquiera was equivalent to Rooth's evennpi.
The second and perhaps more serious objection regards the claim that the differences between
auch nur and even on the one hand and ni siquiera, oute kan, nemmeno, should make the
has proposed that they are very much like NPIs, but to account for their more limited distribution one needs to
attribute them a somewhat different meaning from round of the mill NPIs like any and ever (cf. Alonso Ovalle &
Guerzoni 2002).
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argument for an NPI even based on the latter stronger than one based on the former. This claim
obviously relies on the assumption that ni siquiera is equivalent to Rooth's evenNpl. These two
items, however, exhibit a number of other important differences, that might ultimately deprive
Barker & Herburger's argument of much of its strength.
In the rest of this section I will illustrate why. I will first point out that, in general, n-
words and NPIs differ in their distribution in ways that can very plausibly be attributed to a
difference in meaning between the two groups. I will then show that the distribution of ni
siquiera and that of the 'easy' presupposition triggered by even differ exactly in the same way.
On the basis of these considerations I will conclude that the alleged equivalence between ni si
quiera and evenNpl is at least ungrounded and therefore it is unclear whether ni siquiera should
represent support for the hypothesis that this second English even exists.
As we mentioned above, Barker and Herburger (2000) focus on the well known fact that
the distribution and meaning of (non-initial) n-words in NC languages like Spanish, Italian and
Greek closely resemble NPIs in non NC languages, like any.
Besides the similarities with NPIs of the any kind that we saw above, non initial n-words
are significantly more restricted in their distribution: (124) shows that merely Downward
Entailing (DE) environments license NPIs, but they do not license n-words;
(124) DE Quantifiers:
a. Less than three students have eaten anything.
b. * Meno di tre studenti hanno mangiato niente.14
Less then three students have eaten n-thing
c. * Menos de tres alumnes comiron nada.
Less than three students ate n-thing
(125) and (126) show that even some anti-additive' 5 contexts (see Zwarts 1993) fail to license n-
words;
14 We include only the Italian examples, but Spanish exhibits exactly the same patterns.
5s Anti-additive operators are DE operators which resemble more closely negation in their logical
properties, than merely DE ones, in that they also support the following entailment:
Op (A v B) --> Op (A) A Op (B).
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Anti-additive determiners: 'every' and of 'no'
(125)a. Every time Dante had any questions Virgil was there to answer.
b. * Ogni volta che Dante aveva nessuna domanda Virgilio era 1 per rispondere.
Every time Dante had n-questions Virgil was there to answer
c. Ogni volta che Maria ha mosso un dito per aiutare, ha combinato un disastro.
Every time Mary has lifed a finger to help, she made a disaster
'Every time Mary lifet a finger to help, she massed the all thing up'
c. * Todo alumno que hyciera/haya hecho nada, fue/sera premiado
Every student that did-subj/past-suj, n-thing, was/ will be prised
(126) a. No one who had committed any crime could fool Sherlock.
b. * Nessuno che aveva/ avesse commesso nessun crimine proteva ingannare Sherlock.
N-body who commit-PAST-IND/SUBJ. n-crime, could fool Sherlock
,c. * Ningun alumno que hacyera/haya hecho nada, sera premiado.
No student who did (subj)/has done (subj) n-thing, will be prised.
In (127) we see that n-words are infelicitous in the antecedent of conditionals:
If clauses:
(127) a. If Mary nociced anything, it would be a problem
b. * Se Maria si accorgesse niente, sarebbe un problema.
If Mary noticed n- thing, it would be a problem
c. Se Maria ti torcera anche solo un capello, dovra vedersela con me.
If Mary will twist to you also only one hair, she will have to deal with me
'If Mary will hurt you even the least bit, she will have to deal with me'
d. *Si Maria de diera quanta de nada, esariamos en probelmas.
If Mary noticed (subj) n-thing, we will be in troubles
e. Si Maria haya movido un dedo per ayuvarte, es un miracolo
If Mary lifted a finger to help you, it's a miracle.
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Finally (128) (129)and (130) show that n-words are unacceptable in 'factive' environments that
do license any and minimizers like a red cent.16
'Only NP'
(128) a. Only Mary saw any student.
a. It: * Solo Maria ha visto nessuno studente.
b. Sp: * S61lo Maria ha visto a ninguin estudiante
Only Mary saw n-one student
c. It: Solo Maria ha alzato un dito per ainutarmi.
d. Sp: S61lo Maria ha movido un dedo para ayudarme.
'Only Mary lifted a finger to help me'
Adversative factives: 'be surprised', 'regret', and 'be sorry':
(129) a. I'm surprised that you saw anybody.
b. It.: *Mi soprende che ti abbia visto nessuno/
c. Sp.: *Me sorprende que te haya visto nadie.
To me surprise:3s that you had:subj/ind seen n-body
'That nobody has seen you surprises me'
d.It.: Mi sorprende che tu abbia alzato un dito per aiutarmi.
e.Sp.: Me sorprende que hayas movido un dedo por ayudarme.
me surprise:3s that you had:subj lifted a finger to help me
'I am surprised that you lifted a finger to help me'
(130) a. Maria is sorry/regrets that you saw anybody.
b. It. * A Mary spiace che tu abbia/hai visto nessuno
c. Sp. * Mary lamenta que tui hayas visto a nadie
Mary regrets that you have (ind./subj.) seen n-body
d. It. A Maria dispiace di aver alzato anche solo un dito per aiutarmi.
Mary regrets to have lifted even only a finger to help me.
'Mary regrets having lifted a finger to help me
16 For an account of why this is so see Von Fintel (1999).
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e. Sp. Maria lamenta haber levantado un s61lo dedo para ayudarme.
Mary regrets have lifted a single finger to help me.
'Mary regrets having lifted a finger to help me
To the best of my knowledge, the only existing attempt to provide a comprehensive and
unified account for the facts above is Alonso Ovalle& Guerzoni (2002). 17 This work argues that
the dissimilar distribution of the two classes, of NPIs and n-words, is due to a difference in
meaning. Specifically, we proposed that while any is a mere existential expression sensitive to
Downward Entailingness, the distribution of n-words can be derived by positing that they are
existentials at the level of assertion but negative existential at the level of the presuppositions.
The contexts where n-words are banned are those where this presupposition is incompatible
either with what the hosting sentence as a whole asserts or with presuppositions introduced by
other expressions (i.e. only and factives) (Alonso Ovalle and Guerzoni for the details of the
proposal). The empirical motivation for the negative presupposition of n-words comes precisely
form the observation that all those environments which do license any but ban n-words share the
following property: they all involve a presupposition which turns out to be incompatible with the
negative existential statement presupposed by n-words.
What is of interest for our present purposes is that Alonso Ovalle and Guerzoni's work clearly
show that it is at least very plausible that any and n-words exhibit differences that ultimately
follow from a difference in meaning. This possibility by itself undermine any conclusion
regarding the meaning of an item in non NC-languages drawn from the meaning of an n-word,
even if when the two appear in the same configurations the ultimate effect of their presence on
the meaning of the whole sentence is the same:
17 These differences are addressed also in Giannakidou 1997, 2000 and 2003 and Penka 2002. Giannakidou's is to
stipulate the existence of a class of polarity items whose distribution is regulated by stronger semantic requirements
on the hosting contexts than those on any. The constraint is that n-words should occur in the scope of anti-veridical
operators (i.e., roughly, operators taking a proposition as an argument and entailing its negation). The proposal is at
best descriptively adequate, but does not provide an explanation as to why n-words should be ruled by these
constraints. Penka (2002) proposes a syntactic account for the even more restricted distribution of n-words in
German and Dutch, The account does not extend to Romance languages where n-words are not restricted only to
environments containing in the syntax an instance of sentential negation, but appear to be fine whenever such a
negation is present semantically.
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(131) a. I didn't see anybody.
b. Non ho visto nessuno.
This brings us back to Barker and Herburger's argument. Recall that this argument relies
on the assumption that we can actually draw conclusions on the meaning of certain occurrences
of English even on the basis of the meaning of ni siquiera. This assumption however is
unjustified. Notice, in fact that the difference in distribution ni siquiera and the 'easy'
presupposition in English, is the same as that between n-words and any. While the former is
unacceptable in the scope of weakly negative quantifiers, in the restrictor of every and no, in the
scope of only and in the complement of Strawson-Downward Entailing factive predicates, the
latter is triggered by the presence of even in each of these environments:
(132) DE Quantifiers:
a. Less than three students had even a bite.
b. * Meno di tre studenti hanno mangiato neppure un boocone.18
Less then three students have eaten n-also a bite
c. Meno di tre studenti nanno mangiato anche solo un boccone.
Less then three students have eaten n-also a bite
d. * Menos de tres alumnus comieron ni si quiera un pedazo.
Less then three students ate n-even a piece
Anti-additive determiners: 'every' and of 'no'
(133)a. Every linguist who read even Syntactic Structures was hired by a multinational.
b. Ogni linguista che abbia letto *nemmeno/anche solo Syntactic Structures
Every linguist that have:SBJ.3s read n-even/also only Syntactic Structures
e' stato assunto da una multinazionale.
is been hired by a multinational.
c. *Todo alumno que hyciera/haya hecho ni siquiera un poco fue premiado.
Every student who did(subj)/ has done( subj) n-even a bit was prized
18 We include only the Italian examples, but Spanish exhibits exactly the same patterns.
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(134) a. No one who had committed even one crime could fool Sherlock.
b. Nessuno cheaveva / avesse commesso *neppure/anche soloun
No one thathave:PAST.IND/PAST.SUBJ.3s committed n-even/also only one
crimine poteva ingannare Sherlock.
crime could fool Sherlock
c. *Ningun alumno que hyciera/haya hecho ni siquiera un poco fue premiado.
No student who did(subj)/ has done( subj) n-even a bit was prized
(135) If clauses:
a. If Mary noticed even one mistake of yours, it would be a problem
b. Se Maria si accorgesse *nemmeno/ anche solo di tuo un errore, sarebbe un problema.
If Mary noticed n- even/ also only one your mistake, it would be a problem
c. *Si Maria se diera quenta de ni siquiera un error, es un problema.
If Mary noticed(subj) of n-even a mistake, it's a problem
(136) 'Only NP'
a. Only Mary saw even one student.
b. It: *Solo Maria ha visto neppure uno studente.
c. Sp: * S61lo Maria vio a ni si quiera tin estudiante.
Only Mary saw n-even one student
d. It: Solo Maria ha visto anche solo uno studente.
Only Mary saw also only one student
'Only Mary saw even one student'.
Adversative factives: 'be surprised', 'regret', and 'be sorry':
(137) a. I'm susprised that you saw even one student.
b. It.: Mi soprende che ti abbia visto *neppure/l anche solo uno studente.
c. Sp.: *Me sorprenderia que vos viera ni siquiera tin estudiante.
To me surprise(subj) that you seen(subj) n-even one student
(138) a. Maria is sorry/regrets that she bought even one book in that shop.
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b. It. * A Mary spiace di aver comprato *neppure/anche solo un libro in quel
negozio.
c. Sp. * Mary lamenta que
Mary regrets to have have bought n-even/also only one book in that shop.
Finally, and most interestingly, unlike even and auch nur/ anche solo, ni siquiera, and nemmeno
are simply ungrammatical in questions:
(139) a. *Hai preso nemmeno un 5?
b. Hai preso anche solo un 5? Negative bias
(140) a. * Vino ni siqiuera Hector?
b. Vino siqiuera Hector? Negative bias
By analogy with the general difference between n-words and any, it might very well be
the case that also the above differences between ni siquiera and even are due to their different
semantics. Once again, this possibility by itself is sufficient to block any conclusion regarding
the meaning of even that is drawn on the basis of the meaning of ni siquiera.
In conclusion it is not completely clear that Barker and Herburger facts alone really
provide an argument against the scope theory of English even.
4.7 Giannakidou (2003): three evens in Greek.
In the previous I argued that an argument for the ambiguity theory based on the existence of n-
words introducing an 'easy' presupposition is likely to run into empirical problems, as the scope
theory is still needed to account for this presupposition in environments where n-words are
banned. This problem of course would disappear if we could attest the existence of a third type
of polarity expressions with the following three properties: (i) they systematically introduced an
'easy' presupposition, (ii) they were acceptable in the same contexts as NPIs and (3) they could
be proven to always take narrow scope with respect to their licenser.
Giannakidou (2003) claims that such an expression does in fact exist in Greek: esto kan,
which she dubs 'concessive even'.
On the basis of considerations regarding its distribution, she claims that concessive even
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(esto) is semantically distinct from the focus particle introducing a 'hard' presupposition in
affirmative contexts (akomi ke) and from the negative word oute kan introducing an 'easy
presupposition' in anti-veridical contexts.19 The facts that lead Giannakidou to this conclusion
are reported in (141)-(146). (141) shows that, unlike akomi ke but like oute kan, esto is
unacceptable in episodic affirmative sentences.
(141) a. I Maria efaje akomi ke to pagoto.
The Mara ate even the ice cream
'Mary ate even the ice cream'
b. * Maria efaje oute kan to pagoto
The Mara ate even the ice cream
c. * Maria efaje esto to pagoto
The Mara ate even the ice cream
On the other hand, in negative sentences esto patterns like akomi ke; as shown in (142) both
expressions are ungrammatical with negation:
(142) a. ??Maria dhen efaje akomi ke to pagoto.
Mary not ate even the ice cream
b. Maria dhen efaje oute kan to pagoto
Mary not ate even the ice cream
'Mary didn't eat even the ice cream'
c. ??Maria efaje esto to pagoto.
Mary not ate even the ice cream
An exception to the last generalization is the case where esto associates with a superlative, in
such a case it becomes acceptable under negation but it still differs from oute kan in what seems
to be the presupposition it introduces:
19 Roughly, a propositional operator Op is anti-veridical iff it support the following entailment: (Op (p) -->
- p), namely sentential negation without and before (see also Zwarts 1995).
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(143) a. I Maria dhen akouse oute kan #ton paramiki'o thorivo/ ton dinatotero thorivo.
The Mary not heard even # the slightest sound/the loudest sound
b. I Maria dhen akouse esto ton paramikro thorivo/?? ton dinatotero thorivo
In questions esto introduces negative bias, unlike both oute kan, which is imply ungrammatical
in questions, and akomi ke, which is fine but does not trigger bias:
(144) a. Efajes esto to pagoto? Negatively Biased
b. *Efajes oute kan to pagoto?
c. Efajes akomi ke to pagoto? Neutral
Finally, in both antecedent of conditionals and restrictor of universal quantification, esto is
acceptable while oute kan is not. Notice that according to one of my informants akomi ke
patterns exactly like esto in this case, and it is even preferred in this environment.
(145) a. An diavasis esto ke tus Chicago Sun Times, kati tha mathis
If (you) read even the Chicago Sun Times, you will learn something.
b. *An diavasis oute kan tus Chicago Sun Times, kati tha mathis
c. An diavasis akomi ke tus Chicago Sun Time, kati tha mathis.
If (you) read even the Chicago Sun Times, you will learn something.
(146) a. Kather estiatorio pu xreoni esto/akomi ke mia draxmi ja ena potiri nero, xriazete kalo
Every restaurant that charges even one drakma for a glass of water, needs a good
mathima apo tin eforia. Easy
Lesson from the IRS.
b. *Kather estiatorio pu xreoni oute kan mia draxmi ja ena potiri nero, xriazete kalo
Every restaurant that charges evena drakam for a glass of water, needs a good
mathima apo tin eforia.
Lesson for the IRS.
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On the basis of these facts Giannakidou draws the two following conclusions: (i) the
three items in Greek are semantically distinct form each other and therefore (ii) English even is
three ways ambiguous between a Positive Polarity, a Negative Polarity and a Concessive lexical
entry as well. The PPI even has the meaning of normal (i.e. K&Ps) even and corresponds to
akomi ke:
(147) I[akomi keJ(C)(p)=[ even ]](C)(p)i.e. it is defined iff
(i) p is the least likely
(ii) there is some true qe C and q : p
'Hard' Scalar Presupposition
Existential Presupposition
The NPI even is claimed to be equivalent to Rooth's NPI even, and is realized in Geek as the n-
word oute kan:20
(148) [ oute kan]](CXp)is defined iff
(i) p is the MOST likely
(ii) there no true q EC ans q : p
'Easy' Scalar Presupposition
Negative Existential Presupposition
Finally, the concessive even is claimed to be a mix between the two in that it carries a
'hard' scalar presupposition, like akomi ke, but a negative existential presupposition, like oute
kan, and is claimed to be equivalent to esto (ke)
(149) I esto ke](C)(p)=f[ even JI(C) (p) is defined iff
(i) p is the least expected
(ii) there is some true other q : p
'Hard' Scalar Presupposition
Existential Presupposition
I have two main objections towards Giannakidou's proposal. The first concerns the claim
that, the different distribution of the three particles above follows from their presuppositions as
20 Contrary to Giannakidou's claim this item is not equivalent to Rooth's evenNp,. In fact the latter carries the weaker
existential presupposition that there is some alternative q to pre that is false. Interestingly, the negative
presupposition of oute kan is the exclusive presupposition of nur2.
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given above. The second has to do with the claim that esto has the meaning given above and at
the same time it is obligatorily interpreted with narrow scope.
Let's start with the first objection. Consider the facts in (141) and (142) repeated here:
(150) a. * Maria efaje oute kan to pagoto
b. * Maria efaje esto to pagoto
(151) a. ??Maria dhen efaje akomi ke to pagoto.
c. ??Maria dehn efaje esto to pagoto.
According to the lexical entries above, (150) and a. and (150)b both assert that Mary ate ice
cream (i.e. (152)a) and presuppose (152)c, in addition (150) a presupposes (152)b and (150)b
presupposes (152)b':
(152) a. Mary ate the ice cream.
b. The ice cream was the most likely thing for Mary to eat.
b'. The ice cream was the least likely thing for Mary to eat.
c. Mary didn't eat anything different form the ice cream
As for the cases in (151), both (151)a and b assert (153) and presuppose (153) b; and in addition
(151)a presupposes (153)c, and (151) b presupposes (153) c'.
(153) a. Mary didn't eat the ice cream.
b. The ice cream was the most likely thing for Mary to eat.
c. Mary ate something else besides the ice cream.
c'. Mary didn't eat anything different form the ice cream.
There is nothing odd about the combination of the assertion and presuppositions of any of the
sentences above. One can very well imagine contexts where Mary ate the ice cream and nothing
else and where it was more likely that she would eat it rather than anything else, or that she ate
the ice cream nothing else and that that the ice cream was the least expected choice...and so on.
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To be more concrete let see this for the sentences with esto. Recall that esto is claimed to be
unacceptable both in negative sentences and in plain affirmative sentences. Let's consider what
the assertion and the presuppositions would be in these environments, according to the lexical
entry in (149) above. The two sentences in (154)a and b have the same set of presuppositions(i.e.
those given in (154)c), because negation is a hole, but the former asserts that Mary ate the ice
cream while the latter asserts that she didn't:
(154) a. * Maria efaje esto to pagoto
The Maria ate even the ice-cream
Assertion: Mary ate the ice-cream.
b. * Maria dhen efaje esto to pagoto.
The Mara not ate even the ice-cream
Assertion: Mary didn't eat the ice-cream.
c. Scalar Presupposition: The ice-cream was the least expected food choice for Mary
Negative Existential Presupposition: Mary didn't eat anything besides ice-cream.
Let's consider assertions and presuppositions of (154)a first. There is nothing wrong with this
combination. In fact we can easily thing about contexts in which the sentence is felicitous and
true, i.e. any context where Mary indeed eat ice-cream and nothing else and that she ate ice-
cream rather than something else is most surprising. One can well imagine a context like this.
Suppose, e.g., that Mary ate ice-cream and that speaker and addressee know this. In addition they
both know she actually really dislike ice cream. However she had her wisdom tooth removed and
the dentist told her that she can eat only ice-cream for two days, but speaker an addressee do not
know about this, all they know is that she had nothing like ice cream all night and they are very
surprised. Given this, the presuppositions of esto do not by themselves ban this particle from
plain episodic affirmative sentences.
Let's turn now to (154)b. This sentence would be predicted to be felicitous an true in any
contexts in which Mary didn't eat the ice-cream and actually didn't eat anything else, and
moreover the ice-cream was the food that we least expected Mary to eat. This sentence, given
what is already presupposed, makes a weird but not incoherent contribution. In fact, it says that
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the most expected think happened although we already knew that less expected things on the
same scale had happened. Still, we can imagine contexts where uttering such a sentence would
make perfectly sense. For example B's response in (155) is such a case.
(155) A: We all saw that Mary didn't eat the pasta and the meet, and also she didn't eat the
salad, although she loves all this stuff so much...and since she hates ice cream the most, I
wonder whether she eat that.
B: Right, she didn't eat the ice-cream either.
In conclusion, the presuppositions Giannakidou attributes to esto do not derive its
unacceptability in negative sentences either.
Giannakidou's analysis of this particle is problematic in another more crucial respect: the
lexical entry of esto does not account for the presuppositions it actually triggers, unless it scopes
outside of a DE expression. Consider once more the case of conditionals and universal
quantifiers, repeated below. If esto did actually introduce the same scalar presupposition as
akomi ke (i.e. a 'hard presupposition) and was, as claimed, interpreted inside the if-clause in
(156)a. and inside the restrictor of the universal quantifier in (157)a., then the predicted
presuppositions of the entire sentences would be 'hard' presuppositions (i.e. (156) c and (157)c,
respectively). However the sentences are described by Giannakidou as rather carrying 'easy'
presuppositions, like (156)b and (157)b:
(156) a. An diavasis esto ke tus Chicago Sun Times, kati tha mathis easy
If (you) read even the Chicago Sun Times, you will learn something.
b. Actual Presuppostion: For all the relevant alternatives x to the CST, reading the CST
and learn something is the less expected than reading x and
learning something;
c. Predicted Presupposition: For all the relevant alternatives x to the CST, reading the
CST is less expected than reading x.
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(157) a. Kather estiatorio pu xreoni esto ke mia draxmi ja ena potiri nero, xriazete kalo
Every restaurant that charges even a drakma for a glass of water, needs a good
mathima apo tin eforia.
Lesson for the IRS.
b. Actual Presupposition: For every amount of money bigger than a drakma, it is less
expected that every restaurant that charges even a drakma for
a glass of water, needs a good lesson for the IRS than that
Every restaurant that charges x for a glass of water, needs a
good lesson for the IRS.
c. Predicted Presupposition (???): For every x and for every amount of money y bigger
than a drakma, that x charges a drakma for a glass of water is
less likely than that x charges y for a glass of water.
In fact, here is how Giannakidou describes the scalar presuppositions of (156):
(158) Vx [ x # CST -)S-expectation (reading x and learning something > reading the CST and
learning something)]
Notice that (158) is equivalent to (156)b, and not to (156), contrary to what we would predict if
we applied Giannakidou's analysis. Notice, in fact that in order for material in the matrix close
(i.e. 'learning something' in the above example) to be contributing to the presupposition of esto,
the particle must take scope over the whole conditional, an option that Giannakidou argues
against.
The analysis runs into a similar problem when questions are considered. Recall, indeed
that questions with esto are negatively biased:
(159) a. Efajes esto to pagoto? Negative Bias
In addition to this, according to my informants, the presence of esto induces the 'easy'
presupposition that the addressee eating ice cream is MORE expected than the addressee eating
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anything else. Once again, the lexical entry for esto which by itself introduces a hard
presupposition instead, cannot account for this presupposition, unless esto scopes over the trace
of whether.
Given all this for the analysis to be coherent, either of the two following claims must be
dropped: that esto takes local scope or that it directly introduces a scalar 'hard' presupposition.
Obviously the first option is preferable, because not only it accounts correctly for the
presuppositions in the above examples but also it would derive the bias of esto in questions
straightforwardly.
In any event, the conclusion is Greek fails to provide any new compelling evidence in
favor of an ambiguity hypothesis.
4. 8 Conclusions
In this chapter I discussed three different pieces of evidence that have been argued in the
literature to support Rooth's ambiguity theory of English even. The first comes form German,
Dutch and Italian where the combination of an exclusive particle with an additive one results in
an NPI introducing an 'easy' presupposition. Specifically I suggested that the ambiguity is not
one of even, but one of nur: this focus particle is underspecified with respect to what it asserts
and what it presupposes. I have shown that one can find cross-linguistic support to this claim as
well. A compositional analysis of the sort proposed here has proven to have the important
advantages over an analysis that takes auch nur and its Dutch and Italian variants to be
unanalyzable idioms with the same meaning as Rooth's evenNpl First it accounts for the NPI-like
behavior of auch nur, second it explain why the three languages under consideration all exploit
the same combination of ALSO and ONLY to achieve the result of even under negation.
This proposal opens a number of interesting questions. One question is to what extent an
un-specified meaning can be extended to English only. A second question regards the
distribution of the two possible meanings for only in different languages. Why is only2 in Samish
just dependent from negation, but it is restricted to environments where it co-occurs with auch in
German, Italian and Dutch?
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Secondly, I considered expressions that belong to the n-words paradigm and argued.that
it is unclear whether we can draw conclusions on the meaning of even from the meaning of these
expressions.
Finally I focused on 'concessive' even in Greek and I have suggested that actually for this
item as well an analysis in terms of scope would not only be possible, but would probably be
preferable.
Given these considerations, my conclusions are that, at the moment, there Feems to be no
strong cross linguistic evidence supporting an ambiguity of even. If anything, there is cross-
linguistic evidence undermining it.
224
Appendix
Chapter 1
(1) DEFINITION: A set P is a partition on W iff:
(i) P -P (W)
& (ii) For any we W, 3pe P & we p (jointly exhaustive in W)
& (iii) For any we W, Vp, p' e P [we p & we p'] then p=p' (mutually exclusivein W)
(2) DEFINITION: A relation R is an equivalence relat'on in W iff:
(i) R cW X W (R is a relation between elements of W)
& (ii) Vw e W, wRw (R is reflexive in W)
& (iii) Vw,w' e W, if wRw' then w'Rw (R is symmetric in W)
& (iv) Vw,w',w", if wRw' & w'Rw" then wRw" (R is transitive in W)
(3) ABBREVIATIONS:
PARTw = {p _ P (W) : p is a partition }
Ew = { R c W X W: R is an equivalence relation }
(4) THEOREM:
There is a one to one correspondence between PARTw and and Ew.
PROOF
Let h be a function from PARTw to !P(W X W) s.t.
Vpart e PARTw, h( part) = { <w, w'>: 3p e part & w ep & w'e p)
h is a one to one correspondence iff
A. image (h) g Ew
B h is one to one
C. h is onto Ew
PROOF of A:
A holds iff V part e PARTw
(i) h (part) is reflexive
(ii) h (part) is symmetric
(iii) h (part) is transitive.
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(D')
PROOF of (i):
1. 3w [ w e W & <w,w> o h (part)] (per absurdum)
2. 3 w [ w E W & - 3p e part [ we p]] (from 1 and D' above)
3. Vw [ we W - 3p e part [ we p]] (from exhaustivity of part)
==> V part e PARTw h(part) is reflexive
PROOF of (ii):
1. Vw,w'e W [<w,w'>e h(part) <-> 3pe part [we p & we p']] (from D')
2. VW,W'e W [<w,w'>e h(part) <-> 3pe part [w'E p & we p]] (from 1)
3. Vw,w'eW [<w,w'>e h(part) <-> <w',w> e h(part)]] (from 2 and D')
==> V part e PARTw h(part) is symmetrical
PROOF of (iii):
1. V w,w', w" [<w,w'>, <w',w'>e h(part)<->3p[w, w',w"e p]]
(from D and exhaustivity of part)
2. V w,w',w"[[<w,w'>, <w',w'>e h(part)-- <w,w">e h(part)]] (from D)
==> V part e PARTw h(part) is transitive
==> h is into Ew
PROOF of B:
B holds iff
VR, R'E E Vpart, part'e PARTw [R OR' & h(part)=R & h(part')=R' -) part* part']
1. V RE Ew V parte PARTw [ h(part)=R -4 R ={<w, w'>: 3p e part & w ep & w'e p}](from D)
2. VR, R' [ R # R' <-> 3<w,w'> [<w,w'>e R <-> <w,w'>e R']
3. VR, R' V part, part' e PARTw [R #R' & h(part)=R & h(part')=R'-- 3<w,w'>
4. [3pe part & w ep &w'E p]<-> - [ 3pe part' & w ep &w'E p]].
5.VR, R' Vpart, part'e PARTw[R #R'& h(part)=R & h(part')=R'4- 3p[pE part <-> pe par']
==> VR, R'eEw V part, part' e PARTw [R AR' & h(part)=R & h(part')=R' -- part t part']
==> h is 'one to one'
PROOF of C:
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C holds iff V Re Ew 3 part e PARTw & h(part)= R
V REEw let partR be s.t. partR = {p: 3we W & p= {w: w R w } }
1. part e PARTw is (i) jointly exhaustive and (ii)mutually exclusive
PROOF of (i)(per absurdum):
1. 3w W [-3p e f(R) & we p]
2. 3 w EW [-3w' s.t. wRw']
3. - (wRw)
4. Vw [w E W -wRw]
==> VR Ew, f(R) isjointly exhaustive
==> VR E E,, f(R) is jointly exhaustive
(negation of (i))
(from 1 and D above)
(1 and 2)
(from PR1 above)
PROOF of (ii)(per absurdum):
1. 3 wE W, 3 p, p'e f(R) [ we p & w Ep'& p #p'] (negation of (ii))
3. Vp[pe P(W)&p# p'- 3w'e W[we p&wO p']
4. 3 w, w', p,p' [ we p & weP' & w'e p & w' p'] (from 2 and 3)
5. V w, w'E W, PE f(R)[ (w' e p & w'e p) <-> wRw'] (from D above)
6. 3 w, w' [ wRw'& w'E p & - wRw'] (from 4,5)
I
==> VR [RE Ew-- partR E PARRTw]
2. VR[Re Ew - h(PartR)= R]
1. V Re Ew 3 [h(partR)= (from 1 and definition of h)
{<w,w'>: 3 pe {q: 3w & p={w':w R w} }& we p& w'ep)
3. V R [h(partR) ={<w,w'>: wRw' }= R]
4. V REEw [h(partR)= R]
(from 1 and 2)V Re Ew 3 part e PARTw & h(part)= R
==> h is 'onto' Ew
there is a one to one correspondence between Partw and Ew
QED
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Chapter 2
Relevant lexical entries
* [[even ]h = Xp: V q C [q ý p q >LIKELY p ]. p(w)=1
"* [whether ] = Xf<<t,t>, t>. 3h <t,t> [ h= ,t.t v h=Xt.t=0 ] & f(h) =1
* [[?.]= p.{p}
* [[who ]= p <,,>. 3x [person(x) & P(x)]
type of [f who]J - <<e,t>, t > quantifies over entities of type e
type of if whether 1]] <<tt, t>,t> quantifies over entities of type <t,t>
Abbreviations
FA = Function Application (Heim & Kratzer 1998)
X-a = X-abstraction rule (from Heim and Kratzer 1998 but generalized to traces of type # e)
IFA = Intensional Function Application (Heim & Kratzer 1998)
p >LIKELYw q = given a set of relevant facts in w, p is more likely than q
K= Karttunen's Wh-quantification, but generalized:
Wh-quantifying Rule (generalized):
If a has daughters 3 and y, where
[[3 ]J is type <<a,t> t> and [Iy ]] is type <a,<st,t>>, then for every world w and assignment g:
[[l ]]",g = { p: 1 ]"',g ( [x a. PE •lY ]W'g (x)) =1}
IFA*:
Itensional Function Application revised (IFA*):
If a is a branching node and {30, y} the set of its daughters then for any possible
world w and assignment function g, a e dom ( [] W, g ) iff PE dom( [[1] w, g) and if
[131] w, g is a function whose domain contains Xw': y e dom( [r1 "' g) . WI) ", g
then [[al w, " = IPI "'g (Xw': yE dom ( []j w',g) . [[yiW'g)
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Computation of the meaning of example (32) on p.72 Did Mary arrive ?
{that Mary arrived, that Mary didn't arrive)
Whether Jf <~,.{ Xw. f ([[Mary arrived ]] W)=l)
1 {Xw. g(l) (i[ Mary arrived I ')=1 }
Q [ft[ I g ([ Mary arrived ]l )= g(1) (f1 Mary arrived] )
ti. < Mtary arrived
For every world w and assignment function g
If whether ] ( i[ 1. Q tl Mary arrived w,'g) =
{p: 3 h <t,>[ h= t.t v h=Xt.t-O ] & p E 1. Q tl Mary arrived "'g (h)} =
{p: 3 h <t,t> [ h= t.t v h=Xt.t=0 ] & p e [Xf<~t>. I? ](f [tl Mary arrived wIj. 'gs f/)] (h)}=
{p: 3 h <. [ h= Xt.t v h=Xt.t-0] & p e [Xf<t,, Xw. f{ ( f Mary arrived]i` ' [ f/ni) =1)] (h)} =
{p: 3 h <t, [ h= Xt.t v h=Xt.t=0 ] & p E { Xw. h ( [[Mary arrived]w) =1 }=
Since there are only two possible values for h:
{p: p = Xw. [Xt.t]( [f Mary arrived ]m )= 1 or p= Xw. [Xt.t-0O] ( [iMary arrivedJw)= 1}}=
{p p = that Mary arrived or p = that Mary didn't arrive}
{that Mary arrived, that Mary didn't arrive) Hamblin-set
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I Computations of the meanings of Did Kim even solve Problem 2, (34)a and (34)b on p. 74
Abbreviations
p = that Kim solved problem 2
For every world w and assignment function g:
{ w. AFF(I even I w(C)(p))=l, Xw. -,([f even w (C)(p))=l 1 by K
Whether Xf<t, .{ w. f (if even ] • (C)(p))=1 } by X-a
1 { w. g(l)(Qleven ]W (C)(p)) =1) by IFA
9 g()(f even ]I)(C)(p)) by FA
tl.<t.t> even ]]w (C)(p) byFA
even C =1 iff Kim solved Problem 2
Kim solved [Problem 2]f
I{w. AFF([[ even ] w(C)(p))=1 , ,w. -- (if even ] w(C)(p))=1} =
{Iw. Vq EC [q # That Kim Solved Pr.2 -> q> LI,ELy That Kim solved Pr.2 in w ] .Kim solved
Problem 2 in w, Xw. Vq E C [q = That Kim Solved Pr.2 -> q> LELYW That Kim Solved Pr.2in w].
Kim didn't solve Problem 2 in w}
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--
For every world w and assignment function g:
{Jw. Ifeven]'(C)(Xw':AFF (lK solved pr. 2]w )=1)=1, Xw. [even](C)(Xw'. - (I[Kim solved P21'w )=1)=1}
Whether • <t. { ~w. f even] "(C) (Xw'. f (f[Kim solved Problem 2 1]' ) =1)=1} by X-;
1 {Xw. I[even] w(C)(Xw'. (g(l)) (f Kim solved Problem 2 ] w" )=1)=1} by IF/
Q even (C)(w'. (g(l)) ( I[Kim solved Problem 21w ) =1) by IF/
even C g(l) ( I Kim solved Problem 2 ] ) by F/
tl. <t.t> Kim solved Problem 2
{Xw. i[even ] "(C) (that Kim solved Problem 2)=1, Xw. Ifeven J(C)(Xw'. (I[Kim solved Pr. 2 ] w )=0 )=1
(Xw. f even ]]"(C)(that Kim solved Problem 2)=1, Xw. f even 1]w (C)(that K. didn't solve Problem 2)=1
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I Y/n questions with even in partition semantics (ft. note # 12)
cLF1:
ff even]" (C)(that Mary solved Problem 2)
even C =1 iff Mary solved Problem 2
Mary solved [Problem 2]f
c3LF2:
a•.w.1w'. [Xw". M. solved Pr2 in w"](w)= [w"M.solved Pr2 in w"](w')
Even
? =1 iff Mary solved Problem 2
Mary solved [Problem 2]f
[I? ]]= aP<st,. Xw.Xw': w and w' e dom (P). P (w) = P(w')
In order to interpret LF2 we do need a type shifted lexical entry for 'partition taking' even in
questions:
For every possible world w:
IevenQ ]J ( f<s.s,) = Xw. Xw': w & w'E dom (Xw' fIeven]"'(f(w'))). 1[even]l"'(f(w'))
Intuitively, here is what this even does:
l[evenQ ]Jw
That nobody came
That Bill and nobody else came
That B. & S. & nobody else came
That B., S., M. & no one else came
That every student came
C
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For every w e c
*Meaning of LF1:
For every possible world w:
0
•• even]D (C)(that Mary solved Problem 2)
even C =1 iff Mary solved Problem 2
Mary solved [Problem 2]f
lelw =
Xw.Xw': VqeC [ q # thatM. solved P2 q > LIKELYW That M solved Pr. 2 & q > LIKELYW' That M
solved Pr. 2] . Mary solved Pr2 in w iff Mary solved Problem 2 in w'
Only if in all the worlds in the context set it is less likely for Mary to solve problem 2 than to
solve other problems the above relation is always defined and therefore, the question is felicitous
(see Ch.1). Therefore LF I1 presupposes HardP.
rMeaning of LF2:
0
-' Xw)Aw'. [Xw". M. solved Pi2 in w"](w)= [w"M.solved Pr2 in w'l(w')
EvenQ
=1 iff Mary solved Problem 2
Mary solved [Problem 2]f
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[[evenh]w(That nobody came)
[Ieven]W (That Bill and nobody else came)
[[evenh]w (That B. & S. & nobody else came)
I[even]w (That every student came)
0011 = ~w. Xw': w' e dom(Xw" [even]l" ' (Xw'. M. solved Pr2 in w' iff M.solved Pr2 in w)).
M solved Problem 2 in w' iff Mary solved Problem 2 in w".
For every w
[I1 (w) is defined iff
Vx [ x P2-- (Xw'. M.solvd x in w' iffM.sold x in w) >iKELYW (Xw'. MsolvedP2 in w' iffMsdoWdP2in w')]
if defined then II[Ol = (Xw'. M. solved Pr2 in w' iff M. solved Pr2 in w)
Presuppositions of the Possible Answers:
For every w e c
Fyes]Iw is defined iff Vx [ x 4 P2- (Xw'. M. solved x in w') >LIKELYw (Xw'. M. solved Pr2 in w') HardP
I[no] w is defined iff Vx [x # P2- (w'. Mdidn'tsolve xinw') >Lmw (Xw'. M.didn'tsolveP2inw') EasyP
If c entails w that Pr 2 is the easiest for Mary, the question is negatively biased
If c entails that Pr2 is the hardest for Mary, the question is neutral
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Chapter 3
Computation of the meanings of who even solved Problem 2, (24)b and (24)c, p.132.
rLF1: 0
Whetl
t l ,e solved Problem 2
b. Abbreviations: p= that g (1) solved Problem 2, prs. =person, P2 = Problem 2
C.
For every world w and assignment function g:
[[ 1 ] 'g  = [jsolved Pr2j](g(1)) by FA
f[ ]"'.g = I[ even] w (C)(p) is defined iff p is the least likely proposition in C.
If defined, then If evenll W (C)(p)= 1 iff (g(1)) solved problem 2 by IFA
1[[O"w 'g  = g(2)([[ even ]jw(C)(p)) defined iff p is the least likely proposition in C.
if defined then = g(2)([[evenI]](C)(p)) =1 ff g(2) ([[solved P2](g(1)) =1 by FA
[O l"W'g  = {Jw: p is the least likelyw proposition in C. g (2 ) ( [ e ven j w(C ) (p ) )= 1} by IFA*
1[ j ]1W'g = Xxe. {Iw: that x solved P2is the least likely in C. g(2X [even]"(C)(thatx solved P2)) =1 }
[[o ]w, = {q: 3x [prs.(x) & q= Xw: hardP. g(2)([[evenjl (C)(that x solved P2))=1] } by K
1[ 0 ] "'g = Af<t, {Iq : 3xe [ prs(x) & q= Xw: hardP f([[even] w (C)(that x solved P2))=I] }By X-a
[[f ]J'g = By K
{ q: 3xe3h<tt, [prs.(x) & (h E { AFF,-, } & q = Xw: hardP. h([[evenl]"(C)(that x solved P2))=1] }
{p: 3xe [prs.(x) & ( p= Xw: hardP. AFF([[evenll w(C)(that x solved P2))=l
v p =Xw: hardP -n (if evenl] W(C) (that x solved P2)) =1)]}
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WLF2:
Whetl
tl,e solved Problem 2
Abbreviation: P2= solved Problem 2
For every world w and assignment function g:
[I ]wg = [ P2 • (g(1)) by FA
1f ]w"g = g(2) ([P2 ]w (g(1))) by FA
i ]w".g = ifeven]]w (C)(Xw'. g(2) ([ P2 I]w'(g(1))=1) by IFA
[@ ]1'wg = {jw: (Xw'. g(2) (f P2]"'(g(1))=1) in the least likely in C.
i[even]j w (C)(Xw'. g(2) ([f P2]jw'(g(1))=1)=1 } by IFA*
[fO 11wg = Xxe. {Xw: (Xw': g(2) (f P2]W'(g(1))=1) in the least likely in C.
if even ]]w(C)(Xw'. g(2) ([f P2]jW'(x))=1)=1) I by X-a
[O]] w'g = [Iwho] (Xxe. { Xw: (Xw'. g(2) ([ P2]]W'(g(1))=l) in the least likely in C.
f even ]]w(C)(Xw'. g(2) (f P2]•" ' (x))=1 )=1 }) by K
= {p: 3x [prs(x) & p= Xw: (Xw'. g(2) (f P2]w"'(g(1))=1) in the least likely in C.
f even I"w(C)(Xw. g(2) (if P21]"'(x))=1)= l]
[f0 ]wig = Xf . {p: 3x [prs (x) & p= Xw: (Xkw'. g(2) (f P2]jw'(g(1))=1) in the least likely in C.
[f even ]w(C)(Xw'. f (f P2]W"'(x))=1)=l] by X-a
101o wg = i[whether ] ([ 0 ]jD by K
= {p: 3xe, f<t, [prs(x) & f E {AFF, --}& p=,w: (Xw'. f (f P21]W'(g(1))=1) in the least likely in C.
i[ evenl]W(C)(Xw. f ([f P2]w (x))=1) =1]
{p: 3x [pr (x) & [(p = Xw: V q E C [q >LIKELYW (W'. f P21]] w(x)=l)]. [ P2]]w (x)=1)
v (p = Xw: V q e C [q >LIKELYW (•W'. i[P2] W'(x) = 0)]. [f P2 I W(x)= 0)]] }
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{p: 3x [person (x)) & [(p = ,w: V q E C [q > KELYW That x solved Pr. 2]. x solved Pr2 in w)
or (p = Xw: VqeC [q > uKvw That xdidn't solve Pr.2]. x didn't solve Pr2)]] }
Equivalence of the de re readings of (whether) which student called and (whether) which student
called:
[[(whether) which student didn't call ] =
{p:3x[[[student] (x)=1& (p= Xw'. AFF( [not-'([[callr'(x)))=l)vp=-w'.x ([[notlf'([[callr'(x))) = 1)]}
{p: 3x [ [[student] (x)= 1& (p= that x didn't call v p = that it is not the case that x didn't cal)] }=
{p: 3x [ [ student w] (x)= 1& (p = that x called or p = that x didn't call)] }=
{p: 3x [[fitudent] (x)= 1 & (p= w'. AFF (f[ called lw'(x)) = 1)vp=Xw'.-- (1[ called f'(x) = 1] }=
[[(whether) which student called I]
Equivalence of G&S's de re readings of which student called and which student call:
([ which students called ](w) =
{ w': Xx. x is a student in w & x called in w= Xx. x is a student in w & called in w' } de re
A n B = A n C
AnB=AnC iff An B=An C
AnB= AnC iff (AnB) =(AnC)
(An B) = (An C) iff An (An B) = An (An C)
An (An B) = An (An C) iff {x:xeA&(xe Avxe B))={x:xEA&(xe Avxe C)}
{x:xeA&(x Av x B)} = {x: xA&(xe Avxe C)})iff{x:xeA&xe B } = {x:xeA&vx C
{x:xeA&xe B)={x:xeA&vxe C}iff An B=An C
Therefore: AnB=AnC iff An B=An C
By substituting A, B and C:
{w': Xx. x is a student in w & x called in w= Xx. x is a student in w & called in w' } =
{w': [[ studentl w n I[ didn't call ]r = [[ student.]W n [[ didn't call ]r }=
{w': Xx. x is a student in w & x didn't call in w= Xx. x is a student in w & didn't callin w' } =
= [[ which students didn't call l (w)
QED
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I Distinctness of G&S's de dicto readings of which student called and which student call
[ which students called 1(w) =
{w': Xx. x is a student in w & x called in w= Xx. x is a student in w & called in w'} (1)
*b *r *
= D n C
I[ which students didn't call ](w) =
{w': x. - (x is a student in w & x called in w)= x. - (x is a student in w'
+ *,
A n B
& x called in w')} (2)
n C
Suppose that (An B) = (Dn C)
Then (An B) = (Dn C)
Thus
{x:xe Aorxe B)}={x:x e Dor xe C)} iff
this is compatible with there being an x which belongs to A and to the complement of B, but not
to the intersection of D with the complement of C, (for example where D is a superset of A).
Given this the set in (1) is not identical to the set in (2)
QED.
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de dicto
de dicto
Wh-questions with unbalanced presuppositions in G&S system
LF:
0
" X w.w'. Xx. w is a person and solved P2 in w --=x. .x is a person and solved P2 in w'
Even
Xx. x is a person and x solved problem 2
who solved [Problem 2]f
l[O1 = Xw. I[even]" (kw'. Ax. w is a person and solved P2 in w =kx.. x is a person and solved P2 in w')
For every w:
[[O1 (w) is defined iff for every x, s.t. 2• Pr2
(Xw'. Ax. w is a person and solved y in w --x. . x is a person and solved y in w') >LIKELY w  w'. Xx. w is a
person and solved P2 in w =x.x. x is a person and solved P2 in w')
If defined, then [[0 ] (w) =(Xw'. Xx. w is a person and solved P2 in w -Xx. .x is a person and solved P2 in
w')
In every w where the problem was the most likely for everybody to solve, any answer entailing
that someone solved the problem contradicts its own presuppositions. This is so because for any
arbitrary individual or set of individuals X the following is false in such a world:
Vy, s.t. y *Pr2
(Xw'. X solved y in w') >LIKELYw (w'. X solved P2 in w')
Given this the only felicitous answer to this question in such a world is the following:
Xw'. Vx [Xx. x is a person and solved Problem 2 in w'](x)=O
239
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